

MICRONESIA
AND STRATEGIC TRUSTEESHIP: A CASE
STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS

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A CASE STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Let the soldier give way to the civilian.
(Cedant arma togae.)

Cicero: Orationes
Philippicae, c. 60 B.C.

In all cases the military should be under
strict subordination to and governed by
the civil power.

Virginia Declaration of
Rights June 12, 1776

Policy is the intelligent faculty, war
only the instrument, not the reverse. The
subordination of the military view to the
political is, therefore, the only thing
possible.

Clausewitz: On War, 1832

In its proper manifestation the jealousy
between civil and military spirits is a
healthy symptom.

Mahan: Naval Administra-
tion and Warfare, 1903

I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual
word of mine, reflecting the tone which was
once so traditional in the Navy ... that
"political questions belong rather to the
statesman than to the military man." I
find these words in my old lectures, but
I very soon learned better.

Mahan: Naval Strategy,
1911

The Party commands the gun; the gun will
never command the Party.

Mao Tse-tung

There are some militarists who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 1937

Both the Army and Navy are aware that they are not the makers of policy but they have a responsibility to define to the makers of policy what they believe are the military necessities of the United States.... The United States must have the means with which to implement its responsibilities.... Those that hate war must have the power to prevent it.

James V. Forrestal
April 17, 1945

When I say that officers today must go far beyond the official curriculum, I say it, not because I do not believe in the traditional relationship between the civilian and the military, but you must be more than the servants of national policy. You must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development of national policy.

John F. Kennedy: To the graduating class, U. S. Naval Academy, June 1961

PREFACE

A historical case study of the development within the American government of a policy decision concerning the disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands in the Central Pacific after American forces had captured them during World War II provides insights into many diverse areas of interest. It traces the development of American civil-military coordination during a period of rapid innovation and change.

The problem of the disposition of the mandated islands helped to develop an awareness of the need for coordination between the State Department and the military. While current civil-military relations are much more complex, formal, and effective than during the Second World War, the basic groundwork and principles were developed during the period this problem was under active and controversial consideration. For example, the first permanent inter-departmental machinery (SWNCC) using an agenda and secretariat support was created during this time frame. This was the direct ancestor of the National Security Council. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, for coordination within the military system, was also created during this time.

The topic also illuminates the wartime methods of making and carrying out of foreign policy decisions.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's personality looms large throughout the issue. His personal style of leadership and administration made possible the inter-agency debate and maneuvering over the issue. His anti-imperialism helped create the issue.

Because of the low state of social, economic, and political development of the islanders, self-government or independence was not a feasible solution at the end of the Second World War. The feasible alternatives covered the spectrum from: (1) annexation, (2) a trusteeship granting a sole administrator exclusive military rights, (3) a trusteeship under condominium administration, (4) the administration by an agency of the universal international organization or by a regional council, and (5) direct administration by the universal international organization. Some decision had to be reached; and the United States, as the conqueror of the islands and as the primary power of the victorious partners, had the responsibility to make it.

The issue was a clear case of conflicting concepts about the correct way to achieve world peace and security. The "one-worlders," whether it was President Roosevelt with his internationally administered bases; or Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, and Harold Ickes with their rapid independence for all dependent people under the aid of a powerful world organization, felt the only way to achieve world peace after the Second World War would be by great-power collaboration and the development of a strong international organization. They desired to set an example for the rest of the

world by gaining no territorial advantage as a result of the war and by submitting the former Japanese mandated islands to the international organization as a trust territory.

The military, on the other hand, had quite a different concept of the means for achieving world peace. With American national security involved, the military could not bring themselves to rely on an untested international organization. They had seen how Japan had fortified the Pacific Islands contrary to the mandate agreement, they had seen the failure of the League of Nations, and they could see the weakness of relying completely on such a fragile thing as great-power collaboration in the maintenance of international peace and security. They would be willing to give an international organization a chance but not at the cost of any impairment to American national security.

If the United States was to be expected to maintain international peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area after the war, the military believed it should have the means with which to exercise its authority--namely control of the strategically located islands. If an effective international organization developed some day in the future, when it had proved effective--then, some American security responsibilities could be gradually shifted over to the shoulders of the organization. Too many American men were being killed capturing these islands while this inter-agency debate was proceeding for the military to easily give up their convictions on this particular issue. The military saw themselves as the

pragmatists--the realists. To them, the "one worlders" were the idealists--the dreamers.

On this issue, the military position was generally supported by the Congress, American public opinion, and the colonial powers, i.e., Britain, France, Australia, and The Netherlands.

The clash of the two concepts occurred most clearly over this issue, although it permeated other contemporaneous issues. The final product of this conflict bore no resemblance to either side's original position. This is an unfortunate result for neither concept of the correct path to world peace was followed. As a result of this issue, the international organization was weakened in the field of trusteeship. Distrust and suspicion developed. Other nations and aspiring peoples saw the resultant strategic concept for what it was--thinly disguised annexation; and the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter were never used as an intermediate step toward independence for emerging states. Other channels were utilized to gain political aspirations, and "independence" became the only "respectful" solution. On the other side, the United States did not annex the islands. If it had, the question of their future political status would have been settled once and for all; and, at least, American security interests in the area would have been indefinitely guaranteed.

Research into this topic has produced insights into areas of interest other than civil-military relations and the formulation of American foreign policy during the Second

World War or various concepts of achieving world peace. From a purely historical point of view, much has been learned about the islands themselves, the evolution of American civil-military relations since the Revolutionary War, and the development of the United Nations Charter--specifically its trusteeship provisions. This topic is also of interest and value because of the individuals involved. The world situation in which we now live was mainly determined during that period of time and by those individuals. American leaders such as Roosevelt, Truman, Hull, Stettinius, Byrnes, Forrestal, Stimson, Leahy, King, Marshall, Welles, and Ickes were vitally involved in this issue. "Working level" men such as Leo Pasvolsky, Alger Hiss, James C. Dunn, Benjamin Gerig, John J. McCloy, Abe Fortas, and Captain Robert L. Dennison were participants. Other "actors" were Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Stalin, Senator Vandenberg, and Harold Stassen. Furthermore, the war-time conferences of Cairo, Teheran, Moscow, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam included discussions of this issue.

This issue includes questions of the proper role of the military in a democracy on the formulation and determination of foreign policy. The assumption is made that military aspects and consequences of foreign policy options should be considered along with the political, domestic, and other aspects in the formulation of any foreign policy. Foreign policy and military policy should be coordinated in order to effectively achieve national policy. The final decisions, of course, rest with the duly elected and appointed civilian officials; but the military's voice should, and must be,

considered in the recommendatory stage if disaster is to be avoided.

Because of the desire to restrict the length of this paper to reasonable proportions, many significant aspects and points of this topic had to be excluded. These will be included as the paper is extended for the author's doctoral dissertation.

Among the more important aspects excluded is the development prior to 1940 of international concern and supervision of dependent peoples. This is needed to place the issue in context. Such a background will include such points as the Nineteenth Century practices and conferences, the League of Nations Mandate System, and the rapid rise of the doctrine of self-determination.

Another aspect omitted is the post-war development of the American civil-military coordination machinery and practice. This will trace the development from where this paper concluded, to the present National Security Council system and other current machinery for politico-military coordination. Presently, besides the President's own staff for national security affairs, there is the large Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Council with its staff; the Office of International Security Affairs under an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense; the Politico-Military Affairs staff under a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department; and a staff within each military service to handle politico-military affairs. The

Army has its International and Policy Planning Division, the Navy has its Politico-Military Policy Division, and the Air Force has its International Affairs Division. Additionally, there are many permanent liaison committees and ad hoc working committees and task forces concerned with the coordination of foreign policy with military policy.

Some points which require elaboration are the role of Congress, various journalistic articles, the legal availability of the islands as well as the actual possessor of their "sovereignty," and many smaller facts, incidents, and sidelights that are needed to put flesh on the account.

Dr. Robert R. Robbins of Tufts University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy provided the suggestion for this topic and has been of great assistance. Most of the original research was done at the U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Naval History Division, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.; and a special word of appreciation must be given to the unsung staff of that office for their professional assistance.

Finally, it must be said that any views and opinions are my own and can in no way be attributed to the United States Government or to any of its agencies. Only material that has been declassified has been utilized in order to avoid the necessity of any official review of the research product. All material of major importance on this topic, with the exception of foreign government correspondence, has, in fact, been declassified as a result of this research.

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE ISLANDS

Covering an ocean area of three million square miles, approximately the size and shape of the continental United States, there are approximately 2,100 islands which are presently administered by the United States under a United Nations Strategic Trusteeship Agreement.

These islands form ninety-six islands units (single islands, clusters, or atolls) of which only sixty-four are regularly inhabited. They comprise three large groups: the Marianas (less Guam) to the north, the Carolines to the south, and the Marshalls to the east.¹ The total land area is only 687 square miles, about two-thirds the size of Rhode Island.

The indigenous population is basically of Micronesian stock, one of the three main cultural and racial divisions of Pacific Oceania. However, there is "racial confusion"² in the Trust Territory. Variances in physical characteristics, customs and languages abound. While collectively called Micronesians, the peoples are locally called Marshallese, Palauans, Trukese, Yapese, Chamorros and so forth. Nine major languages and many variations of dialect are spoken. The Spanish language changed basic Chamorro

1. See Appendix A for maps showing these islands in relation to each other and to the Pacific basin.

2. Stephen H. Roberts, Population Problems of the Pacific (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1927), p. 15.

permanently; and there are German, Japanese and English linguistic influences. Since the Second World War, English has been the official language and the language of instruction.

The people of the Marianas, the Chamorros, resemble the Filipinos and Asians, while the people of the Eastern Carolines and Marshalls resemble, to some extent, the Polynesians. The racial mixture is even more confused by Spanish, Filipino, Malaysian, Formosan, German, Japanese and other bloods. Micronesians, until perhaps quite recently, have never developed an inter-island community but remained centered on their individual island groups. Recently, there has been a degree of "rural to urban" movement with resultant urban blight in some of the towns.

The Marianas are high volcanic islands, while the Marshalls are all low coral islands or atolls. The Carolines have many atolls and coral islands but, also, have the high volcanic island of Kusaie and four culturally distinct groupings of islands: Ponape, Truk, Yap and Palau. Only two islands, Bebelthaup and Ponape, are larger than one-hundred square miles. In November 1947, the peoples of the Carolines numbered 33,148, the Marshallese 9,718 and the Chamorros (less Guam) 5,431, for a total of only 48,297. Total population on June 30, 1968, was 94,469.

Traditional native life was not the harmonious paradise as often pictured. Rousseau's "natural man" did not exist in the Pacific island communities. On the harsh side of native life was the continuous uncertainty, fear and dread

with warfare the usual status. Cruel practices commonly followed were massacres of women and children, widespread cannibalism with great cannibal debauches after massacres, a general disregard for human life with little or no care for the sick, and social institutions of infanticide and strangling of old people.³

In 1522, Magellan discovered Guam, and the intrusion of Europeans began. White explorers, traders, whalers and ship-wrecked sailors had a shattering effect on the islanders' social organization. Whiskey, firearms, whooping-cough, mumps, measles, jaundice, miscegenation and forced labor were all introduced to the islands. However, none of these undisciplined, itinerant whites had the disruptive effect of the missionaries, for "there the strongest efforts were made to transform native society by plan, not by inadvertance as in the case of the commercial interlopers, and in the process to assimilate it to the West."⁴

The Spaniards concentrated on the Marianas during their three-hundred year rule leaving the Caroline and Marshall Islands virtually undisturbed. In the 1860's, the Germans became interested in the copra potential of the Carolines and Marshalls and proclaimed a protectorate over the Marshalls in 1885, which created difficulties with Spain that were not resolved until 1899. The Germans additionally raised their

3. Ibid., pp. 27-32.

4. C. Hartley Gratten, The Southwest Pacific To 1900: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 196.

flag on Yap in 1885; and the ensuing dispute over this issue was settled by the Pope, as arbitrator, in favor of Spain. By a treaty in 1899, the three island groups were ceded to Germany for a payment of four-million dollars, with the exception of Guam which had been ceded to the United States a year earlier.

The Germans concentrated on producing copra in the Marshalls and Carolines. In 1916, Japan obtained from the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy a pledge that at the peace conference those Governments would support Japan's claim to the German islands north of the equator. By the end of the war, Japan was in firm military possession of the islands. The American Naval General Board, on January 24, 1918, recommended for strategic reasons that the islands "be acquired by the United States; and this object should be kept in view and prepared for by the Department of State as a preliminary to future peace negotiations and settlements."⁵ However, President Wilson, against any territorial expansion for the United States, did not attempt to acquire them. He did oppose Japan's demands for annexation and was also against a Japanese mandate of the islands but felt he could not prevent their being mandated. His main concern

5. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, United States Department of State, Background Information On The Japanese Mandated Islands, No. DA-107, November 18, 1946, pp. 3-4, OP-35 files.

was to assure that Japan could not utilize them for naval bases.⁶ The compromise was a Class "C" Mandate to Japan, dated December 17, 1920, with a specific provision that "no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory."⁷ The American Senate did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles with the Mandate Charter. It did, however, ratify a Japanese-American convention on February 11, 1922, by which the United States gained cable rights on Yap, which included verbatim the terms of the League's Mandate Charter.⁸


Japanese settlers were imported in great numbers, between 70,000 and 100,000. Sugar and fishing industries were developed in the Marianas with the copra industries, largely confined to the Marshalls and Carolines, left in the hands of the Micronesians. Railroads and roads were built, but education and political development were neglected. The Japanese policy was one of "exploitation, colonization, and militarization."⁹

6. Ibid., p. 4 and R. H. Fifield "Disposal of the Carolines, Marshalls and Marianas at the Paris Peace Conference," American Historical Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 1946), pp. 472-478 and George H. Blakeslee "Japan's Mandated Islands," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 286 (December 17, 1944), pp. 764-768.

7. Mandate Charter, Article 4, Signed at Geneva on December 17, 1920.

8. United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 664.

9. Cdr. Daniel J. Morgiewicz, USN, "Micronesia Especial Trust," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 94, No. 10 (October, 1968), p. 75.



In 1932, rumors circulated that Japan was fortifying some of the islands, especially Truk. Japan denied the reports, although Japanese naval and nationalist leaders had frequently stated in speeches and in newspaper and magazine articles that they wanted the islands mainly for their possible value in a war against the United States.¹⁰ On March 27, 1935, Japan withdrew from the League but continued to submit annual reports to Geneva on her mandate. Japan's right to continue to operate as the mandatory power was never officially questioned by the League; and Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, stated in the Diet on February 22, 1934, that while Japan's status as a mandatory was not affected by her withdrawal from the League, "The Japanese Government, however, have never entertained the view that these islands are Japanese territory."¹¹ Following Japan's withdrawal from the League, the military policies of Japan began to dominate the administration of the islands. In 1938, Japan ceased to collaborate with the League and filed its last report in late 1939 which failed to contain the usual paragraph stating that no fortifications or bases had been constructed. Foreign ships were not permitted to visit Micronesia after 1937; and after 1939, no natives were allowed to go from the Marshalls to Kusaie, where the only American residents were located. .

10. Blakeslee, "Japan's Mandated Islands," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 286 (December 17, 1944), p. 766 and United States Department of State, Background Information On The Japanese Mandated Islands, p. 4.

11. Blakeslee, "Japan's Mandated Islands," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 286 (December 17, 1944), p. 768.

Compared with an appropriation of \$185,000 for harbor works and aircraft facilities in 1936, the 1940-41 appropriation was \$367,000 for harbor works and \$850,000 for air routes¹² and aircraft facilities.

World War II brought fighting and devastation to many of the islands such as Tinian, Saipan, Kwajalein and Truk. The effect on the peoples of the Marianas was tremendous; but, except for the main bases, the Carolines and Marshall groups were hardly touched by direct combat.

12. Huntington Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4 (July, 1944), p. 640. Fortification was also prohibited by the Five-Power Naval Treaty of 1922. Japanese fortification of any of these islands prior to Pearl Harbor has recently been denied by a former Japanese military officer. He also points out that the prosecution at the Allied Military Tribunal, Tokyo, 1946-1948, could not substantiate the charges of pre-war fortification. See: Lt. Gen. Mastake Okumiya, JASDF (Ret.), "For Sugar Boats or Submarines," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 94, No. 8 (August 9, 1968), pp. 66-73.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Much has been written about the "military mind" and the concept of "civilian control" over the military. Because of the desire to limit the scope of this particular paper, a comprehensive historical review of these two aspects of civil-military relations has not been included. These aspects, with a more detailed review of the development of the instrumentalities of civil-military coordination, will be amply covered in this author's dissertation. The bibliography to this paper indicates the sources utilized thus far in research on these areas.

The question of the proper relationship of military power to civil authority is "one of the most ancient and difficult problems of political society ... it is a major problem in statecraft, upon the successful solution of which will depend the welfare of the people and the survival of the state."¹ When the military side of the relationship has been emphasized, the government has been called "militaristic;" and when the civil side is dominant, it has been called "weak."² Quincy Wright also wrote that a balance

1. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power: A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 1.

2. Quincy Smith, "The Military and Foreign Policy," in Jerome Gregory Kerwin, ed., Civil Military Relationships in American Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 116.

seems to have been considered desirable. He continued this thought by observing:

The military may be thought of as an instrument of government or an influence on government. It consists, on the one hand, of an organization of men, materials, and ideas ready to enforce the law or policy established by the government and, on the other hand, of the complex of attitudes and opinions of the members of that organization ready to influence the government's decisions on law or policy. Either the military machine or the military mind may be exaggerated and also either of them may be depreciated.³

Since colonial times, the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the "civilian control" concept. Standing armies were despised, distrusted, and feared by the Founding Fathers of the Republic. This was part of England's legacy to America. The Declaration of Independence accused George III of tyrannous acts in that "he has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislature.... He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power."⁴ General Washington, as early as 1777, indicated he was acutely aware of colonial distrust of the military and patterned his actions accordingly.⁵

3. Ibid.

4. Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History (4th ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 101.

5. William R. Tansill, The Concept of Civil Supremacy Over the Military in the United States; Its History and Practice (Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 94, Washington, 1951), p. 3.

Many provisions of the Constitution were designed to render the military subordinate to the civil authorities. The debates over the adoption of the Constitution afford vivid insights into the deep distrust and fear of any federal military establishment.

The Constitutional provisions placed four principle checks against a standing army ever becoming an instrument of oppression. These were: (1) the policy of keeping military forces at a minimum, (2) reliance upon the militia primarily; the standing army was to be called upon only when it was deemed necessary, (3) keeping the States' militia independent and, thus, available to counteract any possible uprising on the part of the standing army, and (4) insurance that the professional forces remained under the control of politically responsible persons, i.e., the Congress.⁶

Presidents Jefferson and Jackson believed a standing army was incompatible with the principles of democracy. In fact, only after 1812 was there a regularly organized standing army as the term is understood today.⁷ This feeling continued to exist throughout the nineteenth century. The "liberal ethic", as described by Professor Huntington, was dominant in American life and hostile to a "conservative

6. Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress Through Military Appropriations, 1933-1950 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 7-8.

7. Tansill, The Concept of Civil Supremacy Over the Military in the United States, p. 13.

ethic" required to develop a professional officer corps. Military officers were "political" in that they developed friends within the Congress in their efforts to earn promotion and to gain appropriations; but this "political" activity did not involve the formulation of foreign policy or participation in partisan political activity.

Naval officers sometimes participated in the making of foreign policy because of the great distances and communication time-lags involved. Conspicuous examples are the American relations with the Barbary Pirates and in early relations with the Far East.

Overall, however, the American military did not participate in either the formulation or the carrying out of foreign policies during the nineteenth century. The relative peace and security for the United States from any serious threat of aggression during that century permitted this total lack of coordination. National attention was focused on domestic matters, the "gilded age" of expansion turned attention inward. The problem of civil-military relations was simplified by "a policy of military weakness and of calculated dispersion."⁹

President Lincoln, by use of the Constitutional "Commander-in-Chief" provision and the duty to "take care that

8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), Chapter Six, pp. 143-162.

9. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, p. 150.

the laws be faithfully executed," permanently changed the basic pattern of civil control of the military. By acting "without Congress, against Congress, and in addition to Congress" he suddenly exalted the office of "Commander-in-Chief."¹⁰ This permanently reduced the "control-over-the-military" role of the Congress relative to the President. President Lincoln's bypassing of the service secretaries on many occasions also derogated that aspect of civil control.

The various bureaus of the services developed into tight little oligarchies of active duty officers competing for the meager congressional appropriations. Congressional interest was in terms of patronage and "pork-barrel" work projects for constituents. As a result, little interest was paid to the small (25,000 after the Civil War) army. The Army was, in fact, supplied with arms from the state arsenal at Springfield. The Corps of Engineers, however, was utilized to build pet projects and was eventually taken over by Congressional, rather than Executive, control.

The Navy was of some interest to the coastal states for the shipyard activity involved. In fact, ships kept in perpetual repair in the yards "provided an elastic demand for politically docile labour. A ship at sea was a ship lost from this point of view and one result was that, in danger of war with Chile in 1881, the United States was

10. D. W. Brogan, "The United States: Civilian and Military Power," in Michael Howard, ed., Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 174.

11

also in danger of defeat."

During the nineteenth century, civilian control did not come from any positive, dynamic type of civilian leadership in the office of service secretary. These political appointments were not praised since they had little patronage compared to other cabinet posts. Only two Secretaries of War [John C. Calhoun, from 1817-1825, and Ewin M. Stanton, during the Civil War] and only two Secretaries of the Navy [Gideon Welles, during the Civil War and W. H. Hunt, during the modernization of the Navy in the 1880's] provided dynamic leadership during the century.

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Because of the civilian attitudes and the dispersal to isolated posts and bases, the military tended to be insulated from the mainstream of American life.

This was bound to have some impact on their view of the world and, more particularly, on their ability to consider nonmilitary factors in their planning, training, and operations. Naturally there was a tendency for the military to reciprocate civilian dislike, to resent poor pay, poor treatment, and the meager resources put at their disposal. This was compounded by a certain contempt for a civilian society oriented to material comfort and success to the exclusion of concern for the nation's security. It is not surprising that this attitude should have led many officers to see themselves as the main guardians of the nation and to distrust civilian abilities and views with respect to national defense.

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11. Ibid., p. 176. See also: Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 226-230.

12. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, p. 139.

13. Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1954), p. 3.

Morris Janowitz feels this social isolation may be frequently overdrawn in that there were some ceremonial and social contacts with the civilians, especially in the south and west; but he agrees there were no real political or professional contacts.¹⁴ The officer corps, even with the resentment toward the civilians, never questioned the concept of civilian supremacy. This was because of the military's dispersal, small numbers, and the constant indoctrination of the civilian supremacy concept. Professor Janowitz describes the "mechanical" indoctrination achieved at the military academies:

It is striking that the most powerful consequence of academy military education in the past has been the inculcation of a mechanical acceptance of civilian supremacy. If the cadets themselves were not taught to think about the political dimensions of warfare, this was thought to be appropriate for a society in which the military was a profession under democratically elected civilian leaders. The concept of submission to civilian authorities centered about the understanding that political authorities decided who was the enemy, when war was to start, and the terms of peace. But, until 1939, the selection system, the narrow emphasis on military history, and the social isolation of the academies produced a breed of political conservatism or political indifference among cadets. Those officers who developed broader interests were influenced by higher military education or by their own inclinations.

The academies have never concerned themselves with the broader task of

14. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 175-177.

inculcating a belief in the importance of accepting on-going civilian administrative supervision of the military establishment. They have never sought to establish principles for limiting the political activities of the military profession as a pressure group on its own behalf for more appropriations. Cadets and midshipmen are implicitly taught not to have open party preferences. But, more explicitly, they have been taught that Congress traditionally starved the military establishment, and that, therefore, it was the duty of the profession to press continually for maximum allocations in the name of military preparedness. 15

Professionalism of the officer corps slowly grew during this long period of isolation. General William T. Sherman, Commanding General from 1869 until 1883, sparked the reform movement within the Army. He was the father of the infantry and cavalry school at Fort Leavenworth. He refused to enter politics as Grant had, believing that a professional soldier should have nothing to do with politics. Prior to Sherman, three of the six Commanding Generals had become presidential candidates. After his tenure, his concept of political neutrality continued among the Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, with the exception of Leonard Wood, until after the Second World War. Sherman also stressed the concept of civilian supremacy and the total divorce of the military from politics. 16

Within the Navy, professionalism was initiated by

15. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

16. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 230-231.

Admiral Stephen B. Luce who crusaded against politics and "technicism" within the Navy. His influence had a lasting effect throughout the naval officer corps. His efforts eventually led to the establishment of the Naval War College in 1884. Luce and Sherman were followed by many other crusaders for professionalism, of which, Admirals A. T. Mahan and William S. Sims as well as General Emory Upton are the better known.

This rise of professionalism was a corollary to the isolation of the military and the development of the military institutions such as schools of higher education, professional journals, and professional associations. The "military mind" (with its "non-political" aspect) permeated¹⁷ the bulk of the officer corps. Young reformers in the Navy led by Henry C. Taylor, William S. Sims, and Bradley A. Fiske advocated a General Staff for the Navy with authority centralized in a single professional naval officer. This was opposed by the entrenched bureaus. In 1900, a General Board was created; but its functions were not administrative or executive. Instead, its functions were merely planning and advisory. The Secretaries of the Navy from 1885 until 1912 supported this effort for more effective central administration but no effective reorganization was accomplished.

Meanwhile, in the Army the reformers were not as

17. Ibid., p. 254.

enthusiastic for centralized authority as those in the Navy. However, Secretary of War Elihu Root, who initiated the Army War College in 1901, felt the need for centralization after the Spanish-American War had shown the disastrous results of the entrenched bureau system. Secretary Root had more effect in achieving a reorganization than did the Secretaries of the Navy. The General Staff act of 1903 abolished the separate office of Commanding General and initiated the office of Chief of Staff. This office had supervision not only of all troops but also of all the special staff and supply departments which had previously reported directly to the Secretary of War. Secretary Root believed this would maintain civilian control over the various, previously semi-autonomous, bureaus while increasing efficiency. As he stated:

It will be perceived that we are here providing for civilian control over the military arm, but for civilian control to be exercised through a single military expert of high rank, who is provided with an adequate corps of professional assistants to aid him in the performance of his duties, and who is bound to use all his professional skill and knowledge in giving effect to the purposes and general directions of his civilian superior, or make way for another expert who will do so.

In this way it is hoped that the problem of reconciling civilian control with military efficiency with which we have been struggling for so many years will be solved.... 18

18. Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903, pp. 259-260.

The General Staff Act of 1903 set the basic tone for the Department of the Army until after World War II. It fostered an identity of interest between the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. Professor Huntington evaluated the effect as:

The old alignment of the Secretary and the bureau chiefs versus the Commanding General was replaced by a new alignment of the Secretary and Chief of Staff versus the bureaus. While some Secretaries at times tried to take a few steps toward a balanced system, their efforts ran counter to the spirit of the existing organization and came to naught. It was easier to rely on the Chief of Staff as the secretarial instrument. Harmony and mutual confidence replaced nineteenth-century acrimony between the military and political leaders of the Department: Chiefs of Staff lavishly praised their Secretaries; the Secretaries were equally generous in their response.¹⁹

Secretary Josephus Daniels, who served throughout the Wilson administration, opposed serious reorganization efforts.²⁰ He believed that civilian, i.e. Secretarial, control would be lost if direct access of the bureau chiefs to the Secretary was eliminated. This position had far reaching effects for the Navy and contributed to Secretary Forrester's position on unification during and immediately after the Second World War. Admiral Fiske went behind Daniels' back to sympathizers in Congress and managed to have the office of Chief of Naval

19. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 298.

20. Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing For Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 59.

Operations created in 1915. The original bill called for centralized control, but Daniels managed to have it changed so that the Chief of Naval Operations' authority was not extended to the civil activities of the bureaus.

Thus, the views of the Navy and Army about the proper method of maintaining civilian control diverged after 1912. Secretary Root also initiated the Joint Board, the first permanent coordination machinery between the Army and the Navy. By approval of the President, the Secretaries of the Navy and War agreed on July 17, 1903, to the formation of the Joint Board, composed of four officers from each service for the purpose of "conferring upon, discussing, and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services."²²

Of interest, is the Navy's proposal for a Council of National Defense. Admiral Mahan's doctrines were concerned with comprehensive and long-range naval policies. An aspect of these doctrines was the relationship of foreign to naval policy. An interest developed within the Navy for some means of emphasizing the relationship and encouraging the civilian officials to actively assert their authority, if only to get them to lay down the guidelines by which naval strategy could be determined.²³ By 1903, the General Board

21. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 250.

22. Millis, ed., American Military Thought, Extract from Army General Orders No. 107 quoted in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903, p. 261.

23. Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 64.

had recommended a long-range naval construction policy with the goal of a fleet "equal or superior to that of any probable enemy."²⁴ President Theodore Roosevelt also thought in these terms; and in spite of a reluctant Congress and public, the United States fleet was the second greatest naval power in the world when he left office in 1909.

To stimulate interest in: (1) building a large fleet, (2) the fleets' strategic and global uses, (3) the relationship between the fleet and foreign policy, and (4) obtaining national policy guidelines, the General Board endorsed a²⁵ proposal in 1911 for a Council of National Defense.

The Council of National Defense was to consist of the Secretaries of State (as Chairman), War, and Navy; the chairmen of the Senate and House Military and Naval Affairs Committees; the Chief of Staff; the Presidents of the Army and Naval War Colleges; and the Aide for Operations. "Its function would be to coordinate military and naval policy and establish clear national policy for both."²⁶ The Army supported the plan, not for any doctrinal ideas, as did the Navy, but as a way to gain a more sympathetic ear from the Administration and Congress, especially in its fight to reorganize the Army from frontier posts into divisions, and to protect it against²⁷ the inconstancy and parochialism of politics.

24. Millis, ed., American Military Thought, p. xxxiv.

25. Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 66.

26. Ibid., p. 67.

27. Ibid.

The Navy needed policy guidance for long-term naval policy and, therefore, desired that the civil authorities establish long-term strategic national policies. The Navy believed it had a role to play in diplomacy and any discussions of national policy would encourage support for the naval program.²⁸ Both the Army and the Navy saw the Council as a source of effective civilian political leadership.

There was much discussion about this proposal prior to the First World War, and it was established in 1916.²⁹ It, however, proved to be a "moribund" organization. The basic idea was advanced again by the Navy in 1919, but first President Wilson's civil-military relations during the World War should be examined.

President Wilson was unlike Lincoln in that he made little use of the functions of the Commander-in-Chief; however, various congressional acts were passed granting him additional authority in the administration of the war activities and while many of these were appealed after the war,³⁰ many remained.

In his relations with the military, President Wilson

28. This conviction of the Navy is evidenced by the multitude of articles that appeared in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings between 1910 and 1940 on the relationship and role of the Navy in diplomacy and national policy. See listing of articles in: Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 69-70.

29. Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil and Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 19.

30. Brogan, "The United States: Civilian and Military Power," pp. 177-178.

"ratified the selection of General Pershing as the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces, he insisted American troops fight as organized units in Europe, he took an active part in wartime diplomacy, and he resisted Congressional efforts to reduce his authority in the administration of the government's war activities. But he gave Pershing a virtual carte blanche in his field command and left Baker [Secretary of War] largely to his own devices in running the War Department in Washington." ³¹ President Wilson's management by delegation was because, in large part, the grand strategy of the war had long been fixed and American troops were only fighting on one front. The War Department took care of the procurement of supplies, the recruitment and training of men, and the coordination between the activities of the War Department and the other government agencies, particularly the War Industries Board. Except for a few general guidelines in negotiating with the Allies, the War Department left military-strategic matters to the field ³² command.

As soon as the war was over, the wartime forces were demobilized. Public attitudes in the United States about the use of force and the role of the military in government underwent a regressive phase that was not to start the long,

31. Hammond, Organizing For Defense, pp. 38-39.

32. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

laborious road back until after 1933. The public, since 1915, had gone through Wilson's "neutrality without favoritism through preparedness" to all-out war but now seemed to think that force had proved to be a failure and America should refuse to be drawn into quarrels.

The public attitude toward the military during the inter-war period underlies the report of the Dwight W. Morrow board in 1925. This board was appointed by President Coolidge as a result of General William Mitchell's court martial to report on "the best means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense." The board recommended keeping military and civil air services separate for the following reasons:

The historic tradition of the United States is to maintain military forces only for defense and to keep those forces subordinate to the civilian government. This policy has been amply justified by our experience. It has been proposed that we should establish a Department of Aeronautics, which should control all or a portion of our military air power as well as our civilian air activities. Such a departure would be quite contrary to the principles under which this country has attained its present moral and material power. If the civilian air development should have anything like the wide ramifications that are predicted for it, such a new policy might have profound effect upon the historic attitude of our Nation toward military and civilian activities. The peace-time activities of the

33. Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 5.

United States have never been governed by military considerations. To organize its peace-time activities, or what it is thought may ultimately be one large branch of them, under military control or on a military basis would be to make the same mistake which, properly or improperly, the world believes Prussia to have made in the last generation. The union of civil and military air activities would breed distrust in every region to which our commercial aviation sought extension.³⁴

In 1919, the Navy again made a bid for the establishment of a coordinating national policy body. Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt is attributed with this new proposal.³⁵

It was for a joint Army-Navy-State Department General Staff. This staff would provide the Navy and the Joint Board with policy guidance that was needed for planning national strategy. Captain Harry Yarnell, on the existing Army-Navy Joint Board, supported Roosevelt on this idea as well as proposing that the Under Secretary of State sit on the Joint Board. Two years later, the Joint Board proposed a similar plan that would have given the State Department a more prominent position in military planning than had

any of the earlier proposals.³⁶ Unfortunately, these proposals were not adopted.

34. Millis, ed., American Military Thought, p. 378.

35. Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 105.

36. E. R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, LXX (June, 1955), pp. 167-168.

In Washington, there was a long tradition of aloofness on the part of the Department of State toward the service departments. Its attitude often indicated that it felt it enjoyed a special relationship with the White House and a primacy among executive departments. State showed no enthusiasm for the efforts of the Navy Department over the years to bring about closer relations, in the hope of having a voice in policies while they were still in the formative stage. Navy's advances were regularly rebuffed; State was prone to operate in a carefully cultivated atmosphere of splendid isolation.³⁷

From Wilson to Hoover, strategic planning was left entirely to the military. The various color war plans were prepared, revised, and filed. None of the Presidents during this period took an interest in them. Even President Hoover, watching the Japanese aggression, took no interest. He was only concerned with the possible financial consequences for the United States from the turmoil in Europe.³⁸ For example, when Secretary of State Stimson announced the policy of non-recognition, Admiral Pratt, the Chief of Naval Operations, was not consulted until afterward about any possible naval implications of that policy. The policy of isolation followed between 1931 and 1937 restricted Secretaries of State Stimson and Hull to the means of moral exhortation and diplomacy. "The diplomatic notes and official speeches took moral positions with no evident military implications. The reciprocal

37. Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 160-161.

38. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 18.

trade agreements legislation was no concern of the military. The long debates over the neutrality acts had indirect military significance; but the military departments had, and apparently sought, no formal voice in them".³⁹

This state of affairs continued through Roosevelt's first term; although he took an interest in the Navy and in the utilization of military officers for civilian tasks. Most of the New Deal supporters of the President were anti-militarists and only reluctantly supported his plans for the Navy. The Army was kept in a starved and neglected condition.⁴⁰

The military were mainly concerned with professional and technical matters during the inter-war period; but many officers, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, did come into contact with politico-military affairs. Additionally, the Reserve Officers Training Corps system was established which drew many officers into contact with the academic world. The conservative political views of the military elites during the inter-war period were that of the "right wing" of the Republican party.⁴¹ Professor Janowitz ably describes the political thinking of the military elites during the first half of the twentieth century and their attitudes toward the civilian authorities:

Extremist political sentiment among the military has not been extensive. Throughout the turbulent response to the depression, only an occasional professional officer joined the native "lunatic" right.... Converts to the left were in

39. Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State, p. 28.

40. Brogan, "The United States: Civilian and Military Power", p. 179.

41. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 250.

effect non-existent....

From the point of view of democratic requirements, the important issue is not the extent of extremist thought, but rather the lack of understanding and respect for the creative role of the practical politician. A few conspicuous civilian leaders are seen as heroes, but the military shares the civilian image that politicians are an unworthy lot. There is, moreover, little sympathy for the particular qualities required to produce political compromise. There is little appreciation of the fact that a political democracy requires competing pressures. The endless struggles over the military budget only serve to re-inforce the conception that party politics and pressure group activities are nefarious. Military conservatism tends to overlook the advantages and safeguards of consensus arrived at by debating conflicting interests and pressures. In a mixture of realism and naivete, the military is disposed to de-emphasize "politics" in national security matters....

Professional officers have always resented the intervention of politicians in military administration. But the quality of civilian direction cannot be judged by the opinions of professional officers alone. Civilian supremacy has operated effectively because political leaders select for high military assignments "unconventional" officers who are 42
the least hostile to civilian intervention.

General George C. Marshall, appointed Chief of Staff on September 1, 1939, was such an "unconventional" military officer. Marshall and President Roosevelt differed completely in administrative style. The General was reserved, made careful judgments, and had a passion for clearly defined 43
channels of authority enclosed in a tidy organization.

42. Ibid., pp. 250-251.

43. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), pp. 22-23.

However, the two men learned to work together in full confidence because of Marshall's attitude on civil-military affairs. His biographer writes:

'I never haggled with the President,' Marshall said later. 'I swallowed the little things so that I could go to bat on the big ones. I never handled a matter apologetically and I was never contentious. It took me a long time to get to him. When he thought I was not going for publicity and doing things for publication -- he liked it.'

Strongly committed to the principle of civilian leadership in the making of national policy, Marshall determined, if at all possible, to follow the President's lead in military matters. Despite his discomfiture at the administration's cautious policy on Army appropriations [prior to the war], Marshall supported it in public while vigorously arguing his service's needs at White House conferences. Only in those cases where the President faced trouble in getting the funds for which he had already asked did the Chief of Staff feel justified in approaching congressional leaders or appealing to the public for support. The General said in later years: 'While it would be difficult at times and [there] would be strong pressures for me to speak to the public, I thought that it was far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member of a team and try to do my convincing within that team than to take action publicly contrary to the desires of the President and certain members of Congress....'⁴⁴

The other high wartime military leaders in Washington operated on similar principles. Possible exceptions to following them might be found in the unification issue and

44. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

the question of the disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands.

After President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech on October 12, 1937, the President began to take an interest in the various strategic plans. At Christmas time, Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, Head of the Navy War Plans Division, was quietly sent to London with the President's approval to confer with the British. This was the first step toward Anglo-American strategic planning. As a result of the Ingersoll mission, War Plan Orange (for a possible war with Japan) was modified to take account of a potential Anglo-American alliance. In both of these developments, "Roosevelt was involved, overtly or covertly. The State Department stayed clear, even though it had set the stage for Ingersoll's trip ..."⁴⁵

Secretary Hull came under fire from some isolationists in Congress when news of Ingersoll's mission was leaked. This encounter with Congress, on the heels of the defeat of the Ludlow resolution, had a lasting effect on Secretary Hull. "He stood them off; but the experience of hostile criticism in Congress, connected to the suspicion of military commitments abroad, reinforced his personal distastes. From that time on he made it a working rule to avoid participation in, and hence first-hand knowledge of -- and hence influence on -- military planning, however important its bearing on foreign policy."⁴⁶

45. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 18.

46. Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State, p. 33.

The State Department, however, was interested in the signs of Nazi and Fascist infiltration into Latin American countries. Early in 1938, a series of meetings with the War and Navy Departments were arranged on an informal basis. In April, 1938, Secretary of State Hull recommended the establishment of a Standing Liaison Committee to be composed of the second-ranking officers of State, War and Navy, to meet regularly to work out coordinated policies and coordinate activities abroad.⁴⁷ President Roosevelt approved the idea but modified it by substituting the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations for the civilian Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy, whose other duties had more to do with domestic affairs than with foreign policy. The Committee was the first formal mechanism since the "moribund" Council of National Defense to provide for high-level coordination on national policy. It was composed of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles as Chairman; the Army Chief of Staff (General Marshall after 1939); and the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Harold R. Stark after 1939). The Committee gave most of its attention to Latin American affairs. An evaluation of its significance is:

Although its specific recommendations of action were of minor consequence, its deliberations, especially after Marshall and Stark became its military members in 1939, encouraged a major

47. Ibid., p. 19.

shift in military thinking, away from the purely passive posture of repelling an invader at our coast lines to the more active anticipatory policy of securing bases and taking other measures in co-operation with friendly Latin American nations to deny to the Axis powers footholds in the Western Hemisphere from which they might further their ambitions. So the notion of hemisphere defense was born.... It proved to be a temporary and limited arrangement, but responded to a real need and pointed ahead to broader⁴⁸ and more elaborate institutions later.

In 1940, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy started holding weekly meetings, but they were unofficial and had "no connection with Mr. Roosevelt's final determination of⁴⁹ policy." A War Council composed of the three secretaries as well as the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations was also formed. This Council met at frequent intervals in the White House; but "when President Roosevelt learned to like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942, he allowed⁵⁰ himself to dispense with any general meetings on war policy."

The War Council, like the Cabinet, had no staff, agenda, or procedure. The old Council of National Defense only existed on the statute books. President Roosevelt drew closer to his military advisers with his Military Order in 1940 that transferred the Joint Army-Navy Board to direct Presidential control. This was the fore-runner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an

48. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

49. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 563.

50. Ibid.

indication of President Roosevelt's desires to work directly with the military, by-passing the service secretaries.

These devices were still inadequate for effective integration of military and foreign policy for there were no "closed" staffs or secretariats to prepare items for discussion, coordinate information, or to follow through on the matters discussed.⁵¹ Secretary of State Hull usually went his own way without coordinating policy decisions with Secretary of the Army Stimson or Secretary of the Navy Knox.

Hull had no part in making or commenting on Admiral Stark's Plan DOG in November 1940 -- 'a strong offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive in the Pacific' -- and refused to commit himself on its follow-up, the national estimate prepared by Marshall and Stark. After the conclusion of the Anglo-American military conversations in Washington in March 1941, Hull refused even to look at the two agreed papers, ABC-1 and ABC-2. Until the end of the war strategic planning was thereafter carried on by the two chiefs, subsequently by JCS, under the very active supervision of the President....⁵²

In fact, the Joint Army-Navy Board had invited Under Secretary of State Welles to attend the opening session of the Washington staff conferences in January-March, 1941, but Secretary Hull vetoed the suggestion.⁵³ The best example of this lack of coordination was Secretary Hull's "ultimatum"

51. On October 12, 1939, the State Department, pursuant to an order from the President, established an Office of Under Secretary-Liaison which, among other duties, assisted the Liaison Committee. It consisted of two full-time State Department officers, Selden Chapin and Harley A. Notter, with counterpart officers in the other two Departments. Harley A. Notter, Post-war Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 16.

52. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 18.

53. Millis, Mansfield and Stein, Arms and The State, pp. 45-52.

note to Japan on November 26, 1941. It was sent without prior consultation with the Army or the Navy who wished to stall for time until their Pacific preparations were more complete. The next day Secretary Hull made his famous statement to Stimson: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox--the Army and the Navy."⁵⁴

After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt relied almost exclusively on his close advisers, Byrnes, Rosenman, Hopkins, and the military leaders, for war-time political and military decisions. The Standing Liaison Committee, the Secretaries' meetings, and the War Council "withered on the vine."⁵⁵ The three Secretaries were excluded from matters of grand strategy by President Roosevelt and did not even, with a few exceptions, attend the wartime allied conferences. The State Department

played a minor role in the direction of the war for political, personal, and organizational reasons. Ideologically, the State Department was peculiarly ill-equipped to deal with the problems of either the war or the immediate postwar periods.... During the war, the State Department continued to believe that its function was diplomacy and that diplomacy was distinct from force. As a result, it devoted itself to relations with neutrals and minor allies and to the development of plans for the United Nations organization. The bitter antagonism between Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles also weakened the Department.⁵⁶

54. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 389.

55. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 320. See also Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 6.

56. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 321. See also Albion and Connery, Forrestal and the Navy, pp. 163-164, and Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State, pp. 94-96.

American politico-military coordination was so confused and, indeed, non-existent during the early months after Pearl Harbor that Sir John Dill reported to General Sir Alan Brooke in late December, 1941, and early January, 1942, that "this country [the United States] is the most highly organized for peace you can imagine.... Never have I seen a country so⁵⁷ utterly unprepared for war and so soft." Sir John Dill reported that the President had no secretariat and no regular private secretary. His impression was that American inter-agency administration was "completely unorganized." He continued his criticism on January 3, 1942, by reporting:

There are no regular meetings of their Chiefs of Staff and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record their proceedings. They have no joint planners and executive planning staff.... Then there is the great difficulty of getting the stuff over to the President. He just sees the Chiefs of Staff at odd times, and again no record. There is no such thing as a Cabinet meeting, and yet the Secretaries for War, Navy, etc., are supposed to function. At present this country has not--repeat--not--the slightest conception of what the war means, and their armed forces are more unready for war than it is possible to imagine The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington who was made Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces and just did it. To-day the President is Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces, but it is not so easy to just do it.⁵⁸

57. Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943: A Study Based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshall The Viscount Alanbrooke (London: Collins, 1957), p. 292.

58. Ibid., pp. 292-293. See also: Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope, p. 262.

At the Arcadia conference at Washington, December 22, 1941-January 14, 1942, General Marshall suddenly proposed the establishment of a unified command for the Pacific. Admiral King was for it, while Admiral Stark was uncommittal. Marshall, assisted by Eisenhower, got the approval of Secretary Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy and then obtained the President's approval. This plan was accepted. Then the military representatives, under Marshall's leadership, established a committee called the Combined Chiefs of Staff to direct Anglo-American strategy. In international conferences, the British Chiefs of Staff would act for themselves; otherwise, they would make their wishes known through the Joint Staff Mission in Washington headed by Field Marshall Sir John Dill.⁵⁹

To provide an American side to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the old Joint Army-Navy Board was replaced by a new organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The main difference between the two was the "closed staff" system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, had the services of its own staff. Some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff subordinate committees will be explained below. Another difference was the full representation of the Army Air Corps. General Arnold had been just recently added to the Joint Board and had been taken to the Argentia conference in August, 1941. Additionally, he had been invited by General Marshall to be present at the Arcadia conference as a full-fledged

59. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope, p. 262.

member. The inclusion of General Arnold in the Joint Chiefs of Staff finalized this trend. The manner in which General Marshall achieved this inclusion is of interest:

Thoroughly aware of the dangers of trying to put through a basic change in organization, he [Marshall] resorted to a pleasant subterfuge. Knowing that the President was about to issue a statement about his military advisers, he arranged with Marvin McIntyre, the President's secretary, to include the name of General Arnold among the Chiefs of Staff. Thereafter, without special legislation, "Hap" Arnold sat with Marshall and King as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Technically the first meeting of this body took place on February 9, 1942. No formal document was ever issued establishing such a group. In actuality it was born at the Arcadia meeting.⁶⁰

General Marshall had another reform in mind. In February, 1942, when he saw that Admiral Stark would be leaving in early March and replaced as Chief of Naval Operations by Admiral Ernest King, he recommended to the President the appointment of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He knew that Admiral King would be concerned over the Army's having two votes to the Navy's one. The General later told his biographer: "I therefore thought it would be wise if we had a chairman and one from the Navy, if one could be found that I thought was entirely impersonal and a man of good judgment."⁶¹

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 298.

The General nominated Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Operations and the current Ambassador to the French government at Vichy. President Roosevelt did not quite agree with General Marshall on the concept of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall expanded on his motives for making the proposal and the President's modification of the original concept in an interview with his biographer:

I thought that it was very important that we, in effect have a neutral agency because we would have had trouble with the Naval Air and the Army Air and the Naval-Army disagreements through the years -- which were exaggerated [at first] ... by the fact that the Navy had a fleet; the Army had no army.... Therefore, I thought it was particularly important to have Leahy in the chair....

I continued to press for Leahy being returned and made chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. The President always answered my proposals regarding Admiral Leahy by saying, 'But you are Chief of Staff.' But I said, 'Mr. President, I am only Chief of Staff of the Army and, in a sense, of the Army Air. There is no Chief of Staff of the military services.' 'Well,' he said, 'I am the Chief of Staff. I'm the Commander-in-Chief.' And I explained to him in great frankness that it was impossible to conceive on one man with all of his duties as President being, also, in effect, the Chief of Staff of all the military services. That it was a superman job and I didn't think that even the exaggeration of the powers of Superman would quite go far enough for this. And I know he was not very well pleased with my statement.

But the trouble was he didn't quite understand what the role of the Chief of Staff would be. [The President appointed Leahy on July 20, 1942, as 'Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy'] ... But the President said he was going to be his 'leg man.'⁶²

62. Ibid., p. 299.

When Admiral Leahy arrived in Washington, he did not have a clear conception of his duties. He saw Marshall, and the General recommended he calmly attend the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and sit in the senior seat on the American side. This Admiral Leahy did and functioned as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from that meeting.⁶³ However, as time went on, Admiral Leahy became more of a Chief of Staff of the President than a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. General Marshall was not happy about this trend; especially as Admiral Leahy did not always keep the Chiefs of Staff informed of the political happenings. The Yalta agreements were one example cited by General Marshall, as well as the fact that Admiral Leahy was "almost exclusively engaged in attending the political meetings" at Potsdam.⁶⁴

However, General Marshall felt that the overall situation was a positive step in the right direction. He gave the following as his evaluation:

Even though Leahy's time was more completely given to attending the President in his political meetings, nevertheless it was quite essential to have the arrangement as it was, because it would never have done to have tried to have gone right straight through the struggle with Admiral King in a secondary position and me as the senior where I was also the senior of the Air. It was quite essential that we have a neutral agency, and Leahy, in effect, was that so far as the Army and Navy requirements and positions were concerned.⁶⁵

63. Ibid., p. 300.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

The wartime influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can hardly be exaggerated. Professor Huntington states that, next to the President, the Joint Chiefs were the "single most important force in the overall conduct of the war, the level and the scope of their activities far transcending those of a purely professional body."⁶⁶ As stated above, these high military leaders were the "unconventional" type of officer. Indeed, they had been chosen, in part, because they possessed the "sense of statesmanship that enabled them to consider the political as well as purely military aspects of the global situation."⁶⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly gained the President's confidence and:

extended their activities and interests far beyond the normal military confines and into the areas of diplomacy, politics, and economics. From the initial great decision to defeat Germany first to the last complex series of decisions on the end of the war with Japan, the major strategic and policy issues of the war were resolved by the President, the Chiefs, and Harry Hopkins. The absence of a formal charter for the JCS facilitated the expansion of its functions since it was impossible for any rival agency to argue that it was exceeding its authority. Tied in close to the President, the interests and power of the Chiefs tended to expand and become coextensive with his.⁶⁸

66. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 318.

67. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 169.

68. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 323. The JCS did not have any charter or other formal definition of functions until the National Security Act of 1947. See also: RADM Julius Augustus Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 663-664.

Professor Huntington strongly criticizes the "politicalization" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their concentration on political objectives led them to forsake their primary role as military advisers to the government. Thus, an effective civil-military relationship broke down. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs shifted from a pre-war position of recommending the attainment of a balance of power system to the concept of the solidarity of the three great powers. They also favored deferring consideration of the postwar settlement until after the end of hostilities. However, according to Professor Huntington, they did not completely abandon the military viewpoint in their thinking. He gives the examples of their pessimism as to the time and effort that would be required to conquer Japan and their desire to "acquire full ownership of the Japanese mandated islands was a typically military approach which brought them into sharp conflict with civilian agencies of the government. In general, however, on the major issues of policy, the views of the Joint Chiefs were those of the civilian statesmen and of the American public."

The American military, in Professor Huntington's analysis, did not "reach out after power--Marshall was no Ludendorff. Instead, power was unavoidably thrust upon them. They were given no choice but to accept it, and, with it, the implicit conditions upon which it was granted."

Professor Huntington's conclusion is that:

69. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 334.

70. Ibid., p. 316.

The prime deficiency in the conduct of World War II was, therefore, the insufficient representation of the military viewpoint in the formulation of national strategy. This key interest, which should have played a major role, was downgraded and neglected.... Less harmony would have produced better policy. If, instead of moving into the seats of power and embracing civilian goals, the Joint Chiefs had preserved their military roles and warned the political leaders that no war is the last war and that the problem of military security would still be with us after V-day, the United States would have come out of the war in a far better strategic position than it did. The derangement of American civil-military relations was simply the institutional reflection of a deeper malady: the ignorance and naive hopes which led the American people to trade military security for victory.⁷¹

On the lower levels of the military, the traditional military viewpoints remained. Lower-ranking officers, both within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and without, urged the "desirability of formulating postwar goals before the conflict ended, maintaining strong forces after victory, and directing policy toward the achievement of a world-wide balance of power."⁷²

A committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), was established in November 1942 to advise the Joint Chiefs on matters relating to military and strategic policy, postwar military policy, Army and Navy coordination problems, and liaison with the State Department. The members of this committee were delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and served as advisors to the American delegation at the San Francisco Conference for the drafting of the United Nations Charter. The members throughout the war were:

71. Ibid., p. 344.

72. Ibid., p. 335.

Lieut. General S. D. Embick, USA (Ret.), Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN (Ret.), and Major General M. S. Fairchild, USAAC.

As the war progressed, the lower-ranking military staffs also became involved in political matters. For the Army, the Operations Division of the General Staff (OPD) became "enmeshed" in matters other than military operations out of necessity.⁷³

This Division (OPD) was General Marshall's "Command Post" throughout the war. It contained no less than four Rhodes Scholars. It provided the Army's contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. The Army also had to deal with military government of occupied areas.

The Navy Department's Occupied Areas Section (OP-50E) became the Military Government Section of the Central Division (OP-13-2) under Captain Sabin on August 1, 1944, and in October 1945 this was replaced by the Office of Island Governments (OP-22) still under Captain Sabin. Another organ of the Navy Department was the Politico-Military Affairs Division (OP-35) organized in early 1946 under Captain Robert L. Dennison.

These naval offices reported to the Chief of Naval Operations via Vice Admiral Russell Willson (who was also on the JSSC) in his capacity as Vice Chief of Naval Operations or via Rear Admiral R. S. Edwards, originally Chief of Staff to Admiral King and, after October 1, 1944, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Edwards' responsibilities after October 1, 1944, in Admiral King's words, were "to attend to matters of military policy for me, whether derived from the business of

73. Ibid., p. 324.

the Navy Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department or the several war boards, including postwar matters, demobilization, organization, etc."

With the occupation of North Africa, a need for civil government arose; and a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the Combined Chiefs of Staff was created for handling related political problems. This committee included James C. Dunn of State, John T. McCloy of War, and Artemus L. Gates for Navy. Other inter-departmental liaison machinery on the working levels, such as the Working Security Committee (to formulate instructions to Ambassador Winant on the European Advisory Council), gradually evolved to provide collaboration on post-war problems.

Yet, no high-level effective coordinating body existed. The State Department soon fell into the habit of by-passing the service Secretaries to deal directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the working level because of this lack of high-level coordinating machinery. Additionally, the service Secretaries were not on the routine distribution list for JCS papers and had been essentially limited by the President to administrative functions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered only to the President. In the War Department, General Marshall did keep Secretary

74. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN and Walter M. Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record (New York: Norton, 1952), pp. 573-574.

75. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 99, 220-225, 349-350, 368. Military officers were also often consulted by the various State Department committees and sub-committees on an ad hoc basis.

Stimson informed, but "the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body moved outside the orbit of the War Department. And the Combined Civil Affairs Committee proved to be a largely ineffective device for McCloy's use, because as a mere subcommittee it could work only when its parent committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that committee's highly independent member groups, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, concurred."⁷⁶

The Working Security Committee was not satisfactory as an inter-departmental liaison device since it had no high rank in the hierarchy. The members were ill informed on what had been agreed to on higher levels. Obstacles were placed before it by other agencies of similar rank.⁷⁷

Secretary Stimson wrote Cordell Hull a complaint letter on the lack of inter-departmental liaison in November 1944, and McCloy and Forrestal saw Under-Secretary of State Stettinius about the situation. From this, developed the idea of reviving the Secretaries' meetings and to provide a working level committee for continuous staff work. When Stettinius succeeded Hull (officially on December 20, 1944), the State-War-Navy Secretaries' Committee was revived, holding its first meeting on December 19, 1944. It now had better organization with an agenda and with Assistant Secretary McCloy appointed recorder. The Three Secretaries' Committee met once a week

76. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 462. Editor comment on article: Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives For the Occupation of Germany, The Washington Controversy," pp. 313-464.

77. Ibid.

at the State Department. The meetings were informal. Often, decisions were not passed on throughout the three departments. Eventually, assistants were included in the meetings who got together afterwards to decide "who said what."⁷⁸

In November 1944, the "working level committee" was formed, called the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, or SWINC as it was dubbed), which had a full-time secretariat and smaller "working groups" of permanent and ad hoc subcommittees. SWNCC provided for the first time effective and competent coordination of the three departments in the political-military field.⁷⁹

The initial members of the committee were James C. Dunn (State), then Director of the Office of European Affairs; Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy (Army); and Assistant Secretary Artemus L. Gates (Navy), all of whom had worked together on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and its American interdepartmental counterpart. Soon, the Working Security Committee and the American Civil Affairs Committee were absorbed into the SWNCC system. SWNCC was authorized to make positive commitments for the three departments; and its main purpose was to: "reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters of common interest and, under the guidance of the Secretaries of State,

78. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.), Interview, September 4, 1969.

79. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 320 and Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 347-348. The committee continued until June 30, 1949, under the name of the State-Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee. It was the direct ancestor of the National Security Council. See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (2 Vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955), Vol. 2, p. 58.

War, and Navy, establish policies on politico-military questions referred to it."⁸⁰ There was effective and direct liaison between SWNCC and the JCS with some military personnel holding positions in both systems and many SWNCC papers going⁸¹ formally to the JCS for comment and/or concurrence.

Area subcommittees were established within SWNCC for Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Far East. SWNCC was a vast improvement over the pre-war Standing Liaison Committee. Its main drawback was that it was formed so late in the war that "the practical shape of its subject matter was largely determined by the military commanders in the field, Eisenhower in Europe and MacArthur in the Far East."⁸²

Throughout this account of American civil-military relations during the Second World War, the Congress has not been mentioned. This is because Congress played a minor role in wartime diplomacy and strategy. No opposition to President Roosevelt developed within Congress to compare with the Committee on the Conduct of the War that confronted President Wilson. There was a large measure of public debate over the Vichy policy and the acceptance of Darlan in North Africa, but Congress played "no significant part in this prolonged and quite public debate."⁸³ The Truman Committee was the only

80. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (November 11, 1945), pp. 746-747.

81. The files of SWNCC papers at the U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office show an extremely close liaison and coordination between the JCS and SWNCC.

82. Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State, p. 97.

83. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 16. See also: Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 324-235.

real effort of Congress to "oversee" the war. Even there, the Committee accepted the huge funding of the secret "Manhattan" project without knowing its purpose.

In summary, civil-military relations during the Second World War saw vast institutional improvements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, as well as the institutionalization of the Bureau of the Budget, advanced the mechanics of inter-departmental coordination. However, the main emphasis was a highly personal one. Sherwood's and Stimson's accounts, as well as all others, show how high-level coordination was really only achieved at the Presidential level. President Roosevelt was the only one who could resolve questions when any component of the coordination process insisted upon its position rather than compromise. Even within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "any officer, in a minority of one, could employ a rigorous insistence on unanimity as a means of defending the interests of his own service."⁸⁴ Effective coordination on the difficult issues was not guaranteed. In cases of disagreement, resort had to be made to the President for a definite and final decision. This state of affairs was in keeping with his style of administration, but the burden placed upon the system was almost unbearable. The burden placed upon the President took his life.

84. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 515.

CHAPTER THREE
INITIAL PLANNING
1942-1944

Having outlined the background of the islands and of civil-military relations, it is now possible to describe the decision-making process that led to the offering of the Japanese mandated islands to the United Nations as a strategic trusteeship. The years, 1942-1944, can be described as a period of departmental juggling for position on the issue. The various positions were developed and put forward; factional lines were tentatively formed on the issue, potential allies were sought, and the opposing positions were attacked.

President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were in agreement on two areas concerning dependent areas. First, they were determined that the United States would seek no territorial advantage or aggrandizement from the war because, in part, of their desire to set an example for the rest of the world, particularly the Soviet Union.¹ Second, they believed that after the war, nationalism and anti-colonialism would be major forces and that all dependent peoples who were ready for the responsibility of independence and who wanted it should be aided in achieving their aim. In this regard, they felt that the old mandate system was unsatisfactory for developing the people since "the nation

1. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York: Macmillian Co., 1948), Vol. 2, pp. 1466-1467.

which is given the mandate soon comes to believe that it carries sovereignty with it."²

Even before the United States entered the war, the principle of non-aggrandizement was proclaimed. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued, in August 1941, the Atlantic Charter which began, "first, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."³ On January 1 and 2, 1942, the United Nations Declaration, which subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, was signed by representatives of twenty-six nations, including the United States.

The British were rushed into both of these declarations without sufficient time to study them. The President presented Prime Minister Churchill with the requests without prior, lower-level, consultations; and the declarations were marked by "haste and informality."⁴ In fact, there is no signed copy of the Atlantic Charter in the British Archives, and Roosevelt told Churchill at Yalta that the Prime Minister's signature on Roosevelt's copy was in Roosevelt's handwriting.⁵

2. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F. D. R. His Personal Letters 1928-1945 (2 vols., New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), Vol. 2, pp. 1371-1372, letter to Jan Christiaan Smuts, Victoria, South Africa, dated November 24, 1942. See also: Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1478, 1484 and 1496.

3. Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations (4th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 624.

4. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), p. 430.

5. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 6: Triumph and Tragedy (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948-1953), p. 392.

As for the United Nations Declaration, the War Cabinet cabled Churchill on December 31, 1941, asking "why the urgency was 'so great as to oblige us to accept a declaration with these defects.'" ⁶ Mr. Churchill's reply, that the President desired immediate approval and that the Russian Ambassador couldn't agree to any changes without receiving new instructions from Moscow [he evidently had had more warning than Churchill], did not reach London until January 2, 1942, the day of the signing. ⁷ It soon became evident that a sharp difference of interpretation existed between Churchill and Roosevelt over the principles enunciated in the declarations. Roosevelt considered the principles to have universal application, while Churchill told Parliament that the Atlantic Charter in no way affected British policy in India and Burma. ⁸ In fact, the proddings of Roosevelt over India during Churchill's visit to Washington after Pearl Harbor raised Churchill's anger so much that he "reacted so strongly and at such length that he [Roosevelt] ⁹ never raised it again verbally." The question of India, and colonialism in general, was to continue; however, as a sore point in official discussions between the British and the Americans.

6. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 432.

7. Ibid., p. 433.

8. Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Political Science Quarterly, LXX (March, 1955), p. 6.

9. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 4: The Hinge of Fate, p. 209.

Harold Macmillan, Under-Secretary of the British Colonial Office from February to December, 1942, remarked later:

To Roosevelt, Britain owes much. Churchill, from the beginning of the War, set himself out to win the President's confidence.... Nevertheless, President Roosevelt's response was by no means as warm or as open as Churchill believed. Certainly there were prejudices deep in the President's soul which made him suspicious of British policy. With all his apparent sincerity and charm, there lay behind the outward show of friendship a feeling of hostility - perhaps even of jealousy - of the great Imperial story of the Old Country. The British Empire was a bugbear to him. Without any precise knowledge, he would lay down the law about Indian and Colonial affairs; and the liquidation of the British Empire was, whether consciously or unconsciously, one of his aims.... I have frequently observed that this inherited antipathy to 'colonialism' is most marked among the oldest families in the United States, especially in New England. To affect suspicion of Britain is perhaps a kind of unconscious, almost nostalgic, tribute to history. Some of my Boston friends, for instance, never seem to be able to forget that unlucky business about the chests of tea. However this may be, the President was no friend of the British Empire. Nor did he understand the clearly defined and steadily pursued procedures by which we had long planned to bestow, by gradual means, first political education and then political independence upon those races for whom we held responsibility. In almost every joint declaration of policy, the Cabinet had to watch, and if possible eliminate, some dangerous phrases.¹⁰

Soon after Pearl Harbor, the State Department established an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy under Secretary Hull as chairman and Sumner Welles as vice-chairman.

10. Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 158-159.

This committee included many "outsiders" such as Norman H. Davis, president of the Council of Foreign Relations; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs; Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University; Benjamin V. Cohen, general counsel, National Power Policy Committee; and Anne O'Hara McCormick, editorial staff of The New York Times.

This committee worked out the framework for studies of the various postwar problems by July 1942 and, thereafter, ceased to work as a whole. Its Subcommittee on Political Problems under Sumner Welles appointed in June 1942 its own Special Subcommittee on International Organization, which was also headed by Welles, to work in conjunction with the State Department's Division of Special Research under Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs, in developing plans for international trusteeship for dependent areas and for a general international organization.

Dr. Pasvolsky was Chief of the "Research Staff," the officer personnel of the Division of Special Research and its succeeding (after January 1943) Divisions of Political Studies and Economic Studies. Harley A. Notter headed the Division of Political Studies and, under him, Durward V. Sandifer and Benjamin Gerig worked on planning for an international organization. In January 1944, the Division of Political Studies was replaced by the Office of Special Political Affairs, and the Division of Economic Studies was abolished. James C. Dunn headed the Office of Special Political Affairs; and Dr. Pasvolsky, still in overall charge, became Executive Director of a new

Committee on Post-War Programs.

By November 1942, a radical plan had been formulated within the State Department to include all dependent territories under a powerful International Trusteeship Agency exercising its supervisory and administrative functions through regional councils.¹¹

This proposal reflected Sumner Welles' own ideas.¹² It also reflected the ideas of Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman of the Government Department at Harvard University.¹³ Secretary Hull restricted the concept to only those dependent territories taken from the Axis and the mandates of the League of Nations because of "obvious reasons of political feasibility."¹⁴ The President approved the tentative plans as modified by Hull.

Although believing in the political development of dependent peoples, President Roosevelt saw the trusteeship concept itself more in terms of providing for international peace and security than in terms of promoting self-government or independence.¹⁵ Internationally administered "trusteeships" would avoid the

11. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, pp. 109-110 and George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System: A Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations (Geneve: Droz, 1964), p. 23.

12. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 383-384.

13. Arthur N. Holcombe, Dependent Areas in the Post-War World (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 97-94.

14. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1638.

15. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, pp. 25-26 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1304-1305, 1996.

necessity for annexation of any strategic points, deny these points to potential aggressors, avoid rival territorial claims,¹⁶ and enable the international organization to police the world.

President Roosevelt had proposed to the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in June, 1942, a form of trusteeship for the island holdings and other colonial possessions of the "weak nations."¹⁷ In this, he specifically referred to Indo-China, Siam, the Malay States and the Dutch East Indies.

The first recorded mention of the post-war disposition of the Pacific Island Mandate is a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated September 15, 1942, and signed by Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President and head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs had written the letter to Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Security Problems of the State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. In it, they stressed the necessity of depriv-¹⁸ing Japan of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands.

President Roosevelt referred to international trusteeship and, in particular, the Pacific islands during his March, 1943, conference with British Foreign Secretary Eden. He went beyond the State Department's trusteeship plan by suggesting that Indo-

16. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1595-1600; also, John C. Campbell and others, The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 42.

17. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, p. 572.

18. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1944 (7 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Vol. 5, p. 1201 footnote.

China and Korea be placed under trusteeship. He then indicated that the Japanese mandated islands should be internationalized.¹⁹ Hull writes that Eden "indicated he was favorably impressed with this proposal."²⁰ However, Harry Hopkins, who was present at the meeting, wrote that in keeping with British dislike for internationalization of colonial areas, Eden said it would be better to turn the islands over to the United States, "preferably in outright ownership."²¹

Eden cabled home his notes on his most formal conference with the President which was held on March 27, 1943. He reported:

in the Far East the policy is to be 'Japan for the Japanese.' Manchuria and Formosa would be returned to China and southern Sakhalin to Russia. The Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific would pass under the trusteeship of the United Nations.... The French Marquesas and Tuamotu Islands would pass to the United Nations, for use respectively as stages on the northern and southern air routes across the Pacific from Caribbean area to Australia and New Zealand. Korea and French Indo-China would pass under international trusteeship; for the former the trustees might be the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.... [The President] suggested in passing that places like Dakar and Bizerta were of the greatest importance for the defense respectively of the United States and Mediterranean. His idea was that the United States should act as policeman for the United Nations at Dakar and Great Britain at Bizerta.

I remarked that the President was being very hard on the French, from whom the strongest opposition was to be expected. He admitted this, but said that France would no

19. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1596 and Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, pp. 715-716.

20. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1596.

21. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, p. 716.

doubt require assistance for which consideration might be the placing of certain parts of her territory at the disposal of the United Nations. Welles reminded the President that the United States Government had gone on the record for the restoration of French possessions. The President said he thought that this referred only to North Africa but Welles observed there was no such modification. The President said that he thought in the ironing out of things after the war this kind of position could be rectified.²²

President Roosevelt gave his approval a few weeks after Eden's visit to a draft proposal for a policy statement on dependent peoples which was to be presented for discussion at the Quebec Conference with the British in August. One of the major points of the draft was that peoples liberated from Japanese rule and unprepared for autonomy should be placed under some form of international trusteeship representing the United Nations.²³ This draft proposal, which included the goal of independent national status for all colonies, was ill received by the British. Foreign Secretary Eden took special exception to the word "independence."²⁴ Churchill "made no comment on it," a rare occurrence for him.²⁵

The President instructed Hull to bring the proposal up

22. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 438.

23. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 471-472 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235.

24. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 254 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1238.

25. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 440.

at the Foreign Minister's conference at Moscow in October. At a briefing on October 5, 1943, the President once again set forth his position, emphasizing the idea of an international trusteeship system for non-self-governing peoples such as Indo-China and Korea as well as for certain other places in order to provide the United Nations as internationalized string of bases encircling the globe. In this latter category, he mentioned the Pacific mandated islands, Hong Kong, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, Ascension Island, ²⁶ Dakar, and a point in Liberia. Secretary Hull even had to admit that Roosevelt wanted to apply the trusteeship idea ²⁷ "widely to all sorts of situations."

Military opposition to Roosevelt's ideas on trusteeship quickly arose. Admiral Leahy, who was probably closer to Roosevelt than anyone else except Harry Hopkins, firmly disagreed with the President on this issue. In his memoirs he states:

One of Roosevelt's pet ideas, which he had discussed with me on many occasions, was a plan for a series of strategic bases all over the world to be controlled by the United Nations. I could never agree with him on this proposal and always felt that any bases considered essential for the security of our own country should be under the sovereignty of the United States.

His argument, particularly in regard to strategic areas in the Japanese mandated groups which we had captured at a high cost in American lives, was that the United States did not wish to acquire any territorial gains

26. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1305 and 1596.

27. Ibid., p. 1305.

as a result of the war. That was a fixed principle with him. Roosevelt believed that we would get the same protection if the mandated territory was under the United Nations. I thought he was wrong then, and have not changed my mind as these notes are being compiled.²⁸

The Navy Department had also been thinking of the post-war status of these islands; and on March 27, 1943, the high-level General Board headed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who later became a Senator and carried his conclusions to the Senate, reported to the Secretary of the Navy:

It is scarcely conceivable that the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of the present war will permit her to remain established in any capacity in the Pacific islands mandated to her after the last war. Her flagrant and deliberate violations of the provisions of Article 4 of the mandate [no fortifications] would seem definitely to require that an administration other than Japanese be established. For reasons of our own security, and because we are likely to be committed to the protection of the Philippines after they have become independent, the United States is vitally interested in the form which a readjustment in control of these islands may take.... Guam belongs to us and again will be administered by us when it has been wrested from enemy hands. The island is one of the Marianas and, as has been demonstrated in the past, is potentially menaced by the other islands of that group unless the same power controls them all. It follows naturally that the United States should control the entire Marianas group.... Because of their geographical position with relation to the Marianas, the Philippines and Hawaii, the same military principle applies in the case of all the islands mandated to Japan; the control of the whole properly belongs to the United States None of the islands in question possesses

28. Fleet Admiral William Leahy, USN, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 314.

natural features of value from other than the military standpoint. Both from the economic and the political standpoints they are a liability to the nation charged with their control and administration. The transfer to the United States of any or all of those islands with all that is implied therein cannot constitute territorial aggrandizement. Japan has frankly referred to them as "unsinkable aircraft carriers" and their severance from her control will be part of her disarmament.... In connection with future sovereignty over the Japanese islands discussed above, the General Board recommends that planning for postwar conditions provide for the United States possession of: (a) All of the former German islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, i.e. the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas (except Guam).²⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy Department strongly felt that permanent and exclusive control over the islands by the United States was a military necessity for national security and international peace in the postwar world. The proposed international organization was untested with no guarantee that it would be able to maintain international peace and security; whereas, traditional sovereignty would be clearcut, with rights and duties universally accepted. Since the islands would not be an economic asset, there could be no question of "territorial aggrandizement"; and the welfare of the natives, few in number, would be adequately guaranteed by American sovereignty. Furthermore, if the islands were to become a trust territory run by the international organization, who would "watch the watchers?" Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

29. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, General Board, Post-war sovereignty over certain islands in the North Pacific, Report No. 450, Serial No. 240, March 27, 1943, Declassified June 22, 1969, General Board files.

If the organization were to later break down, the status of the islands would be in doubt producing an unstable situation.

These islands were intended by the President and the State Department to be included in the trusteeship system; and, therefore, for that reason alone, the military began demanding changes in the trusteeship plan itself while still fighting for annexation of the islands.

An example of the military's concern is the "Central Pacific Islands" incident. In January 1944, Admiral Nimitz in Honolulu referred in a civil-government directive to "the British Resident Commissioners of Central Pacific Islands to be occupied," meaning the Gilberts and other Central Pacific Islands that Britain owned prior to the war. Admiral King sent a quick message with a follow-up letter telling Nimitz that the wording could be construed to include the Japanese mandated islands; and that, therefore, the directive should be changed to avoid the possibility of giving any nation, other than the United States, any basis for obtaining sovereignty or other territorial rights in the mandated islands.³⁰ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also, recommended to the Secretary of State at the same time that "no action should be taken which directly or indirectly would prejudice the ultimate disposition of these islands."³¹ Some writers have mentioned that this letter to the Secretary of State was a result of

30. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, CinCUS and CNO letter to CinCPAC and CinCPOA, serial 00178, January 18, 1944, Declassified June 20, 1969, CNO files.

31. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1944, Vol. 5, p. 1266. Referred to in Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State June 23, 1944.

British activity in the islands, but the recently declassified communications to Nimitz show that it was clearly a result of the Admiral's directive and intended as a precautionary measure. The military were obviously protecting their preferred solution.

At the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of October 1943, Hull circulated the United States' proposed plan for trusteeship, still in general terms; but the topic was not placed on the agenda.³² Secretary Hull wrote that "we had definite ideas with respect to the future of the British colonial empire on which we differed with the British."³³ He claimed the United States had the right to discuss the British Empire since failure to make provisions for the ultimate self-government of the possessions could produce possible future conflicts involving the United States and that the "right of self-determination" declarations applied, not only to the occupied countries of Europe, but to peoples everywhere.³⁴ Eden remarked that he was not prepared to discuss the American proposed text, and Molotov only said he would study it.³⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained a victory of sorts when the President, on November 23, 1943, approved the policy

32. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 197-198.

33. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1477-1478.

34. Ibid., p. 1478.

35. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 440.

that "the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in the 'Blue Area' described as 'Required for the direct defense of the United States ...'" ³⁶ Yet, the President only a week later, holding a memorandum from the State Department's Geographer's Office on the question of trusteeship for certain Pacific islands, favorably mentioned the concept of international trusteeship as Hull had outlined it at Moscow during the afternoon conference on November 29 at the Allied Conference at Teheran. ³⁷

Admiral Leahy was still trying to convince the President not to apply the trusteeship concept to the mandated islands. In his notes of the Teheran conference, he wrote:

The problem of trusteeships came up during the United Nations discussion. Roosevelt was convinced that his proposed world organization could exercise the necessary sovereignty over such areas as the mandated Japanese islands which Tokyo had exploited so fully while ostensibly these islands still were under the control of the League of Nations. In our conversations, I had argued vigorously that the United States, for its own future security, should keep and exercise sovereignty over any of the Japanese mandated islands that we captured. ³⁸

The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, stated that the United States, United Kingdom, and China "covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

36. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1945 (5 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 94. Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1945.

37. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 197-198.

38. Leahy, I Was There, p. 210.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914...." ³⁹

Thus, the policy was officially announced that the mandated islands would be taken from Japan, but the old formula of "no territorial aggrandizement" was repeated.

Early in 1944, the State Department's committees produced a revised plan for trusteeship which would include dependent areas voluntarily placed under the system as well as the mandates and former enemy territory. The new plan called for the system to operate under the international organization's General Assembly rather than through regional councils. Actual supervisory authority would be exercised by a subsidiary Trusteeship Commission. Of major importance, it contained a provision giving the international organization's Executive Council authority over any trust territories where fortifications were to be established under the application of international security measures. ⁴⁰ This was the beginning of the subsequent strategic areas concept in the United Nations Charter. Thullen believes that this provision reflected "the tendency towards increased realism regarding the necessity of mechanisms to ensure international security and, in particular, Roosevelt's determination to

39. U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 232, (December 4, 1943), Cairo Declaration, p. 393.

40. Ruth Russell and Jeanette Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, October, 1958), pp. 341-343.

place all strategic bases under United Nations control since it was an abandonment of the former principle of non-militarization of mandated areas."⁴¹

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox spoke out for annexation publically on March 9, 1944, when he stated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "'those mandated islands have become Japanese territory and as we capture them they are ours.' He explained that they were not of much use except for military purposes, and that nobody in the Government opposed his view that such of them as were necessary as bases should be allotted to us."⁴² Where Secretary Knox got the impression that "nobody in the Government opposed his view that such of them as were necessary as bases should be allotted to us" is hard to imagine. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were still thinking in terms of an international organization administering strategic bases throughout the world. Unfortunately, Knox always relied on his "newspaperman's memory" and never dictated notes of conferences, and his private papers contain little substantive matter. His statement probably is just indicative of his being left out of strategic and postwar planning discussions. Admiral King's papers seem to indicate there was little personal contact or friendship between Knox and himself, and President Roosevelt relied solely on his military advisers during the war for strategic planning.

41. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, p. 32.

42. Huntington Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4 (July, 1944) pp. 640-641.

On March 11, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote to the Secretary of State detailing their firm position on the mandated islands:

As evidenced in the present war, the Japanese Mandated Islands bear a vital relation to the defense of the United States. Their assured possession and control by the United States are essential to our security. Together they constitute a single military entity, no element of which can be left to even the partial control of another nation without hazard to our control of that entity The Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under the sole sovereignty of the United States. Their conquest is being effected by the forces of the United States and there appears to be no valid reason why their future status should be the subject of discussion with any other nation.⁴³

In April 1944, Dr. I. Bowman of the State Department was in London with Under-Secretary Stettinius. Dr. Bowman told the British Foreign Office that the State Department still wanted a joint Anglo-American declaration concerning trusteeship. According to the British Foreign Office, the State Department's

idea was now to emphasise the promotion of material well-being and self-government rather than political independence, but they envisaged international machinery of a supervisory and not merely a consultative character. He [Dr. Bowman] said that American opinion would expect something to be said on the subject in connexion with the World Organisation. Mr. Standley told him that the British Government would not go beyond the parliamentary statement of July 13, 1943 [statement of British policy

43. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1944, Vol. 5, p. 1201. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, March 11, 1944.

in the House of Commons by Mr. Oliver Standley that explained the British policy of gradual self-government for dependent peoples]. The Foreign Office thought that the Americans wished for a statement in order to justify their own plans to annex certain Japanese islands in the Pacific, and because the President wanted in his election campaign to avoid any risk of being called a champion of imperialism.⁴⁴

Of interest in respect to that last surmise, a Gallup Poll published on May 23, 1944, gave a boost to the advocates of American control of the islands. It indicated that 69 percent of the American public desired to "keep" Micronesia as well as the islands owned or controlled by Britain and Australia that the United States had captured.⁴⁵

The State Department still intended for the islands to be placed under the trusteeship system; and the latest form of the plan, dated June 22, 1944, was submitted to the State Department's high-level Postwar Programs Committee which, under Hull as chairman and Under Secretary of State Stettinius as vice-chairman, reviewed proposals before they were submitted to the President.

The next day, June 23, 1944, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major General George V. Strong, Senior Army Member of the Joint Post War Committee, concerned with reports of Australian and New Zealand designs on the islands, saw Joseph C. Grew, Director of the State Department Office

44. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 440.

45. Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship," Foreign Affairs, p. 642.

of Far Eastern Affairs. He repeated the Joint Chiefs' position on the disposition of the islands. This conversation⁴⁶ was reported to the Secretary of State.

The military officers gained a strong supporter in this matter when James V. Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy. He saw the State Department's June 22, 1944, trusteeship plan and was shocked. He talked to Stettinius about it on July 7, 1944, asking "if this was a serious document and if he understood that the President was committed to it (I [Forrestal] added that it seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar arrangements that there should be no debate as to who ran the Mandated Islands...)." ⁴⁷ While this shows the beginning of what proved to be great support for the military's point of view, it also demonstrates the appalling lack of coordination between the military and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and, also, the lack of coordination between the State and Navy Departments.

The State Department began to feel the influence of political, as well as, military pressure. Former President Hoover supported retention of Pacific bases in a speech to the Republican national convention in June 1944, and various⁴⁸ Senators were also speaking out for annexation.

The trusteeship plan was radically revised downgrading the powers of the Trusteeship Council to merely examining

46. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1944, Vol. 5, p. 1266. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1944.

47. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 8.

48. The New York Times, June 28, 1944, and September 24, 1946.

reports from the administering authorities, conducting periodic inspections, and considering petitions. Under the older plans, the stress was on direct administration; and the Trusteeship Council would have had the power of being able to recommend and revise trusteeship charter terms, to designate or replace administering authorities, and to terminate trust status. Another gain for the military was that the active role that the trust territories were to play in providing for the maintenance of international peace and security was emphasized.⁴⁹

The President himself was finally influenced by the consistent opposition of the Joint Chiefs to international administration of the islands. In reply to a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending annexation, he pointed out on July 10, 1944, that the United States was seeking no additional territory but that "I am working on the idea that the United Nations will ask the United States to act as Trustee for the Japanese Mandated Islands. With this will go the civil authority ... and also the military authority to protect them; i.e. fortifications, etc. It does not necessarily involve a decision on permanent sovereignty."⁵⁰ The President on July 15th also approved the trusteeship proposals in their new, July 6th, form.

49. Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter, pp. 344-345 and Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, Appendix 39, p. 606.

50. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 387.

The above steps were a giant movement toward a compromise position in the formulation of an agreed-upon policy; but the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War and Navy (now Stimson and Forrestal) still felt uneasy over the situation. The President had left Washington on the 15th (the same day he approved the trusteeship plan) for a conference in Honolulu with MacArthur and Nimitz. While he was gone, the American Delegation for Dumbarton Oaks met on July 18 preparatory to the conference. The Delegation was composed of Under-Secretary Stettinius, Grew (then Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Bowman, Cohen, Dunn, Hackworth, Hiss, Hornbeck, Pasvolsky, Notter, Admiral Willson, Admiral Train, General Embick and General Strong, among others. At this meeting, the members representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admirals Willson and Train with Generals Embick and Strong, achieved a "coup" when they "by specific and insistent request" obtained the decision to omit the section on trusteeship from the "Tentative Proposals" and from the scope of matters to be raised by the United States at the conference.⁵¹ Secretary Hull described this as a "great disappointment" for it

had been a project conceived and elaborated in the State Department by my associates and me and enthusiastically concurred in by the President.... The Joint Chiefs felt that a discussion of the trusteeship system would inevitably embrace concrete questions of who should

51. Ibid., p. 295 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1706-1707.

be trustee over what territories, and that dissension might therefore arise among the Allies.

Furthermore, they were anxious to keep the whole matter open pending a determination within our own Government of a definite policy with regard to the subsequent disposal of some of the Japanese islands in the Pacific, including those held by Japan under mandate. It was their view that complete control of these islands by the United States for military purposes was necessary to our national security, and they felt that this could perhaps best be achieved through outright annexation rather than through a trusteeship system.

My associates and I, on the other hand, were convinced that the security objective of the United States control of the islands for military purposes, could be fully secured through a system of trusteeship.... While we agreed to the omission of this subject from the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, we did not intend to let the project die and hoped to bring it up again at the general meeting of the United Nations.⁵²

These views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were later officially conveyed to the Secretary of State in a note dated August 3, 1944, from General Marshall.⁵³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that:

From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeships and territorial settlements, particularly as they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan.⁵⁴

52. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1706-1707.

53. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 295 and U. S. State Department, Foreign Relations 1944, Vol. 1, p. 700.

54. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27 files; SWNCC 27 dated January 19, 1945, and February 15, 1945; and SWNCC 27-1, dated February 26, 1945; Declassified, March 1970.

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, held between August and October, 1944, trusteeship was not discussed except for an informal expression of interest by each of the foreign governments in a future consideration of the issue after a private exchange of papers.⁵⁵ For two weeks after the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the State Department worked on a draft letter addressed to General Marshall for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It proposed that the "Tentative Proposals" that had been withheld from the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks should now be sent to the other three major powers for inter-governmental exchanges of views prior to the general United Nations conference. An ad hoc committee was established to consider the problem as a whole and the draft letter in particular. It was comprised at the "policy level" by Pasvolsky and Dunn and at the "working level" by Henry S. Villard of the Near Eastern Office, Robert B. Stewart of the European Office, Harley Notter of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Benjamin Gerig, Donald C. Blaisdell, James F. Green, and Ralph Bunche from the Divisions of the latter Office, and C. Easton Rothwell, the Executive Secretary of the Post-War Programs Committee.⁵⁶ Rather than delivering the draft letter, it was decided to invite Admiral Willson and General Strong of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to informal discussions on the issue. Such a discussion was held on November 8th with

55. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 375.

56. Ibid., p. 387.

Acting Secretary of State Stettinius, Hackworth, Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Wilson participating. No meeting ground could be reached,⁵⁷ and consideration of the problem was inconclusive.

On November 15, 1944, Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky saw the President who told them that the principle of international trusteeship should be firmly established with adequate machinery for this purpose.⁵⁸ He also directed the State Department, "in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to redouble their efforts in examining the trusteeship proposals further."⁵⁹

Prior to leaving the year 1944, it is useful to take a look at what the Congressional and public opinions were concerning this issue during this period, August 1944 through January 1945.

Church groups, labor groups affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems (which summarized the views of faculty groups in forty-five colleges and universities), all advocated the advancement of dependent peoples, with a variety of administrative machinery recommended. Beyond the general attitudes, the above groups gave very little attention to the mandated islands.⁶⁰

57. Ibid., pp. 374-376.

58. Ibid., p. 377.

59. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System, p. 34.

60. John W. Masland, "Group Interests in Post-War American Pacific Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council Paper No. 6, January, 1945, p. 10.

The Universities Committee proposed three main solutions for the islands. One solution was to put them under the direct supervision of the international organization. Another solution was to put them under a regional commission representing the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and China. The commission might, in turn, report to an agency of the international organization. The third solution was that they should be mandated by the international organization to some one country, in the case of many islands to the United States. The report stated the first solution was favored by two-thirds of the faculty groups expressing an opinion, and that the other third were evenly divided between the other two solutions. However, several groups mentioned they would favor the third choice as an alternative if the first one was unavailable.⁶¹

On the other side of the issue, the American Legion recommended in September 1944 that "support be given such measures as may be needed to assure our nation of the continued control and supervision of such Army and Navy bases as may be deemed necessary for national security and protection of our nation."⁶² The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Denver reported to the Pacific Affairs Conference that during 1944 (no month mentioned), the following questions were asked of the American public:

61. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

62. Ibid., p. 25, Resolution adopted by the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the American Legion, Chicago, Illinois, September 18-20, 1944.

"Do you expect the United States to fight in another war within fifty years?"
 Yes 54%, No 25%, Depend on Peace 4%, Undecided 17%.

Those who answered "Yes" and the "Undecided" were asked: "Are there any particular countries you think we are likely to fight against?"

| | | |
|-----|-------------------------|-----------|
| 33% | spontaneously mentioned | Russia |
| 17% | " | " Germany |
| 10% | " | " Japan |
| 6% | " | " England |

(Some other nations received a few votes)⁶³

These results would seem to indicate a sense of realism, rather than idealism, among the American public that might be construed as likely support for retention of strategic islands.

Senator McKellar (D. Tenn.) introduced a resolution asking for permanent American tenure of all Japanese islands between the equator and 30°N plus Bermuda, the West Indian colonies, and the Galapagos Islands. ⁶⁴ Senator Reynolds

(D., N.C.) concurred with Senator McKellar and offered to ⁶⁵ extend the proposition to include "southern" California.

Senator Albert B. (Happy) Chandler (D., Ky.) announced the United States must "have possession of every island in every ocean which, if in the possession of an enemy, would be a ⁶⁶ direct menace to the people of the United States." Of course, this was a period close to the 1944 elections, and the political statements might not always reflect sober judgment; but the general tenor is important.

63. Harry H. Field, "American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council Paper No. 8, January, 1945, p. 16.

64. U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., August 15, 1944, p. 7007.

65. Ibid., August 15, 1944, pp. 7017-7018 and August 18, 1944, p. 7170.

66. Ibid., August 15, 1944, p. 7017.

The Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945, discussed dependent peoples. It was attended by Phillip C. Jessup, Admiral T. C. Hart, Ralph J. Bunche, Huntington Gilchrist, and Felix M. Deesing, among other Americans. A total of twelve countries were represented. The round-table discussions strongly emphasized the need for the political development of dependent peoples. Those representing subject peoples felt that "security" might become an excuse after the war for the deferring of independence. The representatives from the colonial powers argued that their countries had no desire to extend their possessions and that they were in favor of future self-government but had to keep in mind their responsibilities which, if hastily abandoned, would increase the "instability and insecurity of the world as a whole."⁶⁷ When the mandated islands were discussed, an American member, not identified, told the round table that the United States, because of postwar security commitments to the Philippines, might need bases in the islands. The United States would then need to exercise full sovereignty over the islands. He pointed out that the "islands were deficient in economic resources and that their maintenance will involve enormous expense.... There was no doubt, however, that if the general doctrine of accountability prevailed, the United States would fully accept its requirements."⁶⁸ A British member said that a transfer of the

67. Security in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), pp. 89-90.

68. Ibid., p. 117.

islands to the United States could hardly be considered a matter of imperialism but "of common sense and world security, as well as in the interests of the local people; but such a matter was tied up with the future of the mandate system. There could be no objection if the transfer were with the consent of the people and made by international agreement and if the principle of accountability were adopted."⁶⁹ There is no record of other responses. "Accountability" referred to the proposed requirement that the administering powers, while having full sovereignty, would make reports on the administration of their dependent territories and would permit visits by members of an international authority.

Stettinius and Grew were confirmed as Secretary and Under-Secretary of State on December 20, 1944, and quickly put into effect a reorganization plan that had been developed within the State Department. Dr. Pasvolsky continued as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs, in charge of "the work of preparing for a United Nations Conference to establish an International Security Organization."⁷⁰ The Office of Special Political Affairs, under Edwin C. Wilson since May 8, 1944, and under Alger Hiss after January 27, 1945, assumed more responsibilities. It had a Division of International Organization Affairs under Durward V. Sandifer with Benjamin Gerig as

69. Ibid.

70. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 349.

associate chief who also headed the new Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Under the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, came Ralph J. Bunche as associate chief and James F. Green who was in charge of the Trusteeship Administrative Branch.

The new Division of International Security Affairs, under Joseph E. Johnson, was responsible for matters regarding the security phases of the proposed United Nations organization including "the relevant security aspects of United States foreign policy generally."⁷¹ The high-level Policy and Post-War Programs Committees were transformed rather than abolished, being effectively replaced by a new Secretary's Staff Committee. This committee had a secretariat under Mr. Yost which succeeded the former secretariats of the Policy and Post-War Programs Committees. The members of the Secretary's Staff Committee were: the Secretary as Chairman; the Under Secretary, Joseph C. Grew; the Assistant Secretaries; the Legal Adviser, Mr. Hackworth; and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Organization and Security Affairs, Leo Pasvolsky. The Assistant Secretaries included William L. Clayton, Economic Affairs; Nelson A. Rockefeller, Latin American Relations; Brig. General Julius C. Holmes, Administration; Dean Acheson, Congress-State Relations; and James C. Dunn, European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern and African Affairs.

Additionally, it was during December 1944 that the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee and the Committee of the Three

71. Ibid., p. 351.

Secretaries were established. Within the military, the unification controversy had begun in 1943 and by December 1944, ⁷² had already arrived full blown before Congress. Additionally, the Interior Department, under the head of Harold Ickes, was casting covetous eyes on the navy administered islands in the Pacific, i.e. American Samoa and Guam. Some navy personnel were evidently reciprocating these sentiments, for Ickes wrote the following letter to Forrestal on November 1, 1944:

For Personal Attention

Dear Jim: I have again received word from a reliable source that the Navy is working on a bill to transfer jurisdiction over the islands and territories [Interior administered Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands] from this Department to the Navy. I may have told you that I mentioned this matter to the President, and he expressed his opposition to any such transfer. I am virtually certain that work is being done in the Navy, and I believe that it is being done without your consent. I have reason to believe that a Captain Ramsey, of the Judge Advocate General's Office, is participating in this activity.

I hope that you will take immediate steps to put a stop to this enterprise.⁷³

This was the beginning of a long and bitter conflict between the Navy and the Interior Department that was to last through the 1950's. Both Departments desired to administer the Pacific island possessions, and Harold Ickes' personality and contempt for the Navy only exacerbated the struggle.

Thus, 1944 ended with the military heavily involved in

72. Demetrios, Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), Congressional hearings were conducted on unification each year from 1944 through 1947.

73. U. S., National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Box 3667.

the development of the trusteeship system as a result of their interest in the Pacific islands. If the President and the State Department had not the intention of including the Pacific mandated islands within the trusteeship system, the military would not have become interested in the trusteeship system.

The military had, in fact, obtained a virtual veto on the trusteeship plans by the President's requiring the State Department to examine its plan "in consultation" with the military. This fitted in with the President's administrative style of frequently not making firm decisions thereby allowing subordinates to fight out the issues in order to force the disagreements either to a compromise solution or eventually up to his level for final resolution. His health at this time and his general style of administration have been succinctly described by James MacGregor Burns:

The great tasks of peace lay ahead - but now [after the 1944 election], as the year of victory neared, Roosevelt was desperately tired. The ceaseless toll and tension of the war years were leaving their mark. Like the great actor he was, he could shake himself out of his weariness and take his old role before the people. Fighting off campaign rumors about his condition, he had handled the exacting "Fala" speech - which so easily could have flopped - with exquisite skill; he had driven gaily for hours through New York streets in a cold, driving rain. But at other times he seemed quite different. His face went slack; he slumped in his chair; his hands trembled more than ever.

Yet so swiftly did he shift from dullness to buoyancy that even while his friends were whispering to one another about their concern there would be fresh reports that the President was showing his old form....

Those who know Roosevelt best could agree fully on only one point - that he was a man infinitely complex and almost incomprehensible. 'I cannot come to grips with him!' Ickes cried more than once, and the words were echoed by a host of congressmen, politicians, diplomats, and bureaucrats who dealt with the canny politician in the White House. His character was not only complex, Robert Sherwood observed, it was contradictory to a bewildering degree.

The contradictions continually bemused or galled Roosevelt's lieutenants....

In many little ways inconsistency ruled; in the way he thanked some subordinates for their efforts and said nothing to others, intervened in some administrative matters and ignored others, had four men doing a single job in some instances (as Flynn once complained) and one man doing four jobs in others, was unaccountably frivolous about some matters and grave about others.

And there was the most baffling quality of all - his sheer, superb courage in facing some challenges, and his caution and indirection in facing others. He acted instantly, electrically, on certain decisions, and unaccountably postponed others for months. It was not strange that he should follow Machiavelli's advice that a leader must be as brave as the lion and as shrewd as the fox, for this had long been the first lesson for politicians. But his metamorphoses from lion to fox and back to lion again mystified even his intimates.⁷⁴

Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky must have been very mystified after their November 15, 1944, conference with the President. They must have expected full support for their trusteeship plan with a firm Presidential decision made in their favor. Instead, they were directed "in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to redouble their efforts in examining the trusteeship proposals further."

74. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 468 [health] and p. 472 [style].

The military, thanks to the President's failure to firmly back the State Department, now had a virtual veto on the trusteeship plans. The State Department was anxious to have an approved plan ready for the San Francisco conference; whereas, the military, if they were not satisfied, could protect their position by merely withholding their approval or by utilizing delaying tactics. The State Department fully realized this state of affairs. On December 30, 1944, Stettinius wrote letters to Forrestal and to Stimson emphasizing that a provision for trusteeship was bound to appear in the United Nations Charter since "not only had the issue been raised by the other participants at Dumbarton Oaks, but considerable criticism had been voiced in the United States against omission⁷⁵ of Section IX [trusteeship] from the 'Tentative Proposals.'" This statement was evidently a bluff for Britain would probably have been more than willing to see no chapter on trusteeships in the Charter while China and the Soviet Union had not shown any strong interest in the matter. Public opinion in the United States has already been described. After this opening comment, Stettinius conceded a major point to the military in order to get consultations started. The State Department proposed that "preparations be made to discuss the general principles and appropriate machinery for international trusteeship, leaving for future discussions all questions of specific territories."⁷⁶ [emphasis added]

75. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, Appendix 54, pp. 660-661.

76. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR
FINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TRUSTEESHIP PLAN, 1945

Agreement was reached in January 1945 on the establishment of an ad hoc Inter-départmental Committee on Dependent Area Aspects of International Organization. The State Department appointed its members on January 5th; but the first meeting was not held until February 2, 1945. The State Department was represented by Dr. Pasvolsky (Chairman), Assistant Secretaries Dunn, Nelson Rockefeller, and Clayton, and Isaiah Bowman. Admiral Willson represented the Navy Department, while Generals Embick and Fairchild represented the War Department and Air Corps respectively. The military representatives were all from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Harold Ickes sent his Under-Secretary Abe Fortas on the basis of Interior's administration of certain island possession of the United States. This is the first official representation of the Interior Department on a committee considering trusteeship provisions. The Interior Department was also to be represented at the San Francisco Conference by Abe Fortas and Benjamin Thoron on the direct request of Secretary Ickes.¹ Other members of the committee were Charles W. Taussig, the United States Commissioner on the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission; Wilson,

1. U. S., National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Box 2879, Letters, Ickes to Stettinius, March 9, 1945; and Grew to Ickes, March 22, 1945.

Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs and the committee's Acting Chairman when necessary; Charles P. Taft, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and alternate for Mr. Clayton; Benjamin Thoron, Director of the Interior Department's Division of Territories and Island Possessions; Mr. Haley, Director of the Office of Commercial Policy; and Gerig and Green from the staff of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Admiral Harold C. Train stood in for Admiral Willson on one occasion and Alger Hiss for Mr. Wilson on one occasion.

While this committee was being established, informal discussions between the State Department and Col. Oliver F. G. Stanley, British Minister of State for the Colonies "on the possibilities of regional commissions for colonial territories, of a declaration of standards for administration of all dependent territories, and of trusteeship. There was recognition, most fully expressed in the discussion on January 18, of the heightening urgency for effecting an exchange of papers on trusteeship before the projected general United Nations conference convened."² However, the State Department was fully aware that the main problem was not the British but the American military. Harley Notter continues:

The immediate problem in the remaining preparation on this question, however, was not international. Rather it was to arrive at an agreed policy proposal within this

2. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, p. 389.

Government that would satisfactorily take into account all the vital national interests of the United States involved in this complex question, including especially provision for the security of the United States in the Pacific. Congressional interest in the disposition to be made of the Pacific islands not under the control of an Allied power was strongly expressed in this period, and a subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives was appointed on January 23 to study this matter.³

About January 20-21, 1945, Forrestal entered in his diary a memorandum that Stimson had prepared for the Secretary of State which was eventually delivered on January 23 just prior to Stettinius' departure for the Yalta Conference. Forrestal records that Stimson felt the disposition of the islands should be settled by the big powers in advance instead of through the proposed trusteeship system. "You will get into needless mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will include them before the necessity of their acquisition by the United States is established and recognized," Stimson wrote.⁴ Stimson further pointed out that the Pacific islands could not properly be regarded as colonies since they did not have large populations of considerable economic resources.

They do not really belong in such a classification. Acquisition of them by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future

3. Ibid.

4. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 28-29.

world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world.⁵

Dr. Pasvolsky stressed the "necessity of responding to the approaches of other governments concerning our views on a trusteeship system" when the Inter-departmental Committee⁶ met for the first time on the second of February. A breakthrough of sorts occurred during the second meeting, held on the 8th. Certain essential differentiations between strategic and non-strategic areas for trusteeship purposes were developed at this meeting. Strategic areas would come within the purview of the Security Council, where the unanimity rule⁷ would apply. This was the basic concept that eventually proved acceptable to all parties. Of course, the military had gone into the discussions with the firm agreement that any discussions or agreements would not prejudice the ultimate decision as to the disposition of any specific territory.

On February 26, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially informed the Secretary of State they had no objections, from the military point of view, to inter-departmental discussions on trusteeship providing such discussions:

5. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 600.

6. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 389.

7. Ibid., pp. 389-390.

a. Give full consideration to the future defense needs of the United States.

b. Exclude direct or indirect discussion of the disposition of any territory under the sovereignty of the United States, or any Japanese territory occupied by the United States forces.

c. Consider no agreement that may eventually give to any foreign nation claim to any control of the "Japanese Mandated Islands" north of the Equator. If there are to be no direct acquisitions of security outposts by the United States or the other principle powers, such proposals should include a type of trusteeship, in respect to all or any part of these areas, which will assure the security interests of the several agreeing nations.... You are assured that, when it has reached a point where there is a draft - or perhaps alternative drafts - suitable for submission as a basis for discussion within this Government, the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will promptly supply their suggestions and recommendations covering the security interests of the country.⁸

The trusteeship plan eventually adopted by the committee specifically stated that it made no assumption about the inclusion of any specific territory. It included a special category of trusteeships: that of "strategic areas" which would come under the United Nations Security Council where the United States' veto would safeguard American interests.⁹

8. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 93-95. Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (James Clement Dunn) to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1945. The various drafts and position papers that the military utilized in preparing this reply are found in: U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office; SWNCC 27 files; SWNCC 27, dated January 19, 1945, and February 15, 1945; and SWNCC 27-1, dated February 26, 1945; Declassified, March 1970.

9. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, p. 134. Memorandum by the Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent Areas, March 17, 1945. The Committee ceased to meet after March 15, 1945.

No evidence is available to indicate exactly when or by whom the "strategic area" suggestion was made. Between meetings of the Inter-departmental Committee, the State Department representatives on the Committee as well as Ralph Bunche, Hartley, Johnson, Notter, and Sandifer met to consider the problems and devise or appraise solutions. The original idea may have come from one of these men or possibly from one of the other Departments represented on the Committee. Ambassador John D. Hickerson states it probably originated in Pasvolsky's and Benjamin Gerig's "United Nations Office" of the State Department; and that it was a real compromise of "one-worlorder" Gerig's principles to accept the strategic trusteeship concept. Gerig probably felt it was the only way to break the deadlock after seeing how strong the Navy felt about annexation. For Ambassador Hickerson, who was on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and in the State Department's European Affairs Office, the strategic concept was acceptable since annexation of the islands appeared to be out of the question. He had previously argued within the State Department for the exclusion of the mandated islands from trusteeship by annexation rather than water down the trusteeship system in order to include the islands; while, at the same time, protecting American security interests.¹⁰

The State Department felt that American security would be fully safeguarded by such a "strategic trusteeship." From this time on, the State Department argued for making the islands a

10. Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Ret., Interview, June 19, 1969.

"strategic trusteeship" with the United States as sole administrator. The military were still not ready to discard their preference for outright annexation. As a fall-back position, however, the military now had a category of trusteeship that was the next closest thing to annexation. They continued to stress the point that their cooperation in developing the trusteeship system did not prejudice in any way the ultimate decision on the postwar disposition of the mandated islands.

While the plan was still being worked out in the Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent Areas, President Roosevelt took the original, broad trusteeship ideas to Yalta; and when Stettinius started to read them to Churchill, the Prime Minister exploded. He stated that "after we have done our best to fight in this war and have done no crime to anyone I will have no suggestion that the British Empire is to be put in the dock and examined by everybody to see whether it is up
11
to their standard."

Eden writes that "though the Prime Minister's vehemence was a warning signal to the Americans it appeared to give most pleasure to Stalin. He got up from his chair, walked up and down, beamed, and at intervals broke into applause. This embarrassed Roosevelt and did not really profit anybody, except perhaps Stalin, who was able to please himself and point the
12
division of his allies at the same time."

11. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), Foreword, no page number.

12. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning, p. 595.

Churchill calmed down when Stettinius explained that the United States did not contemplate any discussions of specific islands or territories to be placed under the trusteeship system; and that "later on, we have in mind that the Japanese mandated islands be taken away from the Japanese. We have nothing in mind with reference to the British Empire."¹³

Churchill, still distrustful, obtained the following note:

It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship should be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.¹⁴

These statements reassured American military leaders as much as they did the British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found a helpful ally.

One disturbing thought is suggested by Sir Llewellyn Woodward's comment that one of the reasons why Churchill did not oppose President Roosevelt on matters which Churchill considered secondary was that "he expected to have to resist American proposals hostile to the recovery of British territory."¹⁵ Churchill was evidently so opposed to placing any part of the British Empire under international trusteeship that it affected his position on non-related issues. Churchill explained his

13. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, Foreword, no page number. See also: Edward R. Stettinius, FDR and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1949), pp. 232-237 and Leahy, I Was There, p. 313 for slightly different accounts of the incident.

14. Stettinius, FDR and the Russians, p. 212.

15. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, p. xlvii.

Yalta position to the Lord President of the Council on March 10, 1945, as follows:

The expression "mandate system" was only used at Yalta to limit the territories which would come within the scope of discussions affecting 'territorial trusteeship.' This is necessary in view of the disappearance of the old League of Nations, on whose authority the mandates were held. It in no way governs any arrangement that may be made for the future. We are certainly not committed to the maintenance of the mandate system; but there is no question of subjecting any non-mandated British territories to any form of territorial trusteeship unless we choose to do so of our own accord. I should myself oppose such a departure, which might well be pressed upon nations like Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium, who have great colonial possessions, by the United States, Russia, and China, who have none.¹⁶

In February 1945, Forrestal toured the Pacific theater and became even more concerned over the question of postwar control of the islands. This is indicated by a memorandum that a Captain C. J. Moore wrote to Admiral Edwards that seems to have been written soon after Forrestal's trip.¹⁷ Vincent Davis interprets this memorandum as also suggesting that there was very little consultation between the Navy Department and the other Departments (State and War) on the issue.¹⁸ As has been shown, however, there were inter-departmental consultations on the matter; but, in effect, Secretary Forrestal

16. Winston Churchill, The Second World War; Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 739-740.

17. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain Moore to Admiral Edwards, undated, Serial 1150D, OP-50D files.

18. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 298.

had been left out of the picture. As Vincent Davis points out, Forrestal's diaries indicate he did not go to Admiral King until March 10, 1945, to learn "what the officers were planning or desired in connection with this matter."¹⁹ This was the time the Three Secretaries (State, War, and Navy) Meetings and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee were just starting to get off the ground. From this point on, Forrestal plays a leading role in the struggle to insure the protection of American security interests in any trusteeship system.

At a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roosevelt talked of his ideas on the trusteeship of the mandated islands. Forrestal summarized the discussion in his diary:

He [Roosevelt] said that his idea which he advanced to Stalin and Churchill, was based on the concept of what he called multiple sovereignty - that is, sovereignty would be vested in all of the United Nations, for example, of the Pacific islands, but that we would be requested by them to exercise complete trusteeship for the purpose of world security. He further said that the Australians had advanced the theses that they would take by direct acquisition everything south of the equator, leaving to us those islands north of that line [the mandate]. This he said was unacceptable. I said there were a number of places that we ought to have for our naval security - Kwajalein, the Marianas, Truk, etc. He also included Manus in this category and said that he would even be inclined to have military rights on Noumea while leaving to the French the economic accruals from New Caledonia. The Secretary of War [Stimson] expressed the hope that if the trusteeship

19. Ibid.

idea was adopted the basis of our exercise of powers under it would be very clearly stated so that there could be no misunderstandings in the future.²⁰

This account, if accurate, indicates Roosevelt's thoughts on the sovereignty of the islands had clarified since his letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the past July. It was the day after this cabinet meeting that Forrestal discussed the matter with Admiral King. At the State-War-Navy Secretarial Meeting on March 13th, Stimson repeated his concern about the trusteeship concept and "told the Secretary of State [Stettinius] he thought he would in due course have to get rid of the gentleman [Leo Pasvolksy] in his Department who was the sponsor of this idea. The Secretary of State agreed, said he had discussed this matter last night with Mr. Hull."²¹ This was the first indication that Stettinius was not of the same mind as Hull and Pasvolksy on this issue.

On March 15th, Mr. Charles W. Taussig, of the State Department's Section on the Anglo-Caribbean Commission and later a member of the American Delegation to San Francisco, met with the President and briefed him on the trusteeship discussions within the Inter-departmental Committee:

I outlined the agreement that had been reached on the general category of strategic areas, and told the President that the military had indicated that they would interpret strategic areas as an entire area - for instance, all of the Japanese islands, north of the Equator, that might come under the

20. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 33.

21. Ibid., p. 36.

administration of the United States. I told him that under their interpretation, the entire group of islands irrespective of whether they were fortified or not would be exempt from substantially all of the international agreements pertaining to civilian populations; that the military had been unwilling to agree to divide strategic areas into two categories - closed areas and open areas.

The President said that he would favor these two categories and that the open areas should be subject to international agreements. He said that if the military wanted, at a later date due to change in strategy, to make all or part of the open area a closed area, it should be provided that this could be done with the approval of the Security Council.

The President then asked me, "What is the Navy's attitude in regard to territories? Are they trying to grab everything?" I replied that they did not seem to have much confidence in civilian controls. The President then asked me how I accounted for their attitude.

I said that I thought that the military had no confidence in the proposed United Nations Organization. The President replied that he thought that was so. I told the President of the letter that Admiral Willson showed me addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, referring to the need of sending representatives to San Francisco in order to protect themselves against "the international welfare boys." The President then said that neither the Army nor the Navy had any business administering the civilian government of territories; that they had no competence to do this.²²

Forrestal met with Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy on March 30, 1945; and they discussed their fears over the trend of thinking on trusteeships. Stimson thought that

22. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 121-122. Memorandum of Conversation with President by the Adviser on Caribbean Affairs (Taussig).

the United States "might be tempted into making quixotic gestures the net result of which might be that we would surrender the hardly won islands which we had taken in the Pacific to the principle of trusteeship, whereas the British, Dutch, and French would not."²³ Stimson was also of the opinion that the State Department proposals camouflaged the realities of the situation and were pointlessly roundabout.

The State Department proposals were meticulously building up a world organization which was to be the trustee and were proposing that we should turn over these bases to this trustee and then take back the management of them and try to make the powers of management big enough to give us the power which we now hold from our efforts in the war.... With that attitude [that the defense of strategic islands was essential to the United States and a definite advantage to all Pacific powers] properly demonstrated I feel sure that we could have met with no objection to retaining enough bases to secure our position in the Pacific. My point was that we had always stood for freedom and peace in the Pacific and we had waged this war to throw out an aggressor and to restore peace and freedom and everybody knew it; that these bases had been stolen by the aggressor, who had used them to attack us and destroy our power; that we had fought this war with much cost of life and treasure to capture these bases and to free from the threat of aggression all of the peace-loving nations of the Pacific. We had actually thus saved from threat Australia and the Philippines and we were engaged in the process of doing it to the East Indies and to China; that if we had called attention to all of this and then said that we proposed to hold the bases which we now had gained in this painful struggle as a means and for the purpose of protecting freedom and peace in the Pacific, no one would have objected. In other words, we should have announced our possession with a declaration

23. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 37.

of trust in which all peace-loving nations were the beneficiaries.²⁴

Stimson, therefore, proposed to Forrestal that a joint letter be sent to the State Department expressing the view that "(a) These islands were of primary importance not merely to the security of the United States but of the world, and essential to the success of any world security organization. (b) That we propose not only to keep them but to exercise our ownership as a trust on behalf of world security, not for any national advantage."²⁵

A better idea was for a joint State-War-Navy letter to the President; and at the meeting of the three secretaries on April 2nd, Stimson presented a letter drafted by his Special Assistant, Mr. Harvey H. Bundy. Surprisingly, Stettinius was in agreement. It was decided to "try to get postponement of the whole subject of trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference, and that they should also draft a public statement, to be made either by the President or the Secretary of State, to the effect that the United States intended to keep the islands but 'only for the continued insurance of peace and liberty for all nations and peoples' adjacent to the Pacific."²⁶ The State Department immediately drafted a proposed memorandum to the President to which segments of Bundy's draft were grafted.²⁷

24. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 601-602. [Diary, March 30, 1945 entry]

25. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 38.

26. Ibid.

27. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Proposed State Department memorandum to the President, dated April 2, 1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy (SC) A14-7/EF files. See appendix B for a copy of this document.

On April 7th, Stettinius reported to his Staff Committee that serious differences of opinion existed among State, War, and Navy Department officials regarding trusteeships, and he was going to send a "short memorandum to the President presenting both sides and pointing out the importance of my discussing it with the President and reaching a decision promptly."²⁸

Stettinius wrote in his diary that he was very dissatisfied with the proposed trusteeship system developed by the ad hoc inter-departmental committee which he claimed had been developed while he was out of town and without full consultation with him (he had been at Yalta). Yet, he also wrote that the memorandum approved by Stimson and Forrestal did not fit with his views either.²⁹ Unfortunately, his own views were never written down.

At the next Secretarial meeting on the 9th, Stettinius informed Stimson and Forrestal that he "did not propose to associate himself with the document ... that he proposed to let the document go as a statement by War and Navy, informing the President that he reserved judgment." When Forrestal asked him why he did not want to go along with the recommendation to postpone trusteeship discussions at San Francisco, Stettinius said "that while his private views accorded with ours, he was under orders to the contrary."³⁰ This comment by Stettinius

28. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 140-141. Extracts from the diary of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., March 18, 1945-April 7, 1945.

29. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 209-210. Extracts from the diary of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., April 8-14, 1945.

30. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 38.

is remarkable. The only person in the nation who can give orders to the Secretary of State is the President. If it had been the President, then Stettinius would probably have informed the other two Secretaries of this so that they could plan accordingly. The best guess would be Harry Hopkins or former Secretary Hull.

Secretary of the Interior Ickes had sent a letter drafted by Under Secretary Abe Fortas to the President on April 5th urgently recommending against any postponement of the discussions at San Francisco on trusteeship. The letter, shown to Stettinius by the President, may have had some influence on Stettinius' actions. It stated:

I am considerably disturbed ... as to the attitude of the Army and Navy with respect to the international trusteeship problem. Under Secretary Fortas, who participated in the State-War-Navy-Interior committee discussions of this problem, has advised me from time to time of the attitude taken by the representatives of the various agencies. I understand that the representatives of the Armed Forces have indicated a strong feeling that the United States should insist upon complete sovereignty of the Japanese mandated islands. I am now informed that the War and Navy Departments are urging that the matter of international trusteeship should not be discussed at the San Francisco Conference, or at least should not be discussed until there is a firm agreement as to United States jurisdiction over the Japanese mandated islands.

I agree that the United States should be the administering power for the Japanese mandated islands. The arrangement worked out by the interdepartmental committee seems to me to assure to the Government all of the rights which it could desire for security purposes. The only question in my mind is whether the arrangement has not gone too far in providing a scheme by which these

areas may be exempted from international accountability. But I feel most strongly that if the United States should insist upon complete sovereignty, an international grab-bag would result.... I also feel that it would be a mistake to fail to reach an agreement on the subjects of mandated territories and dependent areas at the San Francisco Conference. The elimination of this topic from the agenda of the Conference would arouse suspicions and would be a continuing source of hostility and distrust.³¹

At the President's press conference of April 5th (his last press conference), he indicated he wanted the islands placed under a trusteeship by saying when asked whether the controlling government in the islands would be the United States, "I would say the United Nations. Or it might be called the world, which has been much abused and now will have the chance to prevent any more abuse."³² Another account records he said, "the United States and the other United Nations must accept trusteeships over Japanese mandate islands, build new naval and air bases..."³³ This statement to the press made while Roosevelt was in Warm Springs may also have influenced Stettinius.

James MacGregor Burns poignantly describes the President's health at this time by recalling, "at the end of March Roosevelt

31. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 198-199. Secretary of Interior to the President, April 5, 1945. An apparent earlier draft of this letter, stronger in tone but without substantive difference, is on file at U. S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Box 2879.

32. Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (9 vols., New York: Random House, 1938-1950), Vol. XIII, p. 610.

33. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to the President, April 13, 1945. See also: The New York Times, April 13, 1945.

left for Warm Springs. The usual crowd was waiting when the train pulled into the little Georgia town. There was the usual bustle of activity at the end of the rear car. But something was different. Roosevelt's big frame, slumped in the wheel chair, seemed to joggle slightly as he was rolled along the platform. His face, once so strong and well fleshed, seemed wasted; the jaw, once so firm, quivered perceptibly. A murmur³⁴ swept through the crowd."

On April 9th, Stettinius sent to the President the trusteeship plan as developed by the inter-departmental committee along with a long letter detailing the differing views of the State Department and the War and Navy Departments. He did not take any position in the letter but merely asked for a meeting³⁵ of all concerned with the President.

That same day, the Secretaries of War and Navy discussed the situation over the telephone; and their staffs drafted a joint letter to the President explaining their position and including a proposed declaration of policy for public release stating that the Pacific islands would be retained by the United States for strategic reasons. This letter was not smoothed out until the 13th. In the meantime, the President had received Stettinius' letter and cabled from Warm Springs on the 10th, "Your message on International Trusteeship is approved in principle. I will see your representative and that of the Army

34. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: the Lion and the Fox, p. 471.

35. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 211-214. Secretary of State to the President, April 9, 1945.

and Navy on the 19th. That will be time enough. And if you³⁶ have already left I will, of course, see you on the 25th." On the afternoon of the 12th, the President died; and Stettinius briefed President Truman on the matter on the 13th asking for³⁷ an early conference on the question with all concerned.

The issue was next taken up at a high-level conference held at the State Department on the 16th. Those present were: Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, Joseph C. Grew, James C. Dunn, Leo Pasvolosky, Harvey H. Bundy (Special Assistant to the Secretary of War), and Major Mathias F. Correa (Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy). At the outset of the meeting, it was agreed that the issue of international trusteeships would not be eliminated from discussion at San Francisco. Next, Secretary Stettinius urged that the declaration of policy annexed to the draft letter of the Secretaries of the Navy and War dated April 13, 1945, not be promulgated at this time "because of the effect it would have on the other nations participating in the conference."³⁸ It was agreed it would not be announced at that time but "at some future date such a declaration would be³⁹ promulgated."

36. Ibid. Footnote to p. 211.

37. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to the President, April 13, 1945.

38. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal, dated April 16, 1945, declassified June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. See appendix C for a copy of this document.

39. Ibid.

The statement of policy, that was drafted by Mr. Bundy, was premised on the United States entering into discussions on a trusteeship system at San Francisco. It declared that

the United States does not seek annexation of territory or economic wealth but strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and atolls. [in the Pacific] are vital to any effective military guaranty of peace in the Pacific.... In order to discharge its responsibility as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights and such rights will involve complete control in the case of certain atolls in the Pacific....

The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable under a trusteeship system to provide, by agreements, for the maintenance of such United States military and strategic rights and control as will be necessary to assure peace and security in the Pacific Ocean or elsewhere in the world.⁴⁰

The wording is of importance since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still remaining firm on their position that any discussions or agreement on a trusteeship system did not prejudice the ultimate decision for the disposition of the Japanese mandated islands. This draft statement indicates that Forrestal and Stimson were now willing to have the islands as a strategic trusteeship on the condition that the United States had absolute control. The actual draft letter of April 13, 1945, has not yet been located to confirm this, but subsequent statements by Forrestal and Stimson, especially at the April 17 conference, would seem to support this conclusion.

40. U. S. Naval Archives Office, Draft Declaration of United States Policy, HHB #2, April 16, 1945, Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. See Appendix D for a copy of this document.

To continue with the conference on the 16th, Forrestal then asked Stettinius whether or not it would embarrass him if the Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the President their draft letter that detailed their positions. Stettinius replied it would be embarrassing at that time and "asked that the sending of such a statement be deferred 'for a few days.' The implication of his statement, although it was not entirely clear, was that he did not wish such a statement to go forward to the President until the San Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it was well under way. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that they acquiesced in his request."⁴¹ It was also agreed that the United States draft on trusteeship (the one approved "in principle" by President Roosevelt) would include language that made it clear the United States did not commit itself to placing any particular territory under the system. The formula worked out at this meeting was that the draft was changed to read: "It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which specific territories within the foregoing categories should be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms."⁴²

Finally, Forrestal asked that the United States draft be further changed to provide that the initial negotiation of

41. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal, dated April 16, 1945, Declassified June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF.

42. Ibid.

trusteeship agreements for strategic areas would be in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly.

Dr. Pasvolsky dissented, believing all negotiations should be made with the General Assembly but was overruled. It is apparent that Forrestal and Stimson were still keeping their options open by including a statement that the United States was not committed to placing any particular territory under the system. At the same time, they were also stiffening the strategic trusteeship provisions in case the islands were ever placed under that category.

On the 17th, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy met with the full United States Delegation to San Francisco⁴³ and discussed their decisions of the day before. At this meeting on the 17th, Forrestal expressed his fundamental philosophy on civil-military relations and on this issue in particular:

1. Both the Army and Navy are aware that they are not makers of policy but they have a responsibility to define to the makers of policy what they believe are the military necessities of the United States, both for its own defense and for the implimentation of its responsibility for maintenance of world peace.... 2. I take it as a premise about all discussions of world peace that the United States is to have the major responsibility for the Pacific Ocean security. and if this premise is accepted there flows from it the acceptance of the fact that the United States must have the means with which to implement its responsibilities.... 5. I closed by re-emphasizing the fact that retention of power by the United States was

43. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 311-322. Eleventh meeting (Executive Session) of U. S. Delegation, April 17, 1945.

not inconsistent with the work on and the hopes for a world peace organization - that those that hate war must have the power to prevent it. [Emphasis added] ⁴⁴

Senator Vandenberg, a member of the delegation, noted of this conference that Stimson made a "particularly moving speech - told of the mistake we made after the last war in letting Japan get these mandated islands.... He said he didn't care so much about the 'title' to these islands if we have ⁴⁵ absolute, undisputed control over our base needs." This is a different attitude than Secretary Stimson revealed in his diary on March 30th. Unfortunately, there is no mention of this conference or any change in attitude in his memoirs. While noting that Forrestal backed up Stimson "100%", Senator Vandenberg wrote that he himself agreed with the State Department which insisted "that this [control over the islands] must be accomplished without setting a precedent for all the other Big Powers to take what they claim they need for their defense (precisely as Russia is already doing)."⁴⁶ It is difficult to tell whether this comment about Forrestal referred to his backing Stimson on the necessity for complete control over the islands or to backing Stimson's view that the "title" to the islands did not matter as long as the United States had control. There is no clear mention of this fine distinction in Forrestal's diary. Forrestal is clearly for absolute control, but he does

44. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 45.

45. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 169.

46. Ibid.

not mention whether he is still for annexation at this time or whether he now supports a strong strategic trusteeship for the islands.

That night, and at the Delegation meeting the next day, the final wording of the trusteeship plan and a United States trusteeship policy was hammered out. Stettinius was able to submit a mutually agreeable policy recommendation to the President.⁴⁷ The President approved it the same day. The policy, not intended for publication but intended mainly as a guideline for the American Delegation at San Francisco, stated:

It is not proposed at San Francisco to determine the placing of any particular territory under a trusteeship system. All that will be discussed there will be the possible machinery of such a system.

The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable to devise a trusteeship system which would apply only to such territories in the following categories as may, by trusteeship arrangements, be placed thereunder, namely: (a) territories now held under mandate; (b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war; and (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which of the specific territories within the foregoing categories shall be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

This system would provide, by agreements, for (1) the maintenance of United States military and strategic rights, (2) such control as will be necessary to assure general peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well as elsewhere in the world, and (3) the advancement of the social, economic, and political welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent territories.⁴⁸

47. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 350-351. Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to President Truman, April 18, 1945.

48. Ibid.

This policy is a far step from that which was behind the initial plans drafted by the State Department in 1942 and 1943.

The military leaders, however, were still absolutely for annexation and feared that control of the islands might be inadvertently lost at San Francisco by some "quixotic" gesture. They decided (undoubtedly on an individual basis) to take the issue to the public in order to gain additional support.

Admiral King publically called for retention and asked "how long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of fighting and building and winning and giving away, only to fight and build and win and give away again?"⁴⁹ Admiral Nimitz on Guam told reporters that the Marianas and Iwo Jima were "vital to our defense in the future.... Those islands are as important to the United States as the Hawaiian Islands."⁵⁰ Support quickly came. Former Admiral Hart, now a Senator from Connecticut,⁵¹ made similar statements. The Senate Naval Affairs Committee sent a subcommittee, headed by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D. Va.), to oversee the American Delegation at San Francisco "to see that the United States got control of the mandated islands."⁵²

49. Army and Navy Journal, Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945), p. 987. Also: The New York Times, April 5, 1945, and U. S. Congressional Record Appendix, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. A1660 and A1706.

50. The New York Times, April 13, 1945.

51. Address given April 22, 1945, over NBC network. Quoted in: Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 170.

52. The New York Times, May 4, 1945, and May 8, 1945.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had representatives on the delegation as advisers who briefed Governor Stassen, the American representative on the Big Five discussions and on Committee II/4 which was writing the trusteeship section of the Charter. They ensured that there was no deviation from the policy approved by the President on April 18, 1945.⁵³

Secretary Forrestal received almost daily reports on the subject of trusteeships from his Special Assistant, Keith Kane, who was an adviser to the American Delegation.⁵⁴ No amendments were submitted to the trusteeship plan that would have seriously harmed American security interests. One amendment, to include "independence" as a political goal for dependent areas rather just "self-determination" created a stir between the Navy and the Interior Department.⁵⁵ The delegation refused to get involved in an inter-departmental fight, and the situation was finally resolved by avoiding the word "independence" in Article 73(b) and to qualify the term in Article 76(b). Actually, in regards to the declaration on dependent areas (Article 73), the Navy did not consider the term in that

53. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 448-452, 1205-1206, 1209, 1279-1280, 1303, 1417-1421. Minutes of U. S. Delegation meetings.

54. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandums from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports from Keith Kane, dated April 30-May 25, 1945. All declassified June 20, 1969. Includes State Department drafts of April 17 and 26, 1945, Secretary of the Navy files, A14-7/EF.

55. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, pp. 1205-1216, 1279-1280. Minutes of U. S. Delegation meetings.

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CONTEXT to be of military concern. The military was more worried about the trusteeship system than about policies dealing with dependent areas. Overall, the final forms of the Chapters of the United Nations Charter that cover trusteeships, Chapters XII and XIII, did not vary to any major extent from the American Trusteeship plan of March 17, 1945, and the Presidential Policy on Trusteeship of April 18, 1945.

Of interest is that the representatives of Australia, New Zealand, and The Netherlands felt free to state publically that the United States should retain control of the islands, some advocating annexation and others stating that they did not care whether it was done by annexation or by trusteeship. Little press reaction against retention was shown. Annette Baker Fox wrote a memorandum in March 1945 for the Yale Institute of International Studies advocating, after considering various alternative solutions and rejecting annexation because of the Atlantic Charter commitment, that the United States be the sole administrator of the islands under a revised mandate system which would "permit the fortification of these islands for the use of at least one of the guardians of peace in the Pacific." Only one relatively unknown commentator, Frederick J.

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56. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports from Keith Kane, May 21, 1945. Declassified June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, A14-7/EF.

57. The New York Times, April 20, 1945, quoting Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs; The New York Times, April 24, 1945, quoting Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Foreign Minister, The Netherlands; and The Washington Star, April 24, 1945, quoting Prime Minister Peter Fraser of New Zealand.

58. Annette Baker Fox, "The Disposition of Enemy Dependent Areas," Yale Institute of International Studies, Memorandum No. 14 (March 1, 1945), p. 14.

Libby, warned against "territorial aggression." It appears that almost all Americans were in favor of retaining control over the islands with a division in opinion over the legal form of control, whether by strategic trusteeship or by annexation, with the annexationists the most vocal side at this point. For example, a Charles M. Davis, in a paper presented to a foreign relations conference on the United States in the post-war world held July 23 - August 3, 1945, analyzed the Pacific frontiers that the United States would have after the war. He stated:

certainly the first problem which will arise from the conclusion of the war in the Pacific will be the disposition of the islands lately under Japanese mandate. To Americans as well as to many other peoples the solution is fundamentally simple; the United States will take them over. There are few reasons why we should not do this, and there are strong ones why we should.... Our experience in Pacific colonial administration has included three types of government: the trusteeship in which we have held the Philippines; the economic-strategic administration of Hawaii, by which we have added to the economy of the islands and they to ours; and the naval government, which has controlled Guam, Wake, Yap, and some of the Line Islands between Hawaii and the Samoans. This third type is the one which is likely to be exercised over the mandated islands.⁶⁰

Secretary Stettinius felt the need to state publically that the United Nations Charter sufficiently safeguarded American

59. United States News, Vol. 18 (May 11, 1945), p. 30.

60. Charles M. Davis, "Problems in the Southwest Pacific," in William S. Willcox and Robert B. Hall, ed., The United States in the Postwar World: Addresses Given at the 1945 Summer Conference of the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1947), pp. 208 and 211.

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security interests in the Pacific. He also felt the need for a formal military endorsement of the Charter for insurance purposes and for use in the Senate Hearings on the

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Charter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their endorsement on June 23, 1945, stating they were "of the opinion that the military and strategic implications of this draft charter as a whole are in accord with the military interests of the

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United States." This statement was not a change of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that American control of the mandated islands by sovereignty was considered by them as the only sure way of guaranteeing American strategic rights. The military was to continue until late October 1946 their unsuccessful fight against the application of the strategic trusteeship system to those islands.

The "annexationists" feeling of success at the San Francisco results was shaken by President Truman's statement enroute to Potsdam on July 20, 1945, that "we are not fighting for conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one

61. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 310 (June 3, 1945), Secretary of State speech of May 28, 1945. Also: Secretary of State statement, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, p. 221.

62. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1, p. 1355. Minutes of 76th meeting of the U. S. Delegation, June 19, 1945.

63. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 1430-1431. Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, June 26, 1945. Also: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, p. 221.

thing of monetary value that we want out of this war."

Their spirits were slightly lifted when the Potsdam Declaration reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration's terms that Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands and

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"such minor islands as we determine."

President Truman must have thoroughly confused the issue when he stated in a broadcast, August 9, 1945, in his report on the Potsdam Conference:

...though the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.⁶⁶

It would seem clear that Forrestal and Stimson did after all take their letter and statement of policy to the President and this was the result. No evidence has yet been located concerning the background of this particular statement.

The August 9, 1945, statement, of course, raised many questions. Were the mandated islands considered already in our possession? Or were they to be "acquired" by arrangements "consistent with the United Nations Charter?" What did the President mean by that phrase? That the United States would

64. Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (3 vols., Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1957), Vol. 2, p. 69.

65. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 318 (July 29, 1945), Potsdam Declaration, p. 137.

66. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 320 (August 12, 1945), President's broadcast August 9, 1945, p. 208.

refrain from the use of force in acquiring bases? This could be a logical interpretation to avoid worrying the current possessors of bases that the United States wanted. It was well known that the United States was pressuring Australia for cession of a base on Manus island as well as desiring other bases around the world. Or did he mean consistent with the trusteeship provisions of the Charter, as many liberals took it to imply?

When the war ended on September 2, 1945, with Japan accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration by the instrument of surrender, the disposition of the mandated islands was still far from settled.

CHAPTER FIVE

POSTWAR INTER-DEPARTMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS AND DEBATE LEADING TO THE FINAL DECISION

Secretary Forrestal obtained President Truman's consent to naval administration of the Marianas on August 14, 1945; and on September 11th, the President approved naval administration over the rest of the mandated islands as "interim arrangements pending study and recommendation by the State, War, and Navy Departments."¹ The Interior Department must have heard of this action because the next day Acting Secretary of the Interior, Abe Fortas, sent a letter to the President while his superior, Harold L. Ickes, was in London. Fortas informed the President that he had asked the Division of Territories and Island Possessions to make a study of the problems of the mandated islands. He concluded by asking, "I hope that you will advise the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and Secretary Ickes that you wish the Interior Department to participate in the discussion of this problem."² Fortas did not have to fear Ickes' disapproval, for Ickes' opinion of naval administration was well known.³

1. Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (3 vols., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol. 2, pp. 70-71.

2. Harry S. Truman Library, Abe Fortas to President, September 28, 1945, Official file, 85-L.

3. See: Harold L. Ickes, "The Navy at Its Worst," Collier's Vol. 118 (August 31, 1946), pp. 22-23, 67 and below pp. 124-125 for examples of his attitude toward the Navy.

The President, however, sat on the letter; and Secretary Ickes wrote a letter on October 18th to remind the President of Fortas' letter and to "offer the suggestion that a joint expert group representing the four Departments visit the Pacific islands for the purpose of preparing for you a detailed plan for interim administration, pending decisions and agreements concerning future disposition and administration of the islands."⁴ President Truman sent a memorandum to the four Secretaries on October 20, 1945, appointing them as a committee to study the problem.

Following the appointment of the Cabinet Committee, representatives of the four Secretaries met on October 25, 1945, and decided to establish a subcommittee to prepare a draft of a recommendation for the Cabinet Committee's consideration. The State Department representative, Mr. Fred Searles, Jr., delayed convening the subcommittee's first meeting. A bitter exchange of letters occurred between Secretary Ickes and Secretary Byrnes, and the subcommittee finally met on January 30, 1946. Mr. Edwin G. Arnold, the Interior Department's Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, submitted a proposal for civil administration of the islands; only to have the State, War, and Navy representatives adopt a resolution that Interior "polish up the plan", for the subcommittee to submit it to the superior committee with the recommendation

that no action be taken until final decision is reached as to trusteeship and as to the disposition of military bases within the

4. Harry S. Truman Library, Ickes to President, October 18, 1945, Official file, 85-L.

islands under consideration, including not only the islands derived from conquest of Japan, but also those under negotiation with Britain, France, Netherland East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand.⁵

This was rightly considered by Interior as a delaying tactic. The "polished" proposal was forwarded on February 20, 1946, and considered by the Secretaries of State, Navy, and War on February 28, 1946. These Secretaries unanimously recommended to the President on March 6, 1946, that "no action should be taken on the proposal by the Committee until such time as the status and title of the Pacific islands concerned should be determined."⁶ The Department of the Interior was not even informed of this action until June 8, 1946. Secretary Byrnes delayed any action because he felt that the status of the islands should be settled at the peace conference, and then the question of which agency should permanently administer⁷ the islands should be discussed.

The Secretaries of War and Navy blocked action since they were quarreling over which one should have the civil administration of the islands.⁸ Agreement was reached among themselves

5. U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior, Office of Territories, A Review of Correspondence and Discussions on Pacific Islands Administration, August 1945 to March 1945, declassified 1969, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman.

6. Ibid., Background Information Memorandum, dated May 1, 1947, signed by Roy E. James, RG 48, File 9-0-7.

7. Harry S. Truman Library, James F. Byrnes to President, January 5, 1946, Official file, 85-L.

8. Admiral Nimitz felt so strongly that the islands should be administered by only one agency that he recommended Interior for the job if the Army continued to stand firm on its demands for Saipan, Tinian, Midway, Wake and Kwajalein. U. S. Naval Archives Office, Note by Admiral Edwards on memorandum from M. B. Gardner to Admiral King, November 15, 1945, declassified June 20, 1969, CNO files (SC) A14-7/EF.

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the strategic responsibility for such decisions as the number, types, and locations of bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still maintained their view that the "islands should be under permanent and exclusive United States control."⁹ Another reason for the blockage was given by the new Secretary of the Interior, J. A. "Cap" Krug, after he arranged for the President to send a letter to the other Secretaries ordering the Four Secretary Committee to meet. This was in May 1947, after the decision had been made to submit the islands to the United Nations as a strategic trusteeship. Secretary Krug gave this report of his first conference on the issue with Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and Secretary of War Patterson:

he [Patterson] said when President named this four-man committee, Byrnes decided it was useless to sit down with Ickes. He said something to the effect that he wouldn't sit down with him and that was the end of it. Then directed Fred Searles to get hold of Abe Fortas and work thing out and Patterson says that was done, but so far as I know, nothing was done. Difficulty arose over feeling of all three [Marshall, Forrestal, and Patterson] of them. One thing we have to keep in mind in our dealings on these matters is that military people are just full of instances where civilian government has worked bad in time of emergency.¹⁰

The President's Navy Day speech on October 27th repeated the pledge that the United States did not seek "one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to

9. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 5.

10. Library of Congress, Transcript of telephone call from J. A. Krug to Girard Davidson, May 16, 1947, Krug papers.

establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power."¹¹ Yet, this statement could also be read different ways.

Meanwhile, the question remained alive in the public domain. The Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace urged the placement of the islands under the trusteeship system. It's pamphlet stated in respect to President Truman's August 9 statement that, "consistency with the United Nations Charter can only mean in the case of strategic areas acquired from Japan trusteeship under the supervision of the Security Council."¹² The American Association for the United Nations criticized the government on December 23, 1945, for being "strangely silent" on any official statement of policy toward the mandated islands.¹³

The Soviet Union was also curious to know the American policy. At the first meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow on December 16, 1945, Molotov asked Byrnes what the United States intended to do with the islands. Byrnes told him that the government's views had not yet been formulated and that the only agreements concerning Japanese islands in the Pacific were the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agreement regarding Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.¹⁴

11. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 8.

12. "The United States and the International Trusteeship System," Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace, New York, September, 1945, p. 6.

13. Vernon McKay, "International Trusteeship - Role of United Nations in the Colonial World," Foreign Policy Report, Vol. 22, No. 5 (May 15, 1946).

14. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 218.

Thus, Byrnes kept his options open while gently reminding the Russians that if the United States kept the mandates, the Soviet Union had nothing to complain about as they had Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

Just before the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly opened in London on January 10, 1946, General George C. Kenney, USA, Air Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, told newsmen at a press conference that the United States should annex all the Japanese islands that it needed.¹⁵ Forrestal recites that Byrnes, at a cabinet meeting on January 29, told of his "difficulties with Senator Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles, who, spurred on by General Kenney during conversations on the way over on the boat, let the word leak out that there was dissatisfaction with the American policy and position on trusteeship.... Byrnes said that the fact had to be faced that Vandenberg's - and for that matter Dulles's - activities from now on could be viewed as being conducted on a political and partisan basis."¹⁶

Perhaps because of the leaks, press speculations, political overtones, and foreign inquiries at London, Byrnes suddenly cabled home on January 15th asking the President for permission to state that the United States would be prepared to trustee the islands "either under ordinary trusteeship arrangements or as strategic areas."¹⁷

15. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 10. See also: Hans W. Weigert, "U. S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25 (1947), pp. 250-262.

16. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 132.

17. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 11.

The President held a news conference on the same day, it is not known if he had already received the cable, and stated in ambiguous language his policy on the islands. The Department of State Radio Bulletin of January 15, 1946, reported:

The President declared that those (islands) we do not need will be placed under UNO trusteeship, and those we need we will keep. Asked how long we intended to keep these islands, Mr. Truman said, as long as we needed them.... Asked if they would be under individual trusteeship of this country, President replied in the affirmative in regard to those islands we need.... Asked if we would have to ask UNO's authority for our individual trusteeships, President replied affirmatively...¹⁸

The President also said that some islands would be under individual trusteeship as well as collective trusteeship, "but that policy would have to be worked out by the United Nations as it went along. He said that we had not demanded any of the islands we need."¹⁹

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, meanwhile, obtained the President's consent for Byrnes to make a statement that the United States would be prepared to trustee the islands "either under ordinary trusteeship arrangements or as strategic areas," and so cabled Byrnes on the 17th without ever having consulted the Army or the Navy. It is as yet unknown who within the State Department took the initiative in proposing this action to Dean Acheson. Forrestal heard of it on the 20th and the next day took the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, with

18. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 343 (January 27, 1946), p. 113.

19. Ibid.

him to see the President. Forrestal wrote in his diary:

Royall and I said that we thought it was a most unwise and precipitate decision and requested the President to tell Byrnes not to make any such statement. He said that the message had gone today requesting Byrnes not to commit this country to any definitive position; it was not clear to me, however, whether he meant that Byrnes was not to make any statement.

I told the President that I think Acheson's method of securing his approval to Mr. Byrnes' request was not consistent with our general ideas of cooperation between War, State, and Navy, and rather in my opinion was a desertion of the general idea of cooperation by getting hasty decisions out of him on behalf of a particular point of view, and I told him I propose to make such a representation to Acheson in very strong terms. He said he hoped I would....

This incident is a reflection of the rapidly vanishing determination in America to see to it that we do not repeat the mistakes of 1918-19 when the formerly German-owned islands of the Pacific were turned over to Japan and Australia ... under a secret agreement between England and Japan without American knowledge until after it was a fait accompli. It is a case for the greatest concern to see this tendency developing so soon in the attitude of the State Department.²⁰

There is no account of this incident in Truman's, Byrnes', or Acheson's memoirs.

Forrestal had found out about the cables from his representative attending the SWNCC meeting on the afternoon of January 20th. His representative, probably Under Secretary John L. Sullivan although no record exists of his name, and War's representative, Mr. Howard C. Peterson, had learned of

20. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 130-131.

the situation from Mr. H. Freeman Mathews, the State Department representative. The War and Navy men were astonished and felt that the President should not commit the government without consulting War and Navy. The Navy representative reported that he understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking an unsolicited position on this, and that Admiral Leahy was transmitting that position to the President. Peterson confirmed that fact, and the two of them convinced Mathews that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views should be brought to Acheson's attention at once; and that Acheson should be urged to cable Byrnes "requesting him to make no statement until advised further after consultation with the President. The cables sent to Byrnes last night, with the President's approval, were the result. It was at this point that I [Patterson] called you at the White House to advise you of the facts."²¹

Therefore, Forrestal knew of the cables that were sent to Byrnes on the night of the 20th. He perhaps did not know their exact content but did know that action had been taken to prevent the government from being committed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had fired off a quick letter notifying the Secretary of State, and indirectly the President, that they still considered it essential to national defense for the United States to gain strategic control of the mandated islands by assuming full sovereignty.²² The Chiefs had evidently kept close watch on the whole situation.

21. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum to Forrestal, unsigned, on SWNCC meeting January 21, 1946, SWNCC 249 files.

22. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 12.

On January 22, Acheson held a news conference and stated that in respect to strategic trusteeship agreements, a refusal of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council would mean there would be no agreement; and the result would be to maintain the status quo. These words implied that the United States had nothing to fear from a failure to reach an agreement protecting American strategic interests. If the United States did not like the final draft trusteeship agreement, there would be no obligation to accept it; and the status quo would be maintained. Furthermore, he pointed out that once such an agreement had been signed, it could not be changed without the consent of the United States, thanks to the veto power. In other words, the only way the United Nations would get the mandated islands under a trusteeship agreement would be by accepting terms agreeable to the United States. When a reporter asked him if the United States did not have to wait until a peace conference awarded the area to the United States before we could make decisions on trusteeship, Dean Acheson replied he did not think it was necessary and that one could proceed in any order "that the nations think best."²³

The press reports and public reaction increased in attention rather than decreased after the President's statement of the 15th. James Reston in The New York Times reported that the Army and Navy, with the support of many Senators and Representatives, were still not reconciled to the trusteeship formula,

23. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 344, (February 3, 1946), pp. 150-151.

even under the strategic formula. An informal poll conducted by The New York Times among a limited number of Senators and Representatives indicated more sentiment for annexation than for "individual trusteeship under the U.N.O."²⁵

In February, the news of the Yalta decision concerning the granting of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union was publically revealed, and this information only increased the cry for annexation. Senator Byrd of Virginia stated that it would be "absurd" to consider placing Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet Union was gaining sovereignty over the Kuriles.²⁶ Former President Hoover spoke out in favor of annexation at the graduation ceremonies of the School of Naval Administration at Stanford. Hoover believed that "the holding of these islands is not an extension of imperialism because we have no designs of economic exploitation.... What we are doing is looking after not only our own defense but we are looking after the defense of the world as a whole."²⁷

In March, 1946, a survey of American public opinion by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver showed 40% of the American people were for outright ownership of the islands, 28% were for American operation

24. The New York Times, January 17, 1946.

25. Ibid., January 31, 1946.

26. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 16.

27. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

without ownership, and 25% were for the United States shar-
 ing its control with other members of the United Nations. ²⁸

Professor W. H. Hobbs was interested enough to write a book that examined each island for its strategic value, its suitability for naval bases, gun positions, air-strips, and sea-
 plane bases in relation to its location, form, and weather. ²⁹

Opposition to the annexationists was minor but vocal. Secretary Ickes and Forrestal had bitter words whenever the subject of naval administration was raised. Secretary Ickes took his views to the public as soon as he left office. On May 29, 1946, he (out of office) delivered a speech entitled, "Meet the Navy" before a joint meeting of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations. He severely criticized the government for not having prepared a trusteeship agreement for the islands. Blasting the Navy for desiring a strategic trusteeship (which actually it did not want) in order that it could keep its administration of dependent peoples "top secret," he continued by saying:

It is time that the State Department ceased to be beguiled by the pleasant tinkle of brass and the luster of gold braid, for it is the Navy which has largely been responsible for our moral failure to date as to our dependencies.... Naval absolutism sneers at every Constitutional guarantee ... The Navy is arbitrary, dictatorial and utterly disregarding of civilian rights ...

28. Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic, Vol. 116, No. 11 (March 17, 1947), p. 31.

29. W. H. Hobbs, Fortress Islands of the Pacific (Ann Arbor, Michigan: J. W. Edwards, 1945).

The Navy is bent upon ruling these island peoples and it is determined that they shall not have those rights which the Charter of the United Nations guarantees; that they shall not have self-government or democracy or racial equality...³⁰

The ultra-liberal Institute of Ethnic Affairs, under John Collier (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1933-1945, Editor of the Guam Echo, published in Washington) contended that military security and trusteeship under the General Assembly were compatible and that the United States should place the islands under a General Assembly trusteeship just because they "lie in a strategic zone where defensive and offensive interests of three powers overlap - China, the Soviet Union and the United States." ³¹ The Institute also declared that:

When the military makes foreign policy, foreign policy makes toward war.

All Americans know that the Army and Navy exercise a pressure power very strong and also dangerous to lasting peace.

But apparently, few Americans - few editors, for example - are aware that the military control over our nation's foreign policy goes entirely beyond mere influence, mere pressure.

The Army and Navy control over foreign policy exists as a formalized, technically and procedurally implemented arrangement.... [which] is known in Washington as SWNCC - the State, War and Navy Co-ordinating Committee through which foreign policies of even the remotest military interest must be cleared. That committee operates under an unanimity role, so that not merely Army and Navy acting together, but Army and Navy

30. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 19.

31. News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, Inc., Vol. 1, No. 5 (November, 1946), p. 3.

acting separately, are empowered to veto any proposal made by State.... The State Department technicians, adequate in numbers and often in technical knowledge, and internationally experienced, confront the military snap-judgment and prejudice; and again and again, to procure action at all, they find themselves accepting compromises or worse, to the grave and cumulative injury 32 of the United States and of the peace hopes.

Collier, Ickes, and former Vice-President Wallace maintained a running public attack throughout 1946 on the military, naval administration of the islands, and on the need for over-
33

seas bases. Forrestal took no public notice of these attacks except when The New York Times printed an editorial filled with inaccurate facts on September 2, 1946. Captain R. L. Dennison drafted a reasoned defense of naval administration but intentionally avoided raising the question of "sovereignty" versus
34

"trusteeship." Forrestal's reply was printed in The New York Times on September 24, 1946. To further offset the bad publicity, the Navy arranged for ten newspapermen to tour the islands. Their reports were consistently favorable to the
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Navy's position and record in administering the islands.

32. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

33. These took the form of letters to editors of papers and public speeches. It is interesting to note that in 1945 and 1946, Ickes had "strongly opposed" the early granting of independence to the Philippines by taking a "vigorous stand" and showing "violent opposition" to the idea. See: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 275.

34. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum from Dennison to Forrestal, September 7, 1946, OP-35 files.

35. The Baltimore Sun, January 11, 1947; The Christian Science Monitor, December 2 and 4, 1946; The Washington Post, December 1, 1946, The New York Times Magazine, May 19, 1946.

The issue of what to do with the mandated islands continued to be discussed throughout the summer and fall of 1946 within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretarial meetings, and SWNCC. A special ad hoc subcommittee of SWNCC was established to work on the problem. It was within this subcommittee that substantive work was done, in close liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy's OP-35 Division, on the development of a draft strategic trusteeship agreement that might be acceptable to all parties. The Army took little part in the work since it felt that the Navy sufficiently upheld the Army's

³⁶ interests. The development of this draft was to be without prejudice to the Joint Chiefs' stated position that only traditional sovereignty could safeguard for all time the rights of the United States in the islands. It was also to be without prejudice to the ultimate decision on what to do with the islands. On those conditions, the Joint Chiefs stated that a strategic trusteeship agreement would be the next best thing to annexation and would probably prevent any future compromise of American security if it contained the following points:

(1) the entire trusteeship to be designated a strategic area; (2) the United States to be sole administering authority; (3) no limitation to be placed upon the utilization of all or any part of the area for United States security purposes; (4) the right of the United States to exclude any areas utilized for military purposes from inspection or report to the United Nations or any of its agencies.

36. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.), Interview, September 4, 1969.

37. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory, Vol. 3, p. 18.

A strategic trusteeship would come under the Security Council where the veto power would ensure that any agreement followed the proposed draft and, once made, could not be changed without United States consent.

With the above points in mind, the SWNCC ad hoc sub-committee set to work. On June 28, 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evidently felt that their position might indeed become prejudiced by the SWNCC work on a feasible draft trusteeship agreement. They reviewed the situation and "reached a conclusion that United States sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands is, from the military point of view, necessary to the national defense, and decided to report that conclusion to the Secretary of State and the President."³⁸ By October, a draft trusteeship agreement had been developed containing the above four points, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to study and comment on it. They repeated their position, but did mention that if other considerations than military had priority, then the proposed agreement was considered adequate to safeguard American security.³⁹

The second part of the United Nations General Assembly's First Session was scheduled to convene in New York in November 1946, and President Truman called a conference of the State, War and Navy Secretaries on October 22 at the request of the Secretary of State to discuss this subject. Admiral Nimitz was also present, as was Admiral Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander-

38. Library of Congress, Leahy papers, Vol. 12, June 28, 1946, p. 66.

39. Millis, ed., The Forrester Diaries, p. 213.

in-Chief and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operation, still argued that "sovereignty of the ex-Japanese mandates should be taken by the U. S., that the ultimate security of the U. S. depends in major part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean, that these islands are part of the complex essential to that control, and that the concept of trusteeship is inapplicable here because these islands do not represent any colonial problem nor is there economic advantage accruing to the U. S. through their ownership." ⁴⁰ Secretary Byrnes records that:

The State and War departments felt that, since Japan had received these islands under a mandate from the League of Nations, our rights were not superior to those delegated by the League and that therefore, if possible, the United Nations should declare them a strategic area to be administered by us under a United Nations trusteeship agreement. We pointed out that at San Francisco the United States delegation, by direction of President Roosevelt, had been a strong advocate of the trusteeship system. We argued that we could not properly adopt a policy that would show a lack of confidence in the system we had urged upon the United Nations. Japan had violated her mandate and therefore we could seek a decision from the United Nations on these mandated islands, while those islands that belonged to the Japanese, such as the Ryukyus, would have to await disposition by the peace conference.⁴¹

It is surprising that the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, would have supported this view. The War Department

40. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 214.

41. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 219.

had consistently backed the Navy in the long struggle for American absolute control over the islands. Unfortunately, there has not yet been located any account by Mr. Patterson or the War Department of this conference or any other evidence to support or refute Byrnes' statement.

President Truman's memoirs are slightly confusing on this, perhaps because he does not directly mention this particular conference. He states:

In earlier meetings with Cabinet members on the question of trusteeships, I found that the State Department held views that differed from those of the War and Navy Departments. I listened carefully to both points of view. In the end I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of the security of the bases. But I also saw the validity of the ideal for which the State Department was contending - that the United Nations should not be barred from the local territories beyond the bases, if at any time the United Nations should want to look into social and economic conditions on these islands. The United States would never emulate the policy of Japan in the areas that were given her under mandate by the League of Nations. We thus assured full protection to our nation against a future Pacific aggressor and, at the same time, laid the foundation for future self-government of the island people.... I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. America fought her own war of liberation against colonialism, and we shall always regard with sympathy and understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage.... I still believed in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of 'self-determination.'⁴²

42. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp. 274-275.

None of the other recorders of the discussion mention Truman's talking about not barring the United Nations from local territories beyond the bases. The trusteeship agreement, as finally concluded, gave the United States the right to close any area for security reasons. Perhaps Truman was talking of another conference or of Okinawa or was giving oral instructions to the military not to close off any area more than necessary while still obtaining the right to do so in the agreement with the United Nations. The last two sentences of President Truman's statement has the ring of State Department drafting. Mr. Truman wrote his memoirs after leaving office. During the first years of his Presidency, he stressed the United Nations and the high principles of de-colonialism and self-determination. He was also inclined to follow the policies and commitments made by President Roosevelt because of his lack of experience and the overwhelming, often hectic, events requiring decisions and action during his initial years in office.

This October 1946 conference occurred just prior to the 1946 elections, at the same time as the controversy over the meat-ration controls, and under the pressure of preparing for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. Additionally, President Truman was deeply involved in the military unification struggle with Forrestal and the Navy bucking him and the other services over the details of the plan. Also, American relations with the Soviet Union were rapidly deteriorating. To his credit, President Truman made a firm decision on this issue

in contrast to President Roosevelt's lack of any clear-cut, command decision. It took only one Presidential conference, where all sides were heard, for a binding decision to be made.

Secretary Forrestal, by this time, had accepted the idea of the islands becoming a strategic trusteeship. At the conference, his main concern was that the State Department negotiators might compromise and accept an arrangement that would jeopardize the security of the United States. Secretary Byrnes assured him that no changes in the draft agreement would be accepted without the approval of the President or the Secretary of State. Forrestal then stated that he was satisfied.⁴³

Forrestal was also reassured by Byrnes on his fear that a subordinate of Byrnes or a delegate to the United Nations might leak an opinion to the press to the effect that "the intransigence of the military was blocking the good intentions of the State Department."⁴⁴ Forrestal was very sensitive to the public opinion trend toward disarmament, the belief of the thesis that the military was running American foreign policy, and against Byrnes' policy in general.⁴⁵

Truman's firm decision was to submit the islands to the United Nations as a strategic trusteeship with the United States as sole administrator under the terms of the agreement drafted by the SWNCC subcommittee. Perhaps the account that comes closest to reflecting the underlying reason for the decision'

43. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 219-220 and Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 213, 215, and 216.

44. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 213.

45. Ibid.

is found in Admiral Leahy's unpublished diaries, on restricted access at the Library of Congress. He recorded:

decision was made to accept a United States trusteeship over these islands on terms acceptable to the United States. In view of public announcements previously made by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, it did not appear possible to take any other action. I cannot escape a fear that sometime in the distant future this decision will permit possible enemies to obtain positions in the Pacific that will require great expenditures of life and treasure to retake.⁴⁶ [Emphasis added]

It would appear that the previous, wide sweeping statements of national policy (Atlantic Charter, United Nations Declaration, and Cairo Declaration, among others, which were enunciated primarily for war-time propaganda purposes) had backed the American government into a corner at the time of a crucial decision.

Unfortunately, Admiral Nimitz' papers are not yet open; but the general feeling of Admiral Leahy and Admiral Nimitz was described by Benjamin Gerig when he talked with John D. Hickerson about "a meeting with the Admirals [not named].... The Admirals were over-ruled. They left with their tails ⁴⁷ between their legs."

The President made the unequivocal public announcement on November 6, 1946; that the United States was prepared to place ⁴⁸ under trusteeship the former Japanese mandated islands.

46. Library of Congress, Leahy papers, Vol. 12, October 22, 1946, p. 86.

47. Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Interview, June 19, 1969.

48. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, (November 17, 1946), p. 889.

Concurrently, the United States made public the draft trustee-⁴⁹ship agreement. It also circulated it to certain foreign governments with the United Nations Charter phrase "states directly concerned" in mind.

Press reaction was, on the whole, favorable; with the usual⁵⁰ small, vocal dissenters.

On February 26, 1947, the United States submitted the draft agreement designating the islands as a Strategic Trusteeship with the United States as the administrator. The Security Council accepted the draft on April 2, 1947, after minor changes were negotiated. Article 6 was amended to refer to the territory's development "towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," rather than merely reading development "towards self-government." Additionally, the words, "as an integral part of the United States," were deleted from⁵¹ Article 3. The Agreement gave the United States wide powers including full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction, the right of fortification, and the right to close⁵² areas for security reasons.

49. Ibid.

50. For an example, see: Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic, Vol. 116, No. 11 (March 17, 1947).

51. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Trusteeship for the Territory of the Pacific Islands," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16 (May 4, 1947), pp. 783-792.

52. United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 1665, and United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 8, No. 123, "Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands," See also: Harold Karen Jacobson, "Our 'Colonial' Problem in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October, 1960), pp. 56-66. See: Appendix E for a copy of the trusteeship agreement.

The American military via SWNCC and its liaison with the JSSC of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization had kept a close watch on the negotiations over changes in the agreement. They were consulted on each proposal; and the final agreement, as amended, received their approval.

Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz recommended the approval of the agreement in appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 7, 1947. Congress approved the agreement by Joint Resolution on July 18, 1947; and the President ratified it the same day.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ISLANDS UNDER TRUSTEESHIP

On July 18, 1947, the same day as the ratification of the trusteeship agreement, military government of the islands was ended by Executive Order No. 9875, which also appointed the Navy Department as administrator pending Congressional legislation. The Four Secretaries (State, War, Navy, Interior) Committee was revitalized after May 1947, on the urging of Interior, to consider which agency should administer the islands. The President decided in 1949 that the Interior Department should administer all of the United States island possessions in the Pacific, i.e., Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory. Various consultations took place, mainly within the framework of an ad hoc SWNCC committee enlarged to include Interior representatives, to coordinate the turn-over and to draft organic bills for submittal to Congress. When Congress did not act on the bill for the Trust Territory, the administration was transferred on July 1, 1951, by Executive Order No. 10265 of June 29, 1951. [This consultation will be explored in more detail in the doctoral dissertation].

Congress did pass an act in 1954 [68 Statute 330] providing for Presidential control of the Trust Territory's government, something which he had exercised de facto since they had been captured. In 1953, the Saipan District, except for the island of Rota, was returned to naval control for a special security reason involving the CIA. The District was returned

to Interior Department administration in 1962 after criticism by the United Nations Visiting Mission that separate administration was encouraging separatist tendencies.¹

Separatist tendencies have been one of the main issues over the past twenty years in regard to the Micronesians' national aspirations. "Political development has been retarded by the persistence of the traditional culture and the absence of a feeling of identification with the territory as a whole."² The vastness of the area, the diversity of the population, and the scarcity of natural resources are significant obstacles to forming a sense of unity.

The Marianas, led by the Saipan Legislature, has consistently voiced their desire to separate from the Trust Territory for union with Guam. There is close social, economic, cultural, biological and geographic ties between Guam and the rest of the Marianas.

On June 12, 1950, the people of the Northern Marianas petitioned the United Nations for their incorporation with the United States as a possession or as a territory, preferably as a territory. They declared that they wanted to someday be considered a part of the United States and get American citizenship.³

In 1959, the Saipan Legislature petitioned that the Mariana Islands be incorporated into the framework of the Territory of

1. Whitney T. Perkins, Denial of Empire: The United States and Its Dependencies (Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1962), p. 324 and David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1964), pp. 123-124.

2. Perkins, Denial of Empire, p. 326.

3. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.10/5, June 12, 1950.

Guam, including American citizenship. They called for a United Nations plebiscite to demonstrate the validity of their aspiration.⁴ An unofficial plebiscite was held on Saipan and Tinian in 1961 to determine whether the people would prefer union with Guam, annexation by the United States, or the status quo. Over eighty percent of the registered voters responded with 1,642⁵ for union, 875 for annexation, and 27 for the status quo.

In July 1963, the Saipan Legislature again unanimously⁶ reaffirmed its desire for union with Guam. The Legislature conducted another unofficial plebiscite with 1,286 voting out of 3,015 registered. Of those voting, 1,231 voted "to become a United States citizen within the political framework of the Territory of Guam."⁷

During the Visiting Mission's trip in 1964, the Saipan and Mariana legislatures presented many petitions which "declared that the people of the Marianas were ready for self-government and wished to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement," and expressed their desire for "integration with Guam on the grounds of historical and cultural affinity, the desire of the people of Saipan to advance at a faster pace than the rest of the Trust

4. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.10/31, November 5, 1959.

5. Morgiewicz, "Micronesia, Especial Trust," U. S. Naval Institute, p. 77.

6. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.10/2.4, July 31, 1963.

7. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1964, Document T/1620, May 18, 1964, p. 155.

Territory, and the freely-expressed wishes of the Saipanese people as made known in the unofficial plebiscites." ⁸ The majority political party, the Popular Party, supported these desires. The minority Democratic Party opposed the petitions claiming that any move to join Guam was premature. They, however, also favored integration with the United States, but only after the Territory as a whole achieved self-government.

The American administration has opposed any separatist movement, and the Visiting Mission strongly pointed out that the future of the Trust Territory must be as an integral unit. The Visiting Mission discounted the historical and cultural links as the reason for the movement, and stated it believed it had originated from Guam and the motivations were for gaining the economic and political benefits of American citizenship. With the development of a "vigorous and unified" Micronesia, it ⁹ felt that the issue "may simply wither away."

In 1964, the Saipan Legislature submitted a blistering petition claiming that they believed the United Nations and the United States "want to inspire and create a nation out of six different districts, different cultures, customs, and traditions.... The people of Mariana Islands District do not ¹⁰ desire or aspire to that." Six months later, they declared that the proposed Territorial-wide legislative body "is a grave threat to the internal peace of the people ... the

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., pp. 156-158.

10. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET. 10/2.6, March 19, 1964.

preponderant mass of our people are not prepared to observe¹¹ and refuse to abide by it." The desire has not appeared to have significantly withered. In 1965 and 1966, the Mariana District Legislature passed resolutions petitioning for closer¹² ties with the United States and maintaining their own identity.

During a Congressional House Subcommittee visit in 1965, the Mariana District Legislature requested American citizen-¹³ship for all of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. In 1966, the Saipanese Legislature voted again for merger with¹⁴ Guam. The Saipanese Chief Sablan stated in 1966, "If a plebiscite were taken, ninety-nine percent of the people would¹⁵ vote to become a territory of the United States."

The 1964 United Nations Visiting Mission reported, "The territory is still in the process of being knitted together. Its unity is still fragile; most people still look at the world and the future from their own districts, not as a part of a unified Micronesia."¹⁶ In 1953, the Marshallese petitioned the United Nations Visiting Mission stating that they didn't

11. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.10/L.9, September 29, 1964.

12. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Documents T/PET.10/L.10, October 25, 1965, and T/PET.10/L.11, January 20, 1966.

13. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Reports on Pacific Affairs, 1965 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 99.

14. The New York Times, March 20, 1966.

15. Willard Price, America's Paradise Lost (New York: The John Day Company, 1966), p. 229.

16. Visiting Mission Report, 1964, p. 159.

want to be "classed with or merged with the Ponapeans! We are proud of our race and our heritage and fear any attempt to' merge us culturally or otherwise with other peoples with the resultant loss of our own culture and individuality."¹⁷

This lack of unity applys within certain island groups and even, as in the case of Ponape, on a single island. Such a situation hinders the "building an administration staffed by Micronesians and greatly limits the rate of progress toward self-government beyond a local level."¹⁸

Steps have been made, however, starting with the local level and building to the territorial-wide level. In 1957, a systematic program of chartering municipal governments was begun.¹⁹ District Legislatures were also developed. Resolutions of these legislatures, when approved by the High Commissioner, became law for the particular district. They are now all composed of elected members and have been granted certain taxing powers.²⁰

The Congress of Micronesia was created in September 1964. The first territorial-wide elections were held on January 19, 1965, and the first meeting was held in July 1965. It is

17. Robert Trumbull, Paradise In Trust: A Report On Americans In Micronesia, 1946-1958 (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1959), p. 109.

18. Ibid., p. 108.

19. Wainhouse, Remnants Of Empire, p. 125.

20. Tudor, ed., Pacific Islands Yearbook (10th ed., 1968), p. 245.

bicameral with a House of Representatives of twenty-one members elected for two-year terms; and a Senate of twelve members, two from each district, serving for four-year terms. The House is apportioned by population with three seats from the Marianas, four from the Marshalls, four from Ponape, five from Truk, three from Palau, and two from Yap. All citizens²¹ over eighteen years of age may vote.

This Congress has helped to create some sense of unity within the Territory, if from nothing else than the mere fact of initiating the first real communications between the peoples of the three groups. The process of evolution of the Congress provided experiences of working together for common purposes. The Congress evolved from a Council of Micronesia whose members were elected by the District Legislatures which, in turn, had evolved from an advisory body whose members were appointed by the District Administrators. The growth and transformation of these bodies was due, in large measure, to the wishes, desires and cooperation of the Micronesians with advice being provided²² by the Administrators.

Election also brought political awareness to the people. The first election had vigorous campaigning with twenty-three

21. U. S. Congress, Reports On Pacific Affairs, 1965, pp. 4-9.

22. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (August 16, 1965), Statement of Mr. Barley Olter, Representative, Congress of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 28, 1965, p. 296. See: Norman Meller, The Congress of Micronesia: Development of the Legislative Process in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969.)

candidates in Ponape running for the six seats and two parties in Palau campaigning with one party capturing five of the six seats.

The intensity of the people in the creation of this Congress is evidenced by the percentage of voting [seventy percent]. It is also evidenced by their celebrations and staying up late beside their radios to hear election results. The people's attachment to this Congress is shown by their enthusiasm in the meetings after the voting and the high courtesy and honor they have extended to the elected Congressmen.²³

Mr. Francis Nunan, Treasurer of the Yap Islands Congress and a representative from the Yap Islands District to the House of Representatives, told the Trusteeship Council in 1966, "The Congress of Micronesia, once only a dream, now stands as an embodiment of the wishes of the people. The formation of the Congress also pointed out very vividly the fact that the Micronesia people can work together for a common goal, one that is beneficial to the welfare of the entire area."²⁴

Before the Trusteeship Council in 1968, the High Commissioner, William R. Norwood, stated, "since then [creation of the Congress] political development has moved forward at an accelerating pace and the deliberation and legislative actions of the Congress of Micronesia have had the effect of strengthening bonds of mutual interest and a sense of common destiny."²⁵

23. Ibid., pp. 296-297.

24. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 55 (September 12, 1966), Statement of Mr. Francis Nunan, Representative, Congress of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trusteeship Council, June 27, 1966, p. 400.

25. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (August 26, 1968), Statement of High Commissioner, Mr. William R. Norwood, before the United Nations Trusteeship Council, June 5, 1968, p. 234.

The aspirations of the Micronesians in regard to their future political status have not yet developed to any firm consensus of opinion.

In 1964, the United Nations Visiting Mission reported that no properly matured opinions on the future had yet emerged. It felt that most Micronesians had assumed that the choices were either full independence or some form of integration with the United States and, knowing that Micronesia was not self-sufficient, felt that the only practical choice was some form of integration with the United States, either as part of Hawaii or part of the Territory of Guam.²⁶

Caution has been the policy of the Micronesians. They have had the wisdom to understand that every alternative must be studied and understood before any choice is made. Mr. Tomas Remengesau in 1964 stated that a consensus of opinion for a particular status "is like the papaya fruit--when it is ripe, it will show on the surface."²⁷ Mr. Barley Olter, the next year, described the situation in a succinct statement:

Given several alternatives, the people invariably insisted that they wished to remain under the present system until they are ready in terms of education standard, economic stability, political sophistication, and social maturity and responsibility. The Micronesians are cautious and are reluctant to gamble for the price of uncertainty. When we are ready to accept the responsibility and are aware of the implications and consequences of committing ourselves to whatever

26. Visiting Mission Report, 1964, pp. 158-159.

27. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 50, (June 29, 1964), Statement of Mr. Tomas Remengesau to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 28, 1964, p. 1019.

political status we prefer, we will ask for it.²⁸

President Johnson asked Congress in August 1967 to establish a study commission to assess all the factors bearing on the political future of Micronesia in response to a request for such a commission by the Congress of Micronesia. In his request, he stated that Congress should provide for the Micronesians to express their wishes "as soon as possible, and not later than June 30, 1972, on the future status of the Trust Territory."²⁹ The Senate struck out the reference to the date and passed the resolution; but it never passed the House and no status commission has yet been established nor has any commitment been made to a date for an act of self-determination.³⁰

After an extensive sounding of political opinion in Micronesia in 1967, Mr. Robert Trumbull reported that while most of the leaders would prefer a union with the United States rather than independence, there was a "general reluctance to 'rush' a decision on the future political status."³¹ Mr. Trumbull

28. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (August 16, 1965), Statement of Mr. Barley Olter, May 28, 1965, p. 296.

29. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57 (September 18, 1967), Presidential letter to Congress with Text of Proposed Joint Resolution Concerning Future of Pacific Islands Trust Territory, August 21, 1967, pp. 363-364.

30. Interview with Mr. Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., March 21, 1969.

31. The New York Times, news article by Robert Trumbull, "Tie to U. S. Favored in Pacific Islands," November 5, 1967.

reported that all of the leaders considered President Johnson's date of 1972 as "too early." The political leader of Yap, High Chief Roboman, said "We are Yapese, not Micronesians, and we want to remain that way," and favored retaining Micronesia under American trusteeship for "at least ten more years."³² Petrium Mailo, the hereditary chief, political leader and largest businessman of Moen Island, Truk, stated, "we need unity within Micronesia before we try to decide a common political destiny for all the islands."³³ Many of the older generation remember the more busy, exciting and prosperous times under the Japanese and perhaps might favor ties with Japan; whereas, many of the young students expressed desires to "study all alternatives before making a decision."³⁴ Most leaders realize that independence "is impracticable for islands so widely scattered and so diverse in language and custom."³⁵ The two political parties of Palau are divided in that one, the Liberal Party, espouses the status quo; whereas, the Progressive Party advocates closer association with the United States as a member of the "American Commonwealth."³⁶

The Congress of Micronesia established a Status Commission

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., and The New York Times, news article by Robert Trumbull, "Micronesia: 2,141 Islands Forgotten by U.S.," October 30, 1967.

35. Price, America's Paradise Lost, p. 229. Statement attributed to Amata Kabua, a frequent critic of the United States' record in Micronesia.

36. Ibid., p. 230.

on August 8, 1967, to study "the range of possibilities and alternatives as may be open to Micronesians with respect to their choice of political status."³⁷ The Commission realized that the question of the political status of Micronesia was tied to economic and social conditions and that the political choice should be one that would give the Micronesians the "advantages and benefits of Western culture and civilization, without losing their identity as a people and without sacrificing their more cherished heritage and cultural values."³⁸ The Commission met with United States Congressional subcommittees touring the islands, has retained an Australian political science professor as an advisor, and has studied the political development of Guam, Fiji, Cook Islands, Puerto Rico, Philippines, and Western Samoa.

The Status Commission filed its report in July 1969. Its recommendation is:

that the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be constituted as a self-governing state and that this Micronesian state -- internally self-governing and with Micronesian control of all its branches, including the executive -- negotiate entry into free association with the United States.³⁹

Ten Micronesian political leaders came to Washington for three weeks in October 1969 to consult with the government on this vital issue.

37. Congress of Micronesia, Interim Report of the Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, p. 4.

38. Ibid., p. 10.

39. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, July, 1969.

Over the past two years, and especially over the past year, there has been a rapidly mounting interest among the Micronesians in their political future. High Commissioner William R. Norwood referred to this increasing discussion and debate within the territory in his speech to the Trusteeship Council on May 27, 1968.⁴⁰ During the 1967 Trusteeship Council debate, Representative Salii had stated that Micronesians did not want to exercise their right of self-determination until the people had "acquired a first-hand knowledge of both the benefits and the responsibilities under each of the possible alternatives available."⁴¹ However, Representative Sawaichi, in 1968, reflected the increased tempo of interest when he reported:

Since then [June 1967], events within and without the Trust Territory have seemed to dictate a reevaluation of our position in this regard and an exploration of ways and means to accelerate the time when the political status of Micronesia can be determined.... We are anxious to get on with the job of nationbuilding. I have all the misgivings, however, that unless we renew our efforts and unless we take positive steps to remove the obstacles which lie in the way of self-determination for the people of the Trust Territory, Micronesia may be overtaken by events; then it would be useless, and indeed moot, to talk about a plebiscite or self-determination.

Many of my fellow Micronesians within and without the Congress of Micronesia entertain doubts when one discusses the prospects

40. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (August 26, 1968), Statement of High Commissioner William R. Norwood to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 27, 1968, p. 227.

41. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57 (September 18, 1967), Statement of Mr. Lazarus Salii, Representative, Congress of Micronesia, to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, June 8, 1967, p. 378.

of a plebiscite on status alternatives which seem to be open to Micronesia. The argument they advance most frequently in support of their positions is that of inadequate development of education and of the economy. There seems to be a general consensus that social and economic development must necessarily precede political self-determination.

There are other Micronesians who take the position that political self-determination must be exercised as soon as it is possible to do so in order to assure some measure of political stability and that, having resolved the political question, the problems of economic, social, and educational development can then be easily identified and resolved.... The determination of the future political status of Micronesia presumes a certain degree of economic and social self-sufficiency. The rate in which [presently] planned programs are put into effect will determine when it will be appropriate for Micronesians to decide on their political status. I am hopeful that the end results of our present efforts in the Trust Territory will be such that Micronesians may soon decide on their future political status.⁴²

Some observers feel that this increased interest in rapid political development is due to a desire to pressure the United States to increase and accelerate its economic and social development programs. Such "scare tactics" as the separatist Saipan Legislature's recent notes to the Soviet Union, Nationalist China, Communist China, France, United Kingdom, and Australia requesting statements outlining the advantages of an alliance with them perhaps are a way of "pecking" at the United

42. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (August 26, 1968), Statement of Mr. Jacob Sawaichi, Representative, Congress of Micronesia, to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 27, 1968, p. 233.

States in order to get a reaction.

Perhaps some Micronesians feel that independence might actually be possible with financial and technical assistance obtained by "renting" areas to the United States for bases; areas that are now used freely and that they know the United States will need.

Since 1967, there has been a shift toward more vocational training and an emphasis placed on English language training to provide the Micronesians with a common language. Over seven-hundred Peace Corps Volunteers, more per-capita than in any other country, have been throughout the area since 1967 carrying out these and other programs. These Peace Corps members have had a definite influence on the Micronesians. They have helped by creating a spirit of self-help, self-assurance and political awareness within the communities. They have hurt by urging the inhabitants to demand equal pay as the Americans, spreading wild rumors of impending military base acquisitions, and by submitting petitions to the United Nations concerning the desire of the inhabitants of Bikini and Enewetak to return to their islands.

44

A questionnaire concerning the future political status of the Territory was submitted to juniors and seniors of the high schools in late 1967. Returns were received from all

43. Interview with Mr. Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., March 21, 1969.

44. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET. 10/42, April 30, 1968.

high schools throughout the Trust Territory, except from three parochial schools. Of those responding, 85.9 percent favored closer association with the United States; although there was no clear consensus whether it should become an integral part of the sovereign territory of the United States or should adopt some kind of an autonomous relationship. Additionally, there was no consensus as to the inclusion or non-⁴⁵ inclusion of Guam in the ultimate status of Micronesia.

What of the possibility of a development of a sense of regionalism in Pacific Oceania? Regional cooperation has developed rapidly since the Second World War. Educational facilities such as the University of the South Pacific in Suva, the College of Guam, the University of Papua-New Guinea, the East-West Center in Honolulu, and the colleges of Australia and New Zealand have been opened to many islanders on scholarships and grants. Inter-island transportation and communications facilities have been improved. Of major importance has been the South Pacific Commission with its two auxiliary bodies, the Research Council and the South Pacific Conference. The Commission members are presently the Western powers that have dependencies in Pacific Oceania plus independent Western Samoa. The scope of the Commission covers almost the entire area of⁴⁶ Pacific Oceania. The Commission's projects are non-political

45. Harvey David Melniker, Questionnaire Concerning The Future Political Status of The Trust Territory of The Pacific Islands (Medford, Massachusetts: Department of Political Science, Tufts University, 1968), pp. 16-19.

46. See map in Appendix. The Kingdom of Tonga cooperates with the Commission's projects and has participated in South Pacific conferences and the South Pacific Games.

and concentrate on social, educational, medical, and agricultural projects that lend themselves to regional solutions. The South Pacific Games, started in 1963, are sponsored by the Commission.

Delegates from all of the participating islands meet as the South Pacific Conference, originally every three years and since 1967, every year, to review and recommend regional projects. Politics is not on the agenda but is a topic for conversation. Led by Ratu (Chief) K. T. Mara of Fiji and Mr. Carlos Taitano of Guam, the delegates to the 1965 Conference asked for a stronger voice in deciding and executing the programs of the Commission.⁴⁷ At the 1967 Conference held at Noumea, there were again desires expressed for fuller participation. By agreement of the Commission members, the rules were modified to give the Conference a more important role in the planning and executing of the work program and to provide for annual meetings of the Conference.

As for the future of regionalism in Pacific Oceania, "if the Western powers do the necessary, both in their own territorial programs and internationally, the island territories will grow slowly closer together until they comprise a regional grouping of peoples with a common ecological pattern, but integrated politically with their separate metropolitan countries. No basis exists for a separate nation of Pacifica or for a Pacific Island Federation. There is every sign that the people

47. The New York Times, news article by Tillman Durdin, "Pacific Islanders Chafe At Control," July 13, 1965.

are proud to be Americans, Britishers, Frenchmen, Australians,
and New Zealanders."⁴⁸

The many obstacles of vast distances, different cultures, different languages, separatist tendencies, a lack of a sense of "One Micronesia," a lack of social and economic development, and a desire to retain their own special economic safeguards (especially land titles) and their own cultural heritage, while at the same time desiring mass economic development, appear too great to be overcome/in the relatively near future. The political development of the people has far outstripped their social and economic development. This can only lead to frustration. New problems such as urban blight and the coral reef-destroying "crown of thorns" starfish only add to their dependence on outside assistance.

One observer reported his fears that "there is a real danger that the United States, so sensitive to world opinion and unhappy to be thought a colonialist power, may step out of the islands before the people are prepared to take over."⁴⁹

48. Carlton Skinner, "Self-Government in the South Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42 (October, 1963).

49. Price, America's Paradise Lost, p. 231.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

In the preface, the assumption was made that military considerations should and must be considered in the formulation of foreign policy. This premise appears to have been successfully demonstrated in this particular case.

If the recommendations of the military had not been heard, the original trusteeship concepts and intentions held by the State Department in 1942 and 1943 would probably be seen in the United Nations Charter. They would have been desirable for non-strategic areas; however, these intentions included that of direct administration of the Micronesian islands by an international organization. The present world might have been treated to the spectacle of the United Nations owning and administering not only the former mandated islands but probably other strategic areas as well. The consequences for world peace would have been disastrous in light of the actual development of the United Nations and the Cold War.

The Soviet Union would have been able to block any undesired Security Council action in respect to the trusteeships. The growth of the number of non-aligned nations and mini-states in the General Assembly, the rise to power of the anti-west Committee of 24 in respect to dependent areas, the decrease in power of the balanced (between administering and non-administering states) Trusteeship Council, and the general emphasis within

the United Nations on rapid de-colonialization [GA Res. 1514 (XV)] would have led, in all likelihood, to chaos in respect to any internationally administered trust territory. Condominium governments are difficult enough as seen in the New Hebrides where Great Britain and France govern in remarkable inefficiency. Imagine the efficiency of a government controlled by more than one-hundred states. Not only world security, but also the inhabitants' welfare would have been adversely affected.

The welfare of the Micronesians would have suffered under international administration, especially by an organ of the United Nations as that institution has evolved. On the other hand, Micronesian welfare has suffered under United States trusteeship administration. This author believes their welfare could have been advanced far more if the islands had been annexed by the United States. As a trust territory, the islands are neither fish nor fowl. They are neither "foreign" territory nor "American" territory in respect to American laws as well as American interest. For example, import-export duties are exacted for all materials going between the islands and the United States, thus, hindering the islands' development. Psychologically, there has been a lack of attention placed on the islands' economic development since their future political status is unknown. Only with the advent of the Nixon administration have the Micronesians been implicitly told that the United States desires closer association with them in the future.

The lack of attention paid to the islands during the 1950's earned for them the nickname, "Rust Territory." The "zoo" theory

accepted then was that the "paradise" should be held in "trust" just as it was received until the natives' educational and political development had advanced to the degree that they could make the decision whether or not they desired economic and social development. Only since the beginning of the Kennedy Administration--led by the demands of the politically educated Micronesians--has the "zoo" theory been discarded. Annexation would have solved the question of the future political status, permitted American investment, eliminated trade barriers, and eliminated the "zoo" theory from the very beginning of American administration.

Flowing from the premise that military considerations must be taken into account in formulating foreign policy is the further premise that the military establishment must, therefore, be represented at the working-level by means of formal liaison committees as well as by informal consultations. Such arrangements were lacking at the commencement of this issue in 1942. This issue helped create an awareness of the need for such coordination which, in turn, led to the establishment of the first permanent liaison committee (SWNCC).

The "civilian mind" and the "military mind" both have attributes that are of value. These attributes and points of view have something to contribute to the formulation of any foreign policy decision bearing on national security. Hopefully, they can be complimentary. In this case study, it appears they were not; but in the crucible of their conflict, a solution was obtained that was marginally acceptable to both.

As with many other conflict resolutions, the debate did not stop with the "final" Presidential decision. The issue was still alive as recently as 1962 when the Saipan District was turned back to the Interior Department. Indeed, as late as 1966, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs circulated a paper "for clearance" to the Pentagon and the Peace Corps for six months before confronting the Interior Department. This paper recommended that the State Department assume responsibility for administering the Trust Territory.¹ Since Congress has yet to pass any organic act for the Territory and has given the President authority over the "civil government" of the islands, the President has the power to transfer Administration agencies by Executive Order.

Mr. Philip W. Quigg suggested that the White House directly administer the Trust Territory in an April 1969 article.² The navy moved back into the islands in June 1969 with two Seabee teams (thirteen men each) assigned to Truk and Ponape. In early 1969, the Interior Department had asked the Department of Defense "to assign [Seabee] teams to the Trust Territories (sic) in an effort to develop a trained core

1. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Territories In Mid-Century," paper presented at the Conference on the History of the Territories, National Archives and Research Service, Washington, D. C., November 3-4, 1969, unpublished, pp. 59-60.

2. Philip W. Quigg, "Coming of Age In Micronesia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April, 1969), pp. 504-505.

of permanent residents capable of carrying on self-improvement programs." ³ The Army controls the island of Kwajalein as a closely-guarded missile base. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps toured the islands during 1969 with a view toward selecting possible future training sites. The issue of the proper administrative agency for the islands has, therefore, not died completely.

The "civilian" side of the decision-making process appears to have been sincerely motivated. The "one worlders" did, in fact, believe that the only possibility for world peace after World War II would be by great-power collaboration. They also believed in self-determination for all peoples. However, self-determination was not at issue in regard to the mandated Pacific islands. All participants in the controversy agreed that the Micronesians would not be ready for any form of political self-determination for the foreseeable future. Most estimates, if given at all, were in terms of one-hundred years. In fact, there is a disturbing lack of consideration by any of the participants for the interests of the Micronesians. There is no mention in any of the documents of a desire to consult with any Micronesians, consider Micronesian interests, or to guarantee eventual self-government to them. The "military" concentrated on the security aspects. ⁴ The "civilians" had two objectives in mind: (1) to develop a trusteeship system guaranteeing

3. Navy Times, March 11, 1970.

4. In this sense, "military" includes the Service Secretaries, Stimson and Forrestal.

eventual self-government to all dependent peoples and to encourage the colonial powers to place their colonies within that system; and (2) to set an example for hopeful emulation by the other powers of: (a) no territorial aggrandizement as a result of the war (with the Soviet Union particularly in mind), (b) faith in and support for the new international organization, and (c) placing of dependent territories within the trusteeship system.

To achieve these political objectives, the "civilians" strongly believed that the former Japanese mandated islands should be included within the proposed trusteeship system. The welfare of the Micronesians had nothing to do with that belief. In this respect, the islands were a "tool" to be utilized in obtaining essentially non-related political objectives. Only as a by-product, in an off-hand manner, was the Micronesian's welfare enhanced.

The premise that post-war, great-power collaboration was essential for world peace underlay all of the State Department post-war planning. Alternative contingency plans were never considered by the State Department. The military were more pragmatic in following the balance-of-power premise. They believed that post-war, great-power collaboration was neither probable nor essential to world peace (as it has been shown) and that security measures should, therefore, be taken to place the United States in a favorable balance-of-power position. Additionally, with the recent experience of Germany in mind, protective steps had to be taken to prevent any post-war

resurgence of Japanese power in the Pacific. The islands were strategically important in a negative sense--that of denial to any potential enemy. Sea lanes to Guam, China, the Philippines, and to Australia had to be secure. The Pacific war being fought concurrently with the inter-departmental debate had a great impact on the military's position. Admiral King expressed his feelings as "how long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of fighting and building and winning and giving away, only to fight and build and win and give away again?"⁵ It appeared senseless, to the military, to make arrangements to give away strategic islands to an unproven international organization when American men were, at that very moment, dying to capture them. The military felt that the Soviet Union would annex territory based on her own national interest and not be dissuaded by any American example.

In fact, the President had even made an agreement at Yalta to support the Soviet Union in the Soviet annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. This action by President Roosevelt contravened all of his grand announcements of "no territorial aggrandizement." Certainly no example was set for the Russians when they saw that the United States, while publically professing non-aggrandizement, condoned aggrandizement by the Russians.

By October 1946, the cold war had started and the Soviet

5. Army and Navy Journal, Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945), p. 987. Also: The New York Times, April 5, 1945; and U. S. Congressional Record Appendix, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. A1660 and A1706.

Union had already annexed Bessarabia, eastern Poland, and part of Czechoslovakia. What could Secretary Byrnes have meant at the October 22, 1946, conference when he said he did not want to set any precedent for other great powers to annex what they felt was important to their security? The Soviet Union had already done so. The cold war was already well underway. Britain had no designs of acquiring territory. France was trying to re-establish herself in Indochina but had neither the power nor the intentions of annexing any new territory.

Throughout all of this issue is the lack of reality by many policy makers, an idealism of one peaceful world after the war, and a "blind" faith in the ability of the proposed international organization to handle everything. As Ambassador Hickerson said in an interview on June 19, 1969, the atmosphere in the State Department in 1945 and 1946 was one of "bring the boys home" and "let the U.N. do it."

Another conclusion is the inadvisability of making grand, eloquent, all-inclusive statements for propaganda purposes. The "non-aggrandizement" statements removed all options and hindered President Roosevelt in his negotiations with the Allies. He had given away a convenient quid pro quo for any diplomatic deals. President Truman started being deliberately ambiguous in his public statements on this issue. The reasons for this are unknown. Perhaps Secretary Forrestal urged him to do so; although, President Truman "was not easily urged." Perhaps President Truman felt he did not have a clear grasp on the issue and declined to paint himself into a corner. He had many issues of greater

immediate importance on the "front burners" during 1945 and 1946 to have the time to consider effectively this issue. Once the approaching United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York moved the problem to a "front burner," a Presidential decision was clearly and unequivocally made.

The propaganda value of President Roosevelt's "non-aggrandizement" statements cannot be accurately measured, but they probably had little, or no, real effect. In any case, any such value did not outweigh the disadvantages of foreclosing options.

The administrative style of President Roosevelt, as demonstrated in this issue, left something to be desired. The President probably benefited from his style prior to the war; but once war came, a one-man show with encouraged inter-departmental feuding could no longer be afforded. Indeed, the burdens placed upon the President by his own style of leadership, more than likely, were the cause of his death.

Secretary Stimson's conclusions about the President's style and a possible improvement on the war-time administration are worthy of quoting extensively:

After the war.... Stimson was reinforced in his wartime belief that Mr. Roosevelt's personal virtuosity in high politics carried with it certain disadvantages which might have been limited if the President had been willing to provide himself with a War Cabinet for the co-ordinated execution of his policies -- a body which might have done in war diplomacy what the Joint Chiefs of Staff did in military strategy.

Problems like those of China and France [could add the disposition of the former Japanese mandated islands] were not merely diplomatic -- the State Department could not and would not assume the whole labor of determining policy in areas where the military interest

was so significant. Yet the military interest could not of itself be wholly determinant; it was not proper that such questions should be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the members of that body well understood.

Mr. Roosevelt therefore could not rely on his regularly constituted advisers -- military or diplomatic -- for final recommendation and co-ordinated execution in problems of war diplomacy. Nor were his regular Cabinet meetings a suitable place for such discussion and decision; there were nearly twenty men in Cabinet meetings, and during the war they became a formality....

The proper solution, Stimson believed, would have been for Mr. Roosevelt to provide himself with a War Cabinet like that upon which Winston Churchill relied in Great Britain. Cabinet responsibility of course is not the same in the United States as in Great Britain, but Stimson felt that Mr. Roosevelt would have found it helpful to have some such body.... Such a body would have included his most trusted personal adviser, Harry Hopkins, and perhaps the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, organized like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a secretariat of top quality and a continuing record of policy decisions made or approved by the President.... Stimson would never have desired that the President's personal initiative and extraordinary talent should be limited by red tape, but he felt sure that such a body would have been a reinforcement to Mr. Roosevelt's less evident abilities as a co-ordinator and executive. Unfortunately the whole idea was foreign to the President's nature; only reluctantly had he accepted the notion of such an organization even in the purely military field, and he never showed the least disposition to alter his methods in diplomacy....

Mr. Roosevelt's policy was so often either unknown or not clear to those who had to execute it, and worse yet, in some cases it seemed self-contradictory....

In summary, then, Stimson's experience of the diplomacy of coalition warfare in World War II left him with this conclusion: Franklin Roosevelt as a wartime international leader proved himself as good as one man could be -- but one man was not enough to keep track of so vast an undertaking.⁶

6. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 561-564.

Much needless time and effort was spent on the problem of the disposition of the islands. It should have been decided quickly and decisively. Instead, thanks to the President's style of leadership and, perhaps, also to his health, the issue dragged on for five years; bitterness developed between State, Interior, and Navy personnel; and the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter were weakened to a point of virtual uselessness. As described in the preface, the United Nations trusteeship system has failed to be universally accepted by both administering powers and the Third World because, in large part, of watering down the provisions, first regular and then strategic, in order to include the Micronesian islands.

The Admirals' decisions to take the issue to the public and to their sympathizers in Congress in April 1945 may be considered by some to have been beyond the limits of responsible military professionalism. This issue is often debated in the theoretics of military professionalism, politico-military relations in a democracy, and the proper role of the military in the formulation of foreign policy. However, under the American constitutional system, the legislative branch must have access to information and testimony from the military leaders. This right has been insisted upon by Congress and it has been successfully protected.

Furthermore, the Admirals spoke out in the absence of any policy decision. This is an entirely different matter than speaking out after a policy decision has been made by the responsible civilian officials. Another distinction is that the

issue being discussed was not a partisan political issue.

The public certainly has a right to know the facts, unless the interests of national security dictate otherwise. In this case, all of the interested foreign governments (especially the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia) were officially notified by the State Department that this policy debate was occurring, and for that reason, no American trusteeship paper would be ready for discussion. This occurred at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and, prior, to the San Francisco Conference. National security interests certainly did not dictate withholding this issue from public debate. In fact, public speculation and debate over the disposition of the islands did occur prior to the Admirals' actions in the Spring of 1945. A more reasoned Congressional and public debate could have been developed as an aid in formulating the policy as well as preparing the public for the probable outcome. Instead, the debates were often based on speculation and steeped in polemics.

Another conclusion from this case study is that the Service Secretaries during this period were effectively out of touch with what was happening on this issue. Not until the Spring of 1945, when SWNCC and the Three Secretaries Meetings were effectively in operation, did Forrestal see a trusteeship plan; and, then, he could not believe that it was serious document. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were thrust into the decision-making arena by President Roosevelt and not by any particular desire of their own. Civilian control and influence by the Service Secretaries on this issue, as well as on

most matters of strategy, was virtually non-existent until after the death of President Roosevelt.

The question of national policies, military policies, foreign policies, and priorities must be evaluated. Admiral King, in a speech on December 6, 1946, clearly stated the national policies of that time which, in fact, are still valid:

It is to be remembered that the Navy does not formulate national policies; the business of the Navy is to support national policies. Under our democratic form of government, national policies are, in fact, the expression of the will of the people, as formulated in the Congress and effectuated by the President. The basic purpose for maintaining United States armed forces is to provide for our security and to uphold and advance our national foreign policies.

The major national foreign policies, from which our military policies derive, appear to be, as nearly as we can now determine: (a) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the United States, its territories, possessions, leased areas, and trustee territories. (b) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty or political independence of other American states, and regional collaboration with them in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. (c) Maintenance of the territorial integrity, security and the political independence of the Philippine Islands. (d) Participation in, and full support of, the United Nations. (e) Enforcement, in collaboration with our Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated enemy states. (f) Maintenance of the United States in the best possible relative position with respect to potential enemy powers, ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States at home.

These policies in the aggregate are directed toward the maintenance of world peace, under conditions which insure the security, well-being and advancement of our country - and so of the entire world.

The tasks of the Navy, both in war and peace, stem from the national policies. My overriding concern is that the United States will have, and henceforth, a Navy competent to carry out these tasks.⁷

The above statement compares well with Forrestal's quotation on the front-piece: If the United States is to have international responsibilities and such national foreign policies, then she must also have the power with which to carry them out. With these national policies set, it is then the responsibility of the military to make recommendations as to how best to achieve them. Foreign policy and military policy must fall within the framework of the national policies.

This is where the coordination between the military and foreign policies comes into the picture. This is where the military must participate in the formulation of foreign policies that have military implications.

Point four of Admiral King's speech: (d) Participation in, and full support of, the United Nations was and is a national policy. But here the matter of priorities is involved. If the islands were given to the United Nations to administer directly, the national policies of points (a), (c), (e) and (f) above, would have been adversely affected. Furthermore, the cause of the United Nations would probably have been also hurt because of the instability of the area and the mismanagement of the islands that would most likely have followed. Maintaining world peace and security is a large part of the United Nations'

7. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, King Papers, Speech to Aircraft Club, Detroit, Michigan, December 6, 1946.

goals, perhaps even larger than the principle of trusteeship and the goal of self-determination for all peoples.

The question of priorities had to be considered by the American decision-makers. Was Byrnes right when he felt that setting an example and supporting the United Nations' trusteeship provisions was of higher priority than the other national goals listed in Admiral King's speech? Perhaps he sincerely believed that the proposed strategic trusteeship agreement would provide for the other national policies, and that the United States could advance all of them by offering the islands under those terms. Truman's memoirs seem to indicate that he felt that way.

Since that decision, the United States has maintained its military rights and position in the islands; but the future status of the islands is uncertain. The Committee of 24 in the United Nations continues to urge the inhabitants to state a desire for independence. Most of the inhabitants wish to maintain their ties with the United States, yet, are becoming disturbed over the lack of development and attention.

Strategically, the islands are still of vast importance even in this nuclear age of inter-continental ballistic missiles. As in 1945, the main strategic value of them to the United States is in their denial to any potential enemy. Over ninety-eight percent of all material sent to South Viet-Nam goes by ship. If the United States is to remain a Pacific power, the sea lanes must be controlled. Also of strategic importance is their value in the positive sense--that of providing training

bases and staging areas for American armed forces. After the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, many, if not most, of the military establishments on that island (as well as those to be closed in Japan proper) will have to find new locations in the Western Pacific. Guam is already saturated with military installations. American commitments to South Korea, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines will continue under the Nixon Doctrine; and American military installations in the Western Pacific will, therefore, still be required.

The emergence of nationalism among many Asian and African peoples has been coupled with national aspirations for political independence and neutrality vis-a-vis the big-power blocs. It is, therefore, advisable to consider Micronesia's emerging, incipient sense of nationalism and national aspirations in order to arrive at practical policies whereby the United States can help, guide and influence these aspirations in order to achieve an eventual political outcome truly in the best interests of both the Micronesians and the United States.

Nationalism has various definitions, with Hans Kohn's definition being the classic example:


Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare.⁸

8. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1944), p. 16.

Does an emergence of nationalism necessarily result in a demand for a politically independent nation-state, or can a sense of nationality be satisfied and compatible with only local autonomy and local self-government? What if a nationality evolves having a sense of nationalism; yet, realizing that political independence is impossible or impracticable due to a lack of natural resources, population, education or a modern economy? What political aspirations develop when the political development of a people outreaches their economic, social and educational development? All these questions pertain particularly to Micronesia.

The politically-aware people in Micronesia are looking at Asia and Africa and asking themselves the following questions. Is the preferred government really independence no matter how bad it might be? Which is better: economic growth, personal liberties, governmental stability but without political independence; or a stagnant economy, restricted personal liberties, governmental instability but with political independence? Should the old culture and social system be preserved at the expense of rapid economic development?

The Micronesian answers to these questions are vitally important not only for the Micronesians, but, also, for the United States.



TRUST TERRITORY of the PACIFIC ISLANDS

MARIANA, CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLANDS
TOTAL ISLAND POPULATION ----- 80,980
97 INHABITED ATOLLS AND SEPARATE ISLANDS
OCEAN AREA APPROX. 3,000,000 SQ. MILES
LAND AREA ----- 700 SQ MILES
2,141 ISLANDS

GRAPHIC SCALE
10 8 6 4 2 0
NAUTICAL MILES
SYMBOLS

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR
UNINHABITED
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR'S RES.
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER



MARIANA ISLANDS DISTRICT
POPULATION ----- 9,586
AREA ----- 163.50 SQ. MI.

MARSHALL ISLANDS DISTRICT
POPULATION ----- 15,710
AREA ----- 69.84 SQ. MI.


YAP DISTRICT
POPULATION ----- 5,931
AREA ----- 65.89 SQ. MI.

PALAU DISTRICT
POPULATION ----- 9,985
AREA ----- 179.35 SQ. MI.


TRUK DISTRICT
POPULATION ----- 22,364
AREA ----- 45.74 SQ. MI.

PONAPE DISTRICT
POPULATION ----- 17,224
AREA ----- 175.66 SQ. MI.

APPROVED *M. H. Goring*
HIGH COMMISSIONER
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC IS.
DATE JULY 1, 1962



Racial Boundaries
in the
South Pacific



DRAFT

STATE DEPARTMENT

~~SECRET~~file
April 2, 1945MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At a meeting on April 2 the Secretaries of State, War and Navy agreed that it was not possible to arrive at agreement with respect to any satisfactory draft paper on the subject of trusteeship with a view of presentation for discussion of the subject with sponsoring powers before the San Francisco Conference. The Secretaries of War and Navy feel strongly that the position of this Government with respect to the necessity for retaining complete control over certain strategic areas in the Pacific should be made known unequivocally to the nations of the world before any discussion even of machinery or principles with respect to a trusteeship system could be entered into. This position was based upon the following considerations:

The United States has always been the champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific Ocean. This war has been fought and is being fought in that cause against the aggressions of Japan who sought to enslave in her empire the Western and South Western Pacific. Our country is now liberating that ocean from this attack, not only for our own interests, but for the interests of all peace loving nations who are situated or have interest in the Pacific. In this cause, with great loss of American lives and expenditure of American treasure, we have taken from Japan and now have possession of certain islands and atolls and still more will shortly be in our hands.

Strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and atolls are vital to any effective military guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Harbor and air fields are as much an integral part of necessary military power as war ships and planes. In order to discharge its responsibilities as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights. The United States policy will be to hold any reserved strategic rights in the interests of the same cause for which we are now fighting -- the cause of international peace and freedom in the Pacific, a cause in which all law-abiding nations in that area have a vital interest.

As you recall, agreement was reached at Yalta that a discussion of a trusteeship system at the San Francisco Conference would be limited to an exchange of views as to principles and machinery for dealing with the trusteeship question; that the territories which might be included in such a system should be restricted to certain categories and that there should be no discussion of specific territories or areas either

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at the San Francisco Conference or in the consultations previous to that conference. Preparations for proposals as to a trusteeship system for discussion at the San Francisco Conference were to be conducted in consultation with the other sponsors and the provisional government of France.

I now find it necessary to recommend that the representatives of the other sponsors and the provisional government of France enter into the discussions and consultations already arranged to take place in Washington. When the consultations have begun I feel that we should then inform them that the state of our preparations has not advanced to the point where we are ready to present any definite ideas as to machinery and procedures for a trusteeship system and that we feel that it would very likely not be possible for us to develop this question sufficiently before the opening date of the San Francisco Conference to have agreed proposals ready to lay before that Conference for consideration. We feel that in the event that the agreed proposals have not been arrived at it would be advisable for the nations convened at the Conference to agree that the study and development of this whole question of a trusteeship system should be made one of the first questions to be considered by the proposed United Nations Organization.

Mr. Forrestal

The indicated paragraphs have been added to the State Department draft of the Memorandum to the President.

Respectfully,

Mathias F. Correa
Mathias F. Correa

*These are from Bundy's
draft declaration of policy*

WCC

MR. FORRESTAL

THE SECRETARY

Mr. Secy.

This is a memorandum
our meeting at State
Dept. today.

Page 7

note.

17 April 1945

MR. DUFFIELD
MAJOR CORREA

Make a tickler on the first
paragraph of page 2 --
I want to raise that question
again in about two or three
weeks.

J.F.

TO:

Mr. Forrestal

You asked to be reminded to raise the
question again on the first paragraph
of page 2.

Respectfully,

Mathias F. Correa

MR. FORRESTAL

MR. FORRESTAL.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

16 April 1945

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BY

DATE

This afternoon there was a conference at the State Department. The following were present:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. - Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson - Secretary of War
James Forrestal - Secretary of the Navy
Joseph C. Grew - Under Secretary of State
James C. Dunn - Assistant Secretary of State
Harvey H. Bundy - Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
Dr. Leo Pasvolsky - Special Assistant to Secretary of State
G. Hayden Raynor - Special Assistant to Secretary of State
Mathias F. Correa, Major, USMCR - Special Assistant to the Secretary of Navy.

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At the outset of the meeting it was agreed that there would be no postponement of the discussion of international trusteeships scheduled to take place at the San Francisco Conference.

Next discussed was the question of whether or not the declaration of policy, which is annexed to draft letter of Secretary of State and Secretary of War to the President dated 13 April 1945, should be promulgated at this time as representing the stand of the United States on this question.

Mr. Stettinius urged that it ought not be at this time because of the effect it would have on the other nations participating in the conference. Mr. Stimson indicated that he was inclined to agree with this. It was finally agreed that the declaration of policy would not be put forth at this time but at some future date such a declaration would be promulgated.

A discussion was then had concerning the State Departments proposed alternate statement. It was agreed that such a statement should be promulgated after it had been approved by the President. Considerable discussion was had of the specific language which would be included in such a statement and a draft was finally agreed upon. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Dunn were delegated to set this draft up in proper form for presentation to the President as the recommendation of the State, War and the Navy for his approval. It was not agreed as to how the statement should be promulgated. A suggestion was made that it should be put out in answer to a "planted" question at the press conference of the Secretary of State.

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The Secretary of the Navy asked the Secretary of State whether or not in the view of the Secretary of State it would embarrass him if the Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the President the expression of their views contained in the draft joint letter of 13 April 1945. The Secretary of State replied that it would at this time and asked that the sending of such a statement be deferred "for a few days." The implication of his statement, although it was not entirely clear, was that he did not wish such a statement to go forward to the President until the San Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it was well under way. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that they acquiesced in his request.

The question was raised as to whether or not the draft on the chapter of trusteeships be proposed by the United States at the San Francisco Conference would include language which would make it clear that the United States by agreeing to the draft or by proposing it did not commit itself to place under trusteeship arrangements any particular territories and that this would be a matter of subsequent agreement.

It was agreed by all present that there would be included in Title I, Section B 1. of the State Department draft, the following language: "It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which specific territories within the foregoing categories should be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms."

The Secretary of the Navy raised the question as to whether or not the United States draft of the chapter on trusteeships should include provisions similar to those contained in the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy revision of the State Department draft which would place the initial negotiation of trusteeship arrangements with respect to strategic areas in the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. The Secretary of War indicated that he concurred in the Secretary of the Navy's view that initial negotiations for trusteeship arrangements be made with the Security Council. Dr. Pasvolksy indicated dissent - stated that in his view all negotiations should be had with the General Assembly, but finally it was agreed that the negotiations of the original trusteeship arrangements with respect to strategic areas should be made with the Security Council rather than the General Assembly, that any alterations of such trusteeship arrangements should not be made without the concurrence of the Security Council but that other arrangements concerning strategic areas which had to do solely with welfare could be negotiated with the General Assembly.

Mathias F. Correa

~~S.E.C.R.E.T~~

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[Draft for statement of United States policy prepared by Mr. Henry H. Bundy]

HHB #2 - 4/16/45.

DECLARATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.

The Conference of the United Nations will soon commence at San Francisco. During this conference a possible system of international trusteeships will be discussed and it is of great importance that this country clearly understand the nature of these discussions. It is not proposed at San Francisco to determine the placing of any particular territory under a trusteeship system. All that will be discussed there will be the possible machinery of such a system.

In entering upon these discussions, the United States Government desires to make clear its attitude with respect to certain areas and to recall certain facts of history. The United States has always been the champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific Ocean area. This war has been fought and is being fought in that cause against the aggressions of Japan who sought to enslave in their empire the Western and Southwestern Pacific. Our country is now liberating that Ocean from this attack, not only for ourselves but for the interests of all peaceful nations who are situated or have interests in the Pacific. In this cause, with great loss of American lives and expenditure of American treasure, we have taken from Japan and now have possession of

certain islands and atolls and still more will shortly be in our hands.

The United States does not seek annexation of territory or economic wealth but strategic rights in a certain number of these islands and atolls are vital to any effective military guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Harbors and airfields are as much an integral part of necessary military power as war ships or planes. In order to discharge its responsibility as a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights and such rights will involve complete control in the case of certain atolls in the Pacific. The United States policy will be to hold any such reserved strategic rights in the interests of the same cause for which we are now fighting -- the cause of international peace and freedom in the Pacific, a cause in which all law-abiding nations in that area have a vital interest.

It will not be the policy of the United States to hold any strategic rights for selfish advantage and the United States will cooperate with the United Nations through such arrangements as may be appropriate to assure the economic and social advancement of the inhabitants of these territories, many of which are very sparsely populated and contain little or nothing of economic value.

The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable under a trusteeship system to provide, by agreements, for the maintenance of such United States military and strategic rights and control as will be necessary to assure peace and security in the Pacific Ocean or elsewhere in the world.

TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMER JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS

Draft proposed by the United States on 17 February 1947, with changes made by the Security Council, when it approved the agreement on 2 April 1947. Words added by the Council are in italics; omitted words are in brackets. Adapted from SCOR, II, Supp. 3; 3 UN Treaty Series, p. 190.

Whereas Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations provides for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent agreements; and

Whereas under Article 77 of the said Charter the trusteeship system may be applied to territories now held under mandate; and

Whereas on 17 December 1920 the Council of the League of Nations confirmed a mandate for the former German islands north of the equator to Japan, to be administered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

Whereas Japan, as a result of the Second World War, has ceased to exercise any authority in these islands;

Now therefore, the Security Council of the United Nations, having satisfied itself that the relevant Articles of the Charter have been complied with, hereby resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for the Pacific islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

ARTICLE 1. The territory of the Pacific islands, consisting of the islands formerly held by Japan under mandate in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is hereby designated as a strategic area and placed under the trusteeship system established in the Charter of the United Nations. The territory of the Pacific islands is hereinafter referred to as the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 2. The United States of America is designated as the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 3. The Administering Authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of this Agreement [as an integral part of the United States], and may apply to the Trust Territory, subject to any modifications which the Administering Authority may consider desirable, such of the laws of the United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and requirements.

ARTICLE 4. The Administering Authority, in discharging the obligations of trusteeship in the Trust Territory, shall act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of this Agreement, and shall, as specified in Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Charter, apply the objectives of the international trusteeship system, as set forth in Article 76 of the Charter, to the people of the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 5. In discharging its obligations under Article 76a and Article 84 of the Charter, the Administering Authority shall ensure that the Trust Territory shall play its part, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the Administering Authority shall be entitled:

- 2 -

1. To establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications in the Trust Territory;
2. To station and employ armed forces in the Territory; and
3. To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the Trust Territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the Administering Authority, as well as for the local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 6. In discharging its obligations under Article 76b of the Charter, the Administering Authority shall:

1. Foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory, and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end shall give to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the Territory; shall develop their participation in [local] government; shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the Territory; and shall take other appropriate measures towards these ends;

2. Promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture, and industries; protect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources; and improve the means of transportation and communication;

3. Promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population without discrimination; protect the health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in arms and ammunition, opium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other spirituous beverages; and institute such other regulations as may be necessary to protect the inhabitants against social abuses; and

4. Promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall take steps toward the establishment of a general system of elementary education; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population; and shall encourage qualified students to pursue higher education, including training on the professional level.

ARTICLE 7. [In discharging its obligations under Article 76c of the Charter, the Administering Authority, subject only to the requirements of public order and security, shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; freedom of conscience, of worship, and of religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.]

In discharging its obligations under Article 76c of the Charter, the Administering Authority shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory freedom of conscience, and, subject only to the requirements of public order and security, freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly; freedom of worship and of religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.

- 3 -

ARTICLE 8.-1. In discharging its obligations under Article 76d of the Charter, as defined by Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the Administering Authority, subject to the requirements of security and the obligation to promote the advancement of the inhabitants, shall accord to nationals of each Member of the United Nations and to companies and associations organized in conformity with the laws of such Members, treatment in the Trust Territory no less favourable than that accorded therein to nationals, companies and associations of any other United Nation except the Administering Authority.

2. The Administering Authority shall ensure equal treatment to the Members of the United Nations and their nationals in the administration of justice.

3. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to accord traffic rights to aircraft flying into and out of the Trust Territory. Such rights shall be subject to agreement between the Administering Authority and the State whose nationality such aircraft possesses.

4. The Administering Authority may negotiate and conclude commercial and other treaties and agreements with Members of the United Nations and other States, designed to attain for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory treatment by the Members of the United Nations and other States no less favourable than that granted by them to the nationals of other States. The Security Council may recommend, or invite other organs of the United Nations to consider and recommend, what rights the inhabitants of the Trust Territory should acquire in consideration of the rights obtained by Members of the United Nations in the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 9. The Administering Authority shall be entitled to constitute the Trust Territory into a customs, fiscal, or administrative union or federation with other territories under United States jurisdiction and to establish common services between such territories and the Trust Territory where such measures are not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system and with the terms of this agreement.

ARTICLE 10. The Administering Authority, acting under the provisions of Article 3 of this Agreement, may accept membership in any regional advisory commission, regional authority, or technical organization, or other voluntary association of States, may co-operate with specialized international bodies, public or private, and may engage in other forms of international co-operation.

ARTICLE 11.-1. The Administering Authority shall take the necessary steps to provide the status of citizenship of the Trust Territory for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

2. The Administering Authority shall afford diplomatic and consular protection to inhabitants of the Trust Territory when outside the territorial limits of the Trust Territory or of the Territory of the Administering Authority.

ARTICLE 12. The Administering Authority shall enact such legislation as may be necessary to place the provisions of this Agreement in effect in the Trust Territory.

- 4 -

ARTICLE 13. The provisions of Articles 37 and 38 of the Charter shall be applicable to the Trust Territory, provided that the Administering Authority may determine the extent of their applicability to any areas which may from time to time be specified by it as closed for security reasons.

ARTICLE 14. The Administering Authority undertakes to apply in the Trust Territory the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and which would be conducive to the achievement of the basic objectives of article 6 of this agreement.

ARTICLE 15. The terms of the present Agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority.

ARTICLE 16. The present Agreement shall come into force when approved by the Security Council of the United Nations and by the Government of the United States after due constitutional process.

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